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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) (as amended 1953), and 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b). This is an Appeal from 
the Final Order of the District Court for the Third Judicial 
District, Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, certified 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) granting LTIC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against TFSL. The Final Order was 
entered on September 6, 1988 and TFSL filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal on October 5, 1988. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Are there genuine i s s u e s of material fac t related to 
Lawyers T i t l e Insurance Corporat ions l i a b i l i t y to Tower Federal 
Savings and Loan Associat ion which precluded the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Lawyers T i t l e Insurance Corporation? 
2. Did Lawyers T i t l e Insurance Corporation have a duty 
t o d i s c l o s e t o Tower Federal Savings and Loan a l l record t i t l e 
information? 
3. Did Tower Federal Savings and Loan reasonably rely on 
Lawyers T i t l e Insurance Corporation's t i t l e report? 
4. I s the assert ion of a separate cause of action 
against an abstractor of t i t l e for the precontractual fa i lure to 
accurately examine and report the s t a t e of t i t l e precluded by Beck 
v. Farjnqrs
 T n s ? Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)? 
5. Does Beck preclude the assert ion of a separate t o r t 
claim for fraud or neg l igent misrepresentation which arose prior to 
and induced entry into a contractual re lat ionship ( issuance of a 
t i t l e policy) without the maintenance of a concurrent breach of 
contract action? 
6. Does the record demonstrate prima fac ie breach of 
contract claims by Tower Federal Savings and Loan against Lawyers 
Ti t le Insurance Corporation su f f i c i en t to withstand summary 
judgment? 
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7. Did First Security Bank's foreclosure of i t s Deed of 
Trust extinguish Tower Federal Savings and Loan's claims against 
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation for negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of contract and/or breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Proceedings 
1. Gulp Construction Company commenced t h i s l i t i g a t i o n 
by f i l i n g a Complaint for Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure on or about 
September 3, 1985. R. 2-24. 
2. Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership 
("Buildmart Mall") defaulted on i t s ob l igat ions under certain 
Industr ia l Development Revenue Bonds ("IRBs") and a loan from Tower 
Federal Savings and Loan (MTFSLM). F irs t Security Bank, Trustee 
and Beneficiary of the IRB loan, in i t i a t ed a nonjudicial 
forec losure proceeding against the re ta i l shopping mall and a mall 
warehouse d i s tr ibut ion center ("Project") developed by Buildmart 
Mall# and, on March 16, 1987, purchased the property at Trustee's 
sa le for $6,200,000.00. R. 5014-5033. 
3. On or about August 17, 1987, TFSL f i l ed and served 
i t s Second Amended Crossclaim# which included claims against 
Lawyers T i t l e Insurance Corporation ("LTIC") for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and neg l igent misrepresentation. R. 5826-5832. 
4. On October 6, 1987, LTIC f i led a Motion to Dismiss 
TFSL's Second Amended Crossclaim as i t related to LTIC. R. 
6365-6367. 
5. On December 14, 1987, Judge Uno conducted a hearing 
on LTIC's Motion t o Dismiss and TFSL's response thereto . R. 6928. 
6. On December 28, 1987, Judge Uno entered an Order 
granting LTIC's Motion to Dismiss TFSL's Second Amended Crossclaim, 
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thereby dismiss ing the claims asserted by TFSL against LTIC. R. 
6939-6940. 
7. On January 15, 1988, TFSL f i l ed a Motion t o Amend i t s 
Second Amended Crossclaim. R. 6965-6968. 
8. On February 11, 1988, Judge Uno granted TFSL's Motion 
t o Amend i t s Second Amended Crossclaim. R. 7052-7054. 
9. On or about February 11, 1988, TFSL f i l ed i t s Third 
Amended Crossclaim which asserted claims against LTIC for breach of 
contract , neg l igent misrepresentation and breach of the duty of 
good fa i th and fa i r deal ing. EXHIBIT A - Tower Federal Savings and 
Loan Assoc iat ion's Third Amended Crossclaim, R. 7036-7044. 
10. On February 19, 1988, LTIC f i l ed i t s Answer t o TFSL's 
Third Amended Crossclaim. EXHIBIT B - Lawyers T i t l e Insurance 
Corporation's Answer t o Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Associat ion's Third Amended Crossclaim, R. 7067-7076. 
11. On June 15, 1988, LTIC f i l ed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment with respect to TFSL's Third Amended Crossclaim. R. 
8558-8561. 
12. On June 30, 1988, TFSL f i l ed a Memorandum in 
Opposition t o LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 8977-8988. 
13. On July 11, 1988, LTIC f i l ed a Reply Memorandum in 
support of i t s Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 9047-9055. 
14. On July 15, 1988, Judge Uno heard argument of LTIC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against TFSL. 
15. By Memorandum Decision dated August 4, 1988, Judge 
Uno granted LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment. EXHIBIT C -
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Memorandum Decision on Lawyers Ti t l e Insurance Corporation's Motion 
for Summary Judgment Against Tower Federal Savings and Loan# R„ 
9315-9330. 
16. By Order dated September 6, 1988, Judge Uno's August 
4, 1988 Order granting LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
entered as a f inal Order and cer t i f i ed as an appealable Order under 
Utah Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(b). 
17. On October 5, 1988, TFSL f i l ed a timely Notice of 
Appeal from Judge Uno#s September 6, 1988 Order. R. 9565-9568. 
18. On October 20, 1988, LTIC f i l ed a timely Notice of 
Cross Appeal from Judge Uno's September 6, 1988 Order. R„ 
9570-9572. 
Statement of Facts 
19. In September, 1983, Buildmart Mall was formed, 
EXHIBIT F - Deposition of Gregory L. Seal, pp. 10, 11, 16 and 17, 
R. 9610. 
20. Buildmart Mall was established to develop and 
construct a retail shopping mall and a mall warehouse distribution 
center ("Project11) located in Salt Lake County. EXHIBIT F -
Deposition of Gregory L. Seal, pp. 16 and 28, R. 9610. 
21. In September, 1984, the IRBs dated July 15, 1984 in 
the face amount of $7,750,000.00 were sold to provide permanent 
financing for the Project. Judge Uno's January 20, 1987 Findings 
of Fact, Finding No. 32, R. 4441-4483. 
22. In approximately the summer of 1984, the principals 
of the project determined that a funding shortfall of approximately 
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$500,000.00 ex i s t ed for completion of the Project . EXHIBIT F -
depos i t ion of Gregory L. Seal, pp. 25, 26, 33, 34, 96 and 97, R. 
9610. 
23. TFSL was approached by a mortgage broker, 
Richards-Woodbury, about lending Buildmart Mall $750,000.00, 
secured by a second pos i t ion deed of t r u s t t o the project . TFSL 
was furnished with Richmond T i t l e ' s Preliminary T i t l e Report for 
the Project . Richmond Ti t l e acted as LTIC's agent in i s su ing the 
Preliminary Ti t l e Report and subsequent T i t l e Pol icy. EXHIBIT D -
Preliminary T i t l e Report; EXHIBIT E - T i t l e Policy; EXHIBIT G -
Deposition of Jef frey K. Woodbury, pp. 10, 11, 70, 76 and 77, R. 
8328-8479; EXHIBIT H - Deposition of August F. Brand, p. 49, R. 
8328-8479; and EXHIBIT I - Deposition of E. Earl Autenreith, pp. 30 
and 55, R. 8328-8479. 
24. In extending the loan, TFSL re l ied on the accuracy of 
the Preliminary Ti t l e Report and Ti t l e Pol icy. EXHIBIT G -
Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, pp. 70, 71, 76 and 77, R. 
8328-8479; EXHIBIT H - Deposition of August F. Brand, pp. 43, 44, 
49 and 51f R. 8328-8479; and EXHIBIT I - Deposition of E. Earl 
Autenreith, pp. 30 and 55-58, R. 8328-8479. 
25. TFSL considered information related to l i e n s against 
the project t o be c r i t i c a l t o i t s determination whether to extend 
the TFSL loan. EXHIBIT G - Deposition of Jef frey K. Woodbury, pp. 
70, 71, 103 and 104, R. 8348-8479; EXHIBIT H - Deposition of August 
F. Brand, pp. 50, 51, and 59-61, R. 8328-8479; EXHIBIT I -
Deposition of E. Earl Autenreith, pp. 29-31 and 55, R. 8328-8479; 
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EXHIBIT J - Deposition of Donald Spagnola, pp. 75-78 and 111-113, 
R. 8328-8479; and EXHIBIT K - Deposition of Richard L. Shaw, pp. 
56, 57 and Deposition Exhibit M3M. 
26. Prior t o the TFSL loan c los ing , numerous l i ens , 
including those in t h e amounts of $40,958.29, $74,272.92, 
$25,386.09, $757.50, $2,255.00 and $84,010.58, appeared of record 
which were not reported by LTIC. These l i e n s were ne i ther 
ident i f i ed on the Preliminary Ti t l e Report nor the Ti t le Policy 
i s sued t o TFSL. LTIC's Memorandum of Points and Authori t ies in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts No. 11; 
EXHIBIT C - Judge Uno's Memorandum Decision, Statement of Facts No. 
10; EXHIBIT G - Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, pp. 128-130, R. 
8328-8479; EXHIBIT H - Deposition of E. Earl Autenreith, pp. 61-65, 
R. 8328-8479; EXHIBIT L - Affidavit of Timothy Krueger, R. 
9259-9276; and EXHIBIT M - Affidavit of Keith Ellerson, R. 
8857-8890. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Original ly , TFSL asserted Crossclaims against LTIC 
sounding in Negl igence, Misrepresentation and Fraud. On December 
28, 1987, t h e lower Court dismissed the t o r t claims, c i t ing Beck v» 
Farmers Ins , Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). The Court held 
tha t the Beck dec is ion required claims of the type asserted by TFSL 
against LTIC t o be brought in the form of or concurrently with 
breach of contract claims, but not as independent t o r t claims. 
Thereafter, the lower Court granted TFSL's Motion t o Amend and 
permitted TFSL's Third Amended Crossclaim t o be f i l ed and served on 
LTIC. The Third Amended Crossclaim included causes of action for 
Breach of Contact, Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of the 
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. LTIC brought a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against TFSL on the referenced claims at the 
conclusion of d iscovery . 
For purposes of LTIC's Motion, i t i s undisputed that 
mechanics' l i e n s of record ex i s ted other than those ident i f ied in 
LTIC's Preliminary Ti t l e Report and Ti t l e Policy and that , had TFSL 
known of the e x i s t i n g undisclosed mechanics' l i e n s , i t would not 
have extended the loan in quest ion. LTIC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was based upon the following arguments: 
(1) TFSL's l o s s was caused by F irs t Security 
Bank's forec losure of i t s f i r s t Deed of Trust 
and not caused by LTIC's act ions; 
- 9 
(2) Under Beck, an insured cannot a s s e r t a t o r t 
claim against an insurer un less i t can and 
does a s s e r t a concurrent contract claim. 
By Memorandum Decision, the lower Court granted LTIC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In i t s Memorandum Decision, the lower Court 
adopted both of LTIC's arguments, holding that LTIC's conduct was 
not the cause of TFSL's damages and that Beck precluded the 
assert ion of TFSL's t o r t claim against LTIC. 
TFSL respec t fu l ly sugges t s that , even assuming the l ega l 
bases upon which the lower Court granted LTIC's Motion to be 
correct , the Court's ruling s t i l l required resolut ion of disputed 
i s s u e s of material fact , part icular ly those related t o proximate 
cause, for which reason summary judgment was inappropriate. TFSL 
also s u g g e s t s that Judge Uno's holdings are based upon fundamental 
mis interpretat ions of Beck. The lower Court erred in granting 
LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, for a var ie ty of reasons: 
(1) LTIC had a duty t o accurately examine public 
records and t o d i s c l o s e the s t a t e of the 
t i t l e t o the Project, including a l l 
mechanics' l i e n s recorded against the same, 
which duty i t admittedly fa i led t o f u l f i l l . 
LTIC does not refute or adequately d ispute in 
i t s Motion the a l l egat ions and evidence in 
support of TFSL's causes of act ion, only that 
the claims cannot be asserted . Clearly, the 
pleadings and discovery are rep le te with 
material factual i s s u e s related to the 
referenced claims; 
(2) Beck nei ther precludes the ex i s t ence and 
assert ion of a t o r t claim against an insurer 
independent of any contractual claim nor does 
i t require that the independent t o r t claim be 
asserted concurrently with a breach of 
contract claim against the insurer . Beck 
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only held that the dut i e s imposed on an 
insurer in a f i r s t party contract were 
contractual in nature, the breach of which 
would g ive r i s e t o a breach of contract 
rather than t o r t claim. Beck did not abolish 
t o r t l i a b i l i t y for insurers ; 
(3) Even i f the lower Court's tortured 
construct ion of Beck i s accepted, TFSL's 
Complaint and the discovery in t h i s case 
adequately support breach of contract and 
breach of the duty of good fa i th and fa ir 
deal ing claims by TFSL against LTIC which 
remain disputed by LTIC but are not r ipe for 
summary judgment s ince they frame numerous 
material factual i s s u e s ; and 
(4) F irs t Security Bank's forec losure of i t s Deed 
of Trust may have ext inguished TFSL's 
secur i ty i n t e r e s t in the project but i t i s 
immaterial and i rre levant t o and had no 
impact or a f f ec t on TFSL's independent claims 
against LTIC. 
Summary Judgment was improper and TFSL respec t fu l ly requests that 
t h i s Court reverse Judge Uno's Order and remand t h i s case to the 
lower Court for t r i a l of TFSL's claims against LTIC, 
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ARgVMENTg 
I. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF LTIC. 
The major purpose of summary judgment i s t o avoid 
unnecessary t r i a l by allowing par t i e s t o p ierce the pleadings to 
determine whether there i s a genuine i s s u e of material fact to 
present to the fact f inder. Webster v. S i l l f 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 
1983). In accordance with Utah Rule of Civi l Procedure 56(c), 
summary judgment i s appropriate and •'. . . sha l l be rendered 
forthwith i f the pleadings , depos i t ions , answers t o in terrogator ies 
and admissions on f i l e , together with the a f f idav i t s , i f any, show 
that there i s no genuine i s s u e as t o any material fact and that the 
moving party i s en t i t l ed t o a judgment as a matter of law." 
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court 
must evaluate a l l evidence and a l l reasonable inferences fa ir ly 
drawn therefrom in a l i g h t most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. Bowen v. Riverton, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). A summary 
judgment prevents the part i e s from ful ly present ing t h e i r cases to 
the court. As a resu l t , courts should be re luctant to invoke t h i s 
remedy. Brandt v. Spr ingvi l l e Banking Co.. 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 
P.2d 460 (1960). 
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S u c c i n c t l y , TFSL a l l e g e d in i t s Third Amended Crosscla im 
a g a i n s t LTIC t h a t i t s u f f e r e d damages a s a r e s u l t of LTIC's breach 
of c o n t r a c t , n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and breach of t h e duty of 
good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g . S p e c i f i c a l l y , TFSL a l l e g e d t h e 
f o l l o w i n g m a t e r i a l f a c t s in i t s Third Amended Crossc la im which, 
a l t h o u g h d e n i e d in LTIC's Answer, were u n c o n t r o v e r t e d in LTIC's 
Motion f o r Summary Judgment and Memorandum in s u p p o r t t h e r e o f : 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
(1) LTIC he ld i t s e l f out as an e x p e r t in t i t l e 
s e a r c h e s . TFSL's Third Amended Crossc la im 
( h e r e i n a f t e r "Claim") para. 3. 
(2) P r i o r t o e x t e n d i n g t h e l oan , i t was n e c e s s a r y 
f o r TFSL t o o b t a i n a t i t l e a b s t r a c t t o 
d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e were l i e n s or o t h e r 
c l a i m s of record pending a g a i n s t t h e borrower 
or t h e r e a l e s t a t e which would c a u s e TFSL not 
t o make t h e l oan . Claim, para. 4. 
(3) As p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s 
be tween t h e p a r t i e s , LTIC was engaged t o 
c o n d u c t t h e l i e n s e a r c h and p r e p a r e an 
a b s t r a c t of t i t l e . Claim, para . 5. 
(4) In performing s e r v i c e s , LTIC had a 
c o n t r a c t u a l duty t o TFSL t o e x e r c i s e t h e 
s k i l l and c a r e n e c e s s a r y t o d i s c o v e r and 
r e p o r t a l l c l a i m s a n d / o r l i e n s of record 
r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o p e r t y . Claim, para. 6. 
(5) LTIC breached i t s c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o 
TFSL in t h a t i t f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e t h e 
r e q u i s i t e s k i l l and c a r e under t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s by f a i l i n g e i t h e r t o f ind or 
r e p o r t a l l of t h e c la ims and l i e n s of record 
a g a i n s t t h e r e a l e s t a t e s e c u r i n g t h e TFSL 
l o a n . Claim, para. 7. 
(6) The f a i l u r e t o d i s c l o s e t r u e and a c c u r a t e 
in format ion r e s u l t e d in l o s s t o TFSL. Claim, 
para . 8. 
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(NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION) 
(1) LTIC assumed a duty outs ide of any 
contractual re lat ionship with TFSL to 
d i s c l o s e the condition of the record t i t l e t o 
real e s t a t e in an accurate and thorough 
manner. Claim; para. 10. 
(2) At the time of i ssuance of the Preliminary 
T i t l e Report and Ti t le Policy, numerous 
mechanics' l i e n s of record encumbering the 
property which was to be the secur i ty for the 
loan were not reported. Claim, para. 11. 
(3) LTIC knew or should have known that the 
ex i s tence of mechanics' l i e n s on the property 
which secured the loan would be a material 
consideration for any lender to consider 
before making a loan and that TFSL would not 
have loaned monies to Buildmart Mall had i t 
known of the ex i s tence of the undisclosed 
mechanics' l i e n s . Claim, para. 12. 
(4) TFSL in fact re l ied on the information 
d isc losed in the Preliminary Ti t le Report and 
Ti t l e Policy in evaluating whether i t would 
agree t o loan money to complete the Project. 
Claim, para. 13. 
(5) TFSL's re l iance on the information was 
reasonable. Claim, para. 14. 
(6) LTIC breached i t s duty t o accurately examine 
and report the s ta tus of the t i t l e by fa i l ing 
to d i s c l o s e l i e n s of record against the real 
e s ta t e . Claim, para. 15. 
(7) The misrepresentations by LTIC were material 
t o TFSL's decis ion to lend money for the 
Project. If TFSL had known of the unreported 
l i ens # i t would not have made the loan. 
Claim, para. 16. 
(8) As a proximate re su l t of LTIC's negl igence in 
fa i l ing t o d iscover and/or d i s c l o s e l i e n s 
af fect ing the real e s t a t e t o secure the TFSL 
loan, TFSL has been damaged. Claim, para. 
17. 
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(] ) LTIC had a du ty imposed by law t o dea l f a i r l y 
and in good f a i t h with TFSL, which du ty was 
b reached by LTIC's f a i l u r e t o d i s c o v e r and 
r e p o r t a l l l i e n s and encumbrances of record 
a g a i n s t t h e Pro jec t. C] a :i m, pa r a , 2] 
. - (2) As a proximate r e su ] t c f LTIC's f a i l u r e tc • 
d i s c o v e r and r e p o r t l i e n s and encumbrances of 
r e co rd a g a i n s t t h e P ro jec t , TFSL has beei i 
damaged. Claim, pa r a , 23, 
linspL * r 
u n c o n t r o v e r t c d jl KM ^qi t imntp ac tua l 
mi mi in ii III • n 
t h i s mnLu\ u iv^ :'.<• m a t e n a i • K I.* puw»r> 
i 
essence , t h a t summai y (inlqnit'iit was a p p r o p r i a t e liu two j easons ; 
(1) TFSl / s damages were caused by F i r s t Secu r i t y 
Bank's f o r e c l o s u r e , no t LTIC's b reach of any 
du ty owing t o TFSL; and 
(2) If TFSL could no t a s s e r t a c o n t r a c t u a l claim, 
i t was unab le t o a s s e r t an i ndependen t to r t . 
claim. 
Il III I ,IK:I Ill mi mi 1 1 1 1 ii"" II! 1 1 ( I «:. MomoL'ni i Il (ill (ill III r. c i w i.uit i in i l (U d m Il nil in I III iiiii1") 
more than to adopt l.TlC'r. argumentr. in whole. 
' fundamental probl rm i ilil ill Juilqe Uno'r. Decision ii'i I hi I 
+-^ ** conclusion i nil I, "iiu IJi i i i l jin11j ninnl Wiin wai ranted in I" it v CJI uf h1 ' 
n e c e s s a r i l v i cqu i r cd Lhn Court to make f i nd ings of fact; 
i ra m l in I ii .IIIII i in, ill i III I «! i n l i ft" I In «! I" "I • mo r u m hi inn P r c i r ? i o n r e v o n l « 
following cuncial. f i n d i n g s ml l a c t i Ill I In w r i t : 11" p u t e d hy 
parties: 
(1) TFSL's damages were not caused by any breach 
of LTIC, rather by Buildmart Mall's default ; 
(2) That TFSL was not in a second l i en pos i t ion 
was not LTIC's faul t ; 
(3) Under e i ther a breach of contract or fraud 
theory, TFSL cannot meet i t s burden; 
(4) TFSL has fa i led t o produce evidence of 
misrepresentat ions by LTIC and neg l igent 
omission cannot l i e where no duty to d i s c l o s e 
e x i s t s ; and 
(5) TFSL has fa i led t o refute that t h e i r i n t e r e s t 
was ext inguished by Firs t Security Bank of 
Utah's foreclosure . 
Since Judge Uno was required to make f indings of fac t in order to 
enter judgment in favor of LTIC# judgment at the summary judgment 
s tage was inappropriate. 
With respect t o the f i r s t numbered conclusion, i t 
necessar i ly requires the Court t o make a proximate cause 
determination, which i s a factual i s s u e for the fact f inder. 
Facts e s tab l i shed during discovery include testimony of TFSL's 
wi tnesses tha t TFSL would not have extended the loan had i t known 
of the undisc losed mechanics' l i e n s . (See Statement of the Case, 
Paras. 24 and 25). Clearly, the i s s u e of proximate cause should 
not have been determined by the Court by summary judgment. 
With respect t o the second numbered f inding, the question 
of LTIC's fau l t or lack thereof i s l ikewise a factual quest ion for 
the fact f inder and should not have been determined by the Court 
by summary judgment. The quest ions whether TFSL was in a second 
l i en pos i t ion and whether or not LTIC was at faul t are i rre levant 
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b a s e d u p o n t h e t e s tiro ony of T F S Lf s w I t n e s s e s t h a t T F S L w o i :i ] d i : :: t 
h a v e nv l m n l p i ] tlim I r ian i i n i l n i I I  in i i i i I I I I I I I n n e o f i l n l o r d i n c n v p r n d , 
/ U a r e s u l t , .t L H i d i n g of l a u L L nil t h e p a i l , of LTI.C w i t h » v K | IM HI 
t o TFRT/*? l i e n p o s i t i o n i s i m m a t e r i a l Lu Urn c l a i m s a s s e r t e d by 
1 I ,%L. ay a inn I 1,11 1  i 
With r e s p e c t I I ho t h i r d numbered c o n c l u s i o n , whellmi 
TFSL i mi hi HUM I 11 I ni i ill HI i mi 111 I  m i in ill In i i In inn mi III Il i mil i i I in 
r tau(.1 111eoi"y ieK jul i cd L1 ie i'u11 in I I 11 i' i 11 II111 f»teLs 111 I  I o ie11 Ili 
f a c t u a l c o n c l u s i o n s , MIIIICII nlionltl have o c c u r r e d nil Mine of tiliiill 
( , j | 11 i ii i | 11 I f I I I i (| j !! ii, iii i i 1 i I I** nil I in i II II II II n r i ,"| | i i i ji i II 
T I" Sli IIIIII i l ' . r i i i i i l Amended Crosr.i I ii in in s e t Coi LI» a b o v e <ni'» more Ui in 
a d e q u a t e l y e s t a b l i s h e d by d i s c o v e r y a d d u c e d in I 111 is m a t t e r find, IIIIII 
f i a i !", r; P I h u l l i I  111 I I i ." > t a t em en t n 1 1 111 < c \\« n, 
Willi r e s p e c t In t in! LUIILUI nuniljcn il c o n c l u s i o n , U n l I i n i 
f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e e v i d e n c e ol III I ni e p r e s e n t a t i o i i f i hy I IM ami I In ml 
in C M 1 1 i q e n l n I I I II in i IIIIII IIIIII II i III IIIIII II III In i i Hill mi II IIIIII II mi in III I e x i s t ' . p i l I III in II i 
c o n c l u s i o n s a n 1 r e f u t e d h\ I ill III 1  111 ami I he Com I. 1 1 Mi nJ inu ly 
e s t a b l i s h * ^ ] f a t i o in d i n e o v e t y which s u p p o r t e d I t s n r ine r t i on t h a t 
.1 ( M l I II II III III (« | I» if I ' I II I I II III I i l l l « i I II II II I 1 ", I I I | I I I f i l l II II III f 1 I II III I II P R , 
JLi-SJ.'^ n ' r i G c s c s c o n s i s t e n t l y I n s t i l l e d t h a t TiTU, r e l i e d mi in h P 
P r e l i m i n a r y T i U e Report" in d e t e r m i n i n g whel h e r t o P Y I P I H I t h e 11«SL 
l o a n , I IMC M a l i nu nil nil I In i i i I iiiiii I  III  in I I I III ililill nm f 
LTTC a d m i t t e d ( p a r n g i a p h 11 of t h e S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s in LTiC's 
Memorandum nl P o i n t s i n d Au tho r i t io r . in Support* of MnVinn for 
S u m m a r y J u d g ni v i»I) n 111J I In1 L L i n i I I i J 1i1111 11 > a r a q i a p 11 111 Il II h i > I < 1 1 I f 
:ii i in J u d g e Uno'n Memorandum Dec i s l i in) lii.il l i e n s i il r e c o r d e x i s t e d 
which were not ident i f i ed by LTIC t o TFSL. As a resu l t , LTIC 
misrepresented the s ta tus of t i t l e # and TFSL re l ied upon such 
misrepresentat ion. These are fac t s that were c lear ly overlooked 
by the Court and should have been submitted t o a jury at time of 
t r i a l , thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. 
Final ly , with respect t o the f i f th numbered conclusion, 
TFSL has never disputed that i t s secur i ty i n t e r e s t in the Project 
was ext inguished by the forec losure of F irs t Security Bank. 
However, TFSL would not have taken a secur i ty pos i t ion behind 
Firs t Security Bank i f LTIC had not misrepresented the s t a t u s of 
t i t l e . The fact that i t did and that i t s secur i ty i n t e r e s t was 
ext inguished by the foreclosure of F irs t Security Bank are 
immaterial conclus ions of law. To extend those conclus ions to a 
f inding that the foreclosure sa le ext inguished TFSL's independent 
t o r t claims against LTIC i s c lear ly an erroneous conclusion of 
law. 
The fac t s s e t forth in TFSL's Third Amended Crossclaim, 
supported by evidence adduced during the discovery period and not 
refuted by LTIC must be viewed in a l i g h t most favorable t o TFSL. 
Durham v. Marcrettes, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). At the summary 
judgment s tage , there c lear ly ex i s ted su f f i c i en t disputed material 
factual i s s u e s t o render summary d i spos i t ion inappropriate. For 
these reasons, Judge Uno's Order granting summary judgment in 
favor of LTIC must be reversed. 
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XJL. LTIC 1 IAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO TFSL ALL RECORD TITLE 
INFORMATION TFSL REASONABLY RELIED ON LTIC'S TITLE REPORT. 
I i i S a v i n g s Bank \ , U.iitJ
 ( II 1 1 1 1 1 II | II 11 || , II II Un i t ed 
S t a t e s S u p r e m e Cour t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t theme win (i In lu in i i sh 
i n f o r m a t j c i i ::c)i i :TM i "it.iln i IIII||II I 11 illy i mil i in I 
t ::: e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a u i i . a i t : in t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t he 
i wider t ak ing , , and n e g l i g e n t nr fa 11 t o o x o r c l s e 
i: e a s oI i ab 1 e ::i a it: = < I mi m i 111 111 I I  11 s t i p u l a t e d 
services, they are responsible lo their employer for Mm loss 
occasioned by nuch neglect or want ol can1 l , i r t r - M 11 •• -"inn h ,*led 
t h a t Mm m e a s u n ul d a m a g e s in s u c h r a s p s j "• I In> f o r i mnninu i i» of 
ilrimngnr* o r a.l 1 l o s s o c c a s i o n e d by 1 he n e g l e c t , n o t "just t h e l o s s 
- •^ ' ^ompla tod by Mm p a r t i e s f o r hi each in 1" i nnhn ant , IitjvJLU'ls. BanJ1,, 
II . a l ,'in I Im e s s e n c e ol TI'M/fi c la imn a q a m o t LTlf" I s t h a t 
LTIC a g r e e d I fun i l r . h i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t i t l n In i CM 1 r o t a t e 
uuuu IiTTC failocl t o i i rn i I at o1 \ ninl I ntiipl H P I y f l r f l r r n I Inn 
r e q u e s t e d i n i o r m a t i o o , <inrl, an n ju iox imate r e s u l t t h e r e o f , 1 I'.S 1. u a s 
damaged Even u n d e r LTIC'rs t o i t u r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of DJLLK, TFSL 
pi or I in ' HI If I ii • i PI I I i .in i I il in I 11 in i I 11 ill I I  I I I '• 
111 v 11 r• b r a s k a c a s e of Hey d v . C h i c a g o T i t l e I n s . C o , , 2 1 8 
N e b , Il III III Ml I I I I ill i | e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a I i! In i n s u r e r 
III l l l l i i III in i III I III III mi I i II i II i in i n MI | ) II iji n n i i II Il II in I i i i I K ( M I I IIII oil 
i m i t r a c t . " " " I ' u n l ' l f f s , iiinii; u n d e r ' i i U " p o l i c y , 
b r o u q l i l an ar t inn n q i i i i s l I lio I n l l o nn i i i i on o i nm|i my |i I n ml i iifj 
r; o | »ai;ato claim!; foi bo th n e g l i g e n c e ami l i ioa t l i I c o n t r a i I lllllie 
i n s u r e d s b r o u g h t t h e i r c l a i m s when t h e y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a p o r t i o n 
of the improvements t o the property they purchased were in fact 
over t h e i r property l i n e , and they were required t o remove them. 
The insureds al leged that , s ince the insurance company had been 
contracted to search the record with respect t o the property, i t 
had breached i t s contract and was a lso neg l igent in fa i l ing to 
furnish adequate information in the t i t l e report. 
In the lower Court, the t i t l e company's demurrer to the 
ent ire lawsuit was sustained, and the insureds appealed. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the dismissal of the 
contract claim but reversed the dismissal of the negl igence claim. 
The rat ionale of the Court with respect t o the contract claim was 
tha t the insureds had obtained that which was described in the 
pol icy , good t i t l e t o the property. 
With respect t o the negl igence claim, the Court embarked 
on a careful ana lys i s of the s e r v i c e s rendered by t i t l e companies, 
and followed the holding in the Kansas case of Ford v. Guarantee 
Abstract and Ti t l e Co., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254 (1976): 
Where a t i t l e insurer presents a buyer with both a 
preliminary t i t l e report and a pol icy of t i t l e 
insurance two d i s t i n c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are 
assumed; in rendering the f i r s t serv ice , the 
insurer serves as an abstractor of t i t l e and must 
l i s t a l l matters of public record regarding the 
subject property in i t s preliminary report. When 
a t i t l e insurer breaches i t s duty t o abstract 
t i t l e accurately i t may be l i ab le in t o r t for a l l 
the damages proximately caused by such breach. 
Heydff 354 N.W.2d at 150, c i t ing Ford, 553 P.2d at 266; See also 
Jarchow v. Transamerica Ti t l e Ins . Co,, 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975). The Court noted that numerous other 
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j u r i sd i c t i ons ! had rPcngnL'.wd the duty ol a I, i l l s i irancp
 r ^mpany 
t o use due en re in p r e p a r i n g t i t l e repnr l s, v. J d e l l v. City 
'L ' i tJt; i l l . ' . . . C o . . I , ' A , l> . <»il n\, .Mill I I . Y . N , <M 
Mass. T i t l e I n s . Co.. 2.JII Mas'!. -I'M), III U.K. Will la mo 
v. Polgnr , 391 Midi, «•. .' IS ll.W./d M <) (1974). S_e_e.,.aleo M- ere v. 
T i t l e I n s . Cy.__.yi Mj UJ«•. I '111 A i k . lull, / I -
S h o t v e l l v. Transamer ica T i t l e I n s . C;i»., '• 1 Wai 
•Mill ( l ' l / l l) , A". sot. fo r th by t h e Ca l i fo rn ia Supr 
Jarchow: • • • 
The di l ty i mposed upon a:i i a b s t r a c t o r of t i t ] e i s a 
r i g o r o u s one: 'An a b s t r a c t o r of t i t l e i s h i r ed 
because of h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l , and when 
s e a r c h i n g t h e p u b l i c r e c o r d s on behal f of a c l i e n t 
he must u s e t h e d e g r e e of c a r e commensurate with 
t h a t p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l . . • t h e a b s t r a c t o r must 
r e p o r t a l l m a t t e r s which could a f f ec t h i s c l i e n t ' s 
i n t e r e s t and which a r e r e a d i l y d i s c o v e r a b l e from 
t h o s e p u b l i c r e c o r d s o r d i n a r i l y examined when a 
r ea sonab ly d i l i g e n t t i t l e sea rch i s made.' 
( c i t a t i o n s omitted) S imi la r ly , t i t l e i n s u r e r i s 
l i a b l e fo r h i s n e g l i g e n t f a i l u r e t o l i s t recorded 
encumbrances in p r e l im ina ry t i t l e r e p o r t s . 
Ja ichuv ,„ I i'/" 1....11 1/pl i I «l HI"" |( I l..aI I I III. 
I n Lloyde '-'1P C o u r t III hi '! lial; >i l i L l e i n s u r a n c e r o m p n n y 
which rondoroil i fcitlo roporl: nnil a l so issued a pulley of "I i H I P1 
ini m11 11111 (" 11 sM11111"11 I \J111 1 i"'.I, i i i t ; 1 t i n I . i i":.« II 11 i 11d<ii 111q 1111 > I, i II, I j 
r e p o r t ! t h e t i t l e i n s u r a n c e company M J V M I \\t -iiin In I i aetoi nil 
l.iLLo and was r e q u i r e d to l i s t all in ill f in of pub l i c tpriiinl 
adve r se ly atCecLi.ug LlLJe Lo ilie roal e s t a t e which war. Lhc1 
ml" I,ho l o p o r t . When a I il lo romp my 1»HI?'. to porCorm i t s 
l i l l f p l 1 i K . I II II I II l J I  Il II i l l f i l l |
 ( II ill III II II II II I I III I I I II I I I Ill I I I I I | I I 
held l i a b l e in I ml il mi ill damages proximate ly caused by breach 
of i t s duty t o accurately examine t i t l e . Such t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y 
i s independent of and d i s t i n c t from the insurance company's 
r e spons ib i l i t y of the insurance company on account of i t s pol icy 
of t i t l e insurance. As a resu l t , the Court concluded that 
d i f f erent causes of action could be asserted under such 
circumstances# one in t o r t and another in contract . 
The t i t l e company in Heyd a lso asserted that any 
neg l igence claims t h a t t h e insured had with respect t o the t i t l e 
report merged with the insurance pol icy and were l imited by the 
language of t h e pol icy which excluded such claims. In reject ing 
that defense# the Heyd Court, quoted the New York Supreme Court in 
the case of L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. T i t l e Guarantee Co,, 52 
N.Y. 2d 179, 418 N.E.2d 650, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 57 (1981): 
Indeed, i t i s because t i t l e insurance companies 
combine t h e i r search and d i sc losure exper t i s e with 
insurance protect ion that an implied duty a r i s e s 
out of the t i t l e insurance agreement that the 
insurer had conducted a reasonably d i l i g e n t search 
. . . . This duty may not be abrogated through a 
standard pol icy c lause which would, i f g iven the 
e f f e c t urged by defendant, place the onus of the 
t i t l e company's fa i lure adequately to search the 
records on the party who secured the insurance 
protect ion for that very purpose. 
Heyd, 354 N.W.2d at 159, c i t ing L. Smirlock, 418 N.E.2d at 655. 
As a resu l t , the Heyd Court held that the insured had se t forth a 
cause of action and remanded the negl igence claim to the lower 
Court for t r i a l . 
The case of Moore v. T i t l e Ins , Co. of Minn., 148 Ariz. 
408, 714 P.2d 1303 (1985), i s a lso i n s t r u c t i v e in the ins tant 
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:i na;t1 ,€ j] : l i i Moore, ai i ac: t:l 0:1 i was • b r o u g h t aga j i i s t a t i t i e 
;i i" i s u r a n c: e c o m p a n y f o r n e g 1 i g e i i c e i i i f a i ] I n g t: :> d i s c o v e i: ] :i e n s 
a q a i n s t p r 0 p e r iy j , j M o o r e ^ t h e c : ,1 l l : | : s t a t e d t l l a t : 
; :•;-. [ t ] h e i n s u r a n c e company h o l d s i t s e ] i: on t a s a .. -: 
s e a r c h e r of t i t l e s and p r o v i d e s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n 
f o r t h e a p p l i c a n t s t o a c t u p o n , and t h e a p p l i c a n t s 
e x p e c t and r e ] y < :: i i t l l i s i n f o r m a t i o n i i i c l o s i n g 
t h e i r d e a l s , 
Moore, ' I >l I1.2d at, 130? 11 Moore, U\v Cimi!' c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e 
I i i a 11 I I ' M i n i l i mi in I i i i i nil Il I in • i f ' i i I II in I III! Il i i f in mi HI in II II l u i . f j ) )|, 11111 
lli.it t h e i n s u r e i l Ii Il n o t r e l i e d upon t h e p r e l i m i n a r y t i l In repor t ; 
i s s u e d Ii1 t h e i n s u r e r llnwnvnr It Ik i m p o r t a n t l'° n I' I III! iL 
Mooio ho ld i on t ra r 1 ! h I I Iii I'LIIII Ii"! i.'uuil h e r e , t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f had t l io r i g h t t o i o l y on t h e t i t l e r e p e n t . F i n a l l y , in 
I L O O . 1 j ? , I ! 1 1 ' 1 i l l ' I III II "Ii 1 II « 11ll I ' Ill 1 II III III III III III I « I III I I I I I I il III ! I I I I ' W 1 1 il I III III I  III III I III 
only be d e t e r m i n e d by t i i a l , not, ai t h e summary judgment s t a g e . 
The S e v e n t h C i r c u i t Cour t ol Appeal r; ennn of £ijJ.pjDrE 
i i a v i m m o[ I l l i n i u m , , S t e w a r t . ' I ' i t l c G U J I . . LuM ll in I 'ill » m | I I 
C i r . lonn) , p r o v i d e s t h e I n s i g h t n e c e s s a r y I o a p p r e c i a t e Llm 
t h r u s t oT TFSL/s c l a i m s iii Mil" i n s t a n t c a s e , II in i i l i t o i / p , 
Pi il i i nsnui p u r c h a s e d ir p r o p e r ! y r i 11 in l laqei I y iiiin I I i , || i 
MNCI'UI iiiKi mi imoi 1 <pi() (" I vim ii! IllatjeiHy I o • -nemo I  iiiinte uiiven 
l o r tine p u r c h a s e p r i c e , fi'll.ewail T i t l e i s s u e d a t i l l e p o l i c y In 
H a g e r t y w h i c h , a loi ig wit l i t h e uini I i| ii |p wnp; a s s i g n e d I i i i t i c n i p ' ' , 
p r e d e c e s s o r . Somet ime t h e r e a f t e r , il w.ii,* d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Robinsun 
had b r>en nd h r l i*:al or] inromn<Mr i. - * • ' .r»" a ' o r 
appL, xeyd-Lj uompeu 
Citicorp made a claim on Stewart T i t l e that i t s l i en on 
the rea l property was unenforceable and voidable because of 
Robinson /s incompetence. In an approved Orphan's Court sa le , 
Stewart T i t l e obtained a quitclaim deed t o the mortgaged premises 
from Robinson's conservator and tendered the same t o Citicorp to 
cure the defec t in i t s mortgage l i e n . Citicorp rejected the deed 
a l l eg ing i t was en t i t l ed t o $27,000.00 in damages due to the 
unenforceabi l i ty of t h e mortgage l i e n . 
Citicorp sued Stewart T i t l e for damages. Both part ies 
presented Motions for Summary Judgment. The t r i a l Judge granted 
Stewart T i t l e ' s Motion finding that tender of the deed was a 
proper exerc i s e of Stewart T i t l e ' s r ight t o e s tab l i sh the l i en of 
the mortgaged premises insured by i t s t i t l e pol icy . Citicorp 
appealed. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered two i s s u e s . 
First , was the t i t l e pol icy breached and second, i f so, was 
Stewart T i t l e ' s tender of the quitclaim deed an adequate cure 
under the terms of the t i t l e pol icy . The Court observed that: 
The mortgagee r e l i e s on the t i t l e insurer ' s 
exper t i se in checking public records; the lender 
parts with a great deal of money in re l iance upon 
the insurer 's guaranty that the l ien i s va l id . 
Cf. 9 J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law 
and Practice f §5201 (1981). Thus, he expects the 
insurer t o have researched the applicable law, as 
well as the records, before i s su ing the commitment 
and t o provide him with areas in which he might 
find surpr i ses - not t o i t s e l f surprise him with 
the use of ambiguous c lauses . 
Citicorp, 840 F.2d at 529, c i t ing , Pohrer v. T i t le Ins . Co., 652 
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N.E.2d 355, 359 (J 978), Tl ie Cour t concluded that: 
As a p r a c t i c a l nat ter , Citicorp would no t have 
extended $27,000.00 cred i t t o Robinson on the 
b a s i s of a voidable mortgage. No l e n d e r would do 
so. Citicorp gave Robinson $27,000.00 on Stewart 
T i t l e ' s promise that the mortgage l i en was 
enfo rceab le by Citicorp. In actual:! ty , a I: 1:1 ie 
time Citicorp could not enforce the l i e n . I t 
could only do so at some future date if Pol n n n i >n'' 
gua rd i an affirmed the l i e n ' s v a l i d i t y . 
kJ jJL^orp» I " ' i hi " «" i p i i i 
t h a t S'pwail 1)L1" I I 1 oreachi I lie t it:lf p o l i c y ' s guaranty and 
t h a t C i t i co rp was e n t i t l e d In ??7,(lf»0.00 in lamaqes. 
Il II II ( C l L l C U J L t i I i i 11 I I I I 11 II I I I I I I I ) ' I {11 M M I I I I i I ' I 111 I l C» i 111 I' 1 M I II 
qui tc la im deed was ait ndrquriM' n u n muloi the c i r cums tances , I I II 1 
i s sue a rose because tho proport^ i mi i ill substant; i ml ( | im • il 
I In1 I i in i ill i l i snjvniy ml llio |i i mli lo m Llihiii il llni" incept ion of the 
t r a n s a c t i o n , I Inn Cuuit de termined t.li il I nmlm w.v; .in imperfect 
c u r e . When Lhr mouio's w i n M i a m i ! I In land had Ta l l in h i I I | I | M U I 
the mot tgage qivnn to r .eeme Lho purchase p i i cn M 1 tun I in IIM 
Stewart T i t l e t e n d e r e d 1 In* deed, I ho land illil mil havn valun In 
r
 u p p n i t t h e m o r t g a g e I Ii ] i mil l d e t e r m i n e d 111 il Iiii 11 ill , III i I 
b e e n linn u a e h c d \[ I ln» i n c e p t i o n nl 1 I in I i an.;acLxoii, I m Uiinl i 
r e a s o n l o s s e s fni H I P b r e a c h w e r e f i x e d al tha t point l l in n u n I 
f o u n d i u r I h o r Unit I 111' I in im i<i i m111t'm11"111 i i I  111> 11 111 i i inm pi m i in I 
t h e t r ansac t ion in A , s t a t e d by 1 hn Court : 
Had S tewar t I ml Ik infon IIII ill C i t i co rp nil I Ii il fact 
[unenforceabil i ty nil I Inn linnl I lin l ln i f t ; would 
not have loaned Robinson $27,000,00 . . . i t i s 
one thing t o say that the pol icy allowed Stewart 
Ti t l e to correct de fec t s in a l i en ' s pr ior i ty . I t 
i s quite another to contend that Stewart Ti t l e may 
'correct ' a voidable mortgage, which the mortgagee 
would never have entered had i t been informed of 
the vo idabi l i ty , by tendering a deed t o the 
property years la ter . Tender does not remove the 
fact that no money would have changed hands but 
for Stewart T i t l e ' s mistake. 
Citicorp, 840 F.2d at 531. The Court ult imately concluded that 
Stewart Ti t l e fa i led in i t s duty to check the l i en ' s va l id i ty and 
was therefore required to pay damages as a resu l t . 
The Restatement of Torts, Second, §552 (1965) provides 
that: 
One who, in the course of h i s bus iness , 
profess ional employment, or in any other 
transact ion in which he has a pecuniary in teres t , 
suppl ies fa l se information for the guidance of 
others in t h e i r bus iness transact ions , i s subject 
t o l i a b i l i t y for pecuniary l o s s caused to them by 
t h e i r j u s t i f i a b l e re l iance upon the information, 
i f he f a i l s to exerc i se reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. 
This Court se t forth the elements of neg l igent misrepresentation 
in the case of Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 
1967) as fol lows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary i n t e r e s t in a 
transact ion, (2) i s in a superior pos i t ion to know 
material fac t s and (3) care l e s s ly or neg l igent ly 
makes a fa l se representat ion concerning them, (4) 
expect ing the other party to rely and act thereon, 
and (5) the other party reasonably does so and (6) 
suf fers l o s s in that transact ion, the representor 
can be held responsible . 
Jardine, 423 P.2d at 662; See also Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 
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. .. .J. . c a r p e r A II1"1 James, The Lav of T o r t s , §7.6 
{195G), ou r t: case of C h r i s t i a n s o n v. Commonwealth 
Land ^ . ^ ^ . ^ I I, (11 Il 
I f . . . t h e informat ion i s g iven in t h e capac i ty 
of one in the* b u s i n e s s of supp ly ing such 
informnt.Lc; c a r e and d i l i g e n c e should be 
e x e r c i s e d which i s compat ib le with t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
b u s i n e s s or p ro fe s s ion invo lved . Those who dea l 
• with such p e r s o n s do so because of t h e advan tages 
wh ich til i ey exp ec t t o d e r iv e £ i: OITI till: :i • := sp e c i a l 
conf idence . The law, t h e r e f o r e , may well 
p r e d i c a t e on such a r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e du ty of c a r e 
t o e n s u r e thn accuracy mini v a l i d i t y uf Mm*1 
in formation 
C h r i s t i a n s o n , f»Mi V.?d a t in1! 1 F flnrpnr r f jnmns, The Law of 
To.rtn, 'i7,f» ill li i' nun i p a r t i c u l a r ! ' | ill forth in Il II II 
I I l l M i 1 i l i t) " I I I I i l l t l N M I j , III I I I I I I I I I M i l 1 llllrll I (» I , l i l l i i J e d i l 1 , III II II 
p e c u n i ii i i n t e r e s t i n I i a n a a c t i u i i u i c l e a r L. i uu IHI^L 
tha i ; TJTTC q a v o f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n liiiii I In P r e l i m i n m v TiLJe I l rpo i l : 
and I I U P lJ*»ln y r e g a r d i n g m e c h a n i c s 1 l i e n s a q a i n s . t l h n p r n p o i l y 
wh ich was t o n c c u r n TF.Sl/fi l oan , which i n f o r m a t i o n was f ui nir.hoil, 
in I! | in in I I i I li mi ill 1 I ' I in li mi I i I re i s inn i In 'I In in I i I i li 1 in HI m,c;. 
TFSL r e l i e d I in 111 in i MM1 m l o r m a t i o i i In ill lie I i i itioiit , fnt will li 
r e a s o n itr; c l a i m s h a v e b e e n a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t LT1C. (See s t a t e m e n t 
1GC) 
li i th<* i n s t a n t case, 1.TIC al so a t tempted t o avoi d 
ulity ' " » ; ' p i U ' i n q r y 
f a i l s ] o r - ^F ~v * ^a«;oir irr=t, v J «i became aware 
t h e t ime IL wa& p iocessincj un^ r-i^liminaLy ixto.^ t\ i f 
Policy that TFSL would take the referenced loan by assignment from 
Richards-Woodbury and therefore would rely on the Title Report. 
Richards-Woodbury advised LTIC that a secondary lender would be 
loaning monies to Buildmart Mall and LTIC was a recipient of a 
copy of TFSL's commitment letter to Buildmart Mall. Second, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that a third party may claim relief 
for negligent misrepresentation even without privity. Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); See also Williams v. Polgar, 391 
Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974). 
In the case of Bush v. Coult, 594 P.2d 865 (Utah 1979) 
this Court found that title insurance is a contract of warranty 
rather than indemnity. Title insurance contracts " . . . differ 
from other types of insurance contracts . . ." in that they M. . . 
are warranties and the insurer determines the state of the 
title." Citing with approval a New York Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Decision# this Court stated that "[u]sually, the very 
purpose and essence of the title insurance transaction is to 
obtain a professional title search, opinion and guarantee." Bush, 
594 P.2d at 867# citing Empire Development Co. v. Title Guaranty & 
Trust Co.. 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918) (emphasis added). 
This Court concluded that M[t]he law imposes no duty upon one who 
seeks title insurance to perform the responsibilities of the 
insurer to ascertain the state of the title." Bush, 594 P.2d at 
877. 
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In the in s t an t case, TFSL would not have extended the 
loan had i t known of t h e l i ens which were undisclosed by LTIC. In 
extending the loan, TFSL materially re l ied upon t he s t a t e of the 
t i t l e given by LTIC and was damaged. Applying the rule s tated by 
t h i s Court in Bush, TFSL had no duty t o perform the 
r e spons ib i l i t i e s of LTICf which re spons ib i l i t i e s were admittedly 
breached by LTIC. As one commentator has noted: 
Applicants for a t i t l e insurance policy are 
in te res ted in obtaining the insurance coverage, 
but they are sometimes more in te res ted in what t he 
company's examination of t i t l e d isc loses . This i s 
perhaps par t ly a t t he base of t he prevai l ing 
philosophy of t i t l e insurance companies 
s t r e s s ing the service of r i sk del ineat ion r a the r 
than r i sk coverage. 
Johnstone, Ti t le Insurance, 66 Yale L.J. 492, 494 (1957). This 
c r i t i c a l d i s t inc t ion i s the very essence of TFSL's negligence 
claim against LTIC. Both LTIC and the lower Court have been 
d i s t rac ted by the issue of r i sk coverage, and, as such, have 
completely ignored the issue of r i sk del ineat ion. Given the fact 
t h a t LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment in no way refutes or 
opposes TFSL's negligent misrepresentat ion claim and inadequately 
addresses TFSL's breach of contract claims, TFSL should not have 
been denied an opportunity to prove i t s a l legat ions through 
t r i a l . For these reasons, Judge Uno's Order grant ing summary 
judgment in favor of LTIC must be reversed. 
III . THIS COURT'S DECISION IN BECK V. FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE 
NEITHER PRECLUDES A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST A TITLE 
INSURER IN TORT NOR THE ASSERTION OF SUCH A CLAIM WITHOUT THE 
MAINTENANCE OF A CONCURRENT BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION. 
In i t s Memorandum Decision and Order, the lower Court 
concluded that under Beck a breach of contractual dut ie s must 
f i r s t be found before any other cause of action could be 
in i t i a t ed . However, the Court misapplied Beck, A careful 
analys i s of the Beck decis ion i s necessary before applicat ion of 
the same t o the ins tant appeal. TFSL respect fu l ly submits that 
there can be l i t t l e question that the bases for LTIC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Judge Uno's Memorandum Decision under Beck 
are erroneous as a matter of law. 
In Beck, an insured brought an action against h i s insurer 
a l leg ing bad fa i th refusal t o s e t t l e a claim for uninsured 
motorist bene f i t s . In the Court's ana lys i s of the case, t h i s 
Court began by considering the d i s t inc t ion between a "f irs t party" 
and "third party" insurance s i tuat ion . In a f i r s t party insurance 
s i tuat ion , t h e insured i s dealing with the insurer in an 
adversarial s i tuat ion , which would not cause a f iduciary 
re lat ionship t o ar i se . In most such s i tua t ions , the insurer 
simply contracts t o insure t o pay claims substant iated by the 
insured in accordance with the insurance contract . 
In a th ird party insurance s i tuat ion , the insurer 
typ i ca l l y works t o protect the insured's i n t e r e s t , as a resu l t of 
which the insurer incurs a f iduciary duty t o the insured to 
protect i t s i n t e r e s t s as zealously as i t s own. See Ammerman v. 
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Farmers Ins, Exchanaey 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967). Since 
the insurer places the insured in a position of trust and 
reliance, its failure to fulfill its fiduciary duty could expose 
the insured to damages, quite possibly in excess of policy 
limits. Accordingly, Utah recognizes in Ammerman a tort cause of 
action to remedy a violation of such a duty. 
In Beck, this Court concluded that the relationship 
between the insured and insurer was a first party relationship. 
However, where other jurisdictions might permit a tort cause of 
action for an insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing (here, the duty to bargain and settle), found to be 
implicit in all contracts, this Court determined that such a tort 
claim may not be asserted. Rather, this Court determined that a 
breach of those duties could give rise in the first party 
relationship to a cause of action for breach of contract since the 
duties and obligations at issue are contractual rather than 
fiduciary. This Court did, however, indicate that damages in 
excess of the policy limits, for consequential damages suffered as 
a result of a breach of the implied contractual duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, could be obtained by an insured even in a first 
party insurance relationship. 
It is important to consider the holdings of this Court in 
the Beck case and their application, if at all, to the instant 
appeal. In Beck, this Court held as follows: 
(1) That the good faith duty to bargain or settle 
under an insurance contract is only one 
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in a l l contracts and that a 
v io la t ion of that duty g i v e s r i s e t o a claim 
for breach of contract . Beck, 701 P.2d at 
798. 
(2) That the refusal t o bargain or s e t t l e , 
standing alone, may# under appropriate 
circumstances, be su f f i c i en t t o prove a 
breach. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798. 
(3) That in a f i r s t party re lat ionship between an 
insurer and i t s insured, the dut i e s and 
obl igat ions of the part i e s are contractual 
rather than f iduciary. Without more, a 
breach of those implied or express dut i e s can 
g ive r i s e only t o a cause of action in 
contract , not one in tor t . Beck, 701 P.2d at 
800; and 
(4) That as par t i e s t o a contract , the insured 
and the insurer have para l le l ob l igat ions to 
perform the contract in good fa i th , 
ob l igat ions that inhere in every contractual 
re la t ionship . Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
Finally, t h i s Court recognized that , in certain cases , the acts 
cons t i tu t ing a breach of contract might re su l t in breaches of duty 
that are independent of the contract and may g ive r i s e t o causes 
of act ion in t o r t . Beck, 701 P.2d at 800, n. 3. 
As important as the holdings referenced above, i t i s a lso 
important t o consider what t h i s Court did not hold in the Beck 
dec is ion , namely: 
(1) That an insurer could not have a dual 
re lat ionship t o the insured, such that , in 
addition to a f i r s t party insurance 
re lat ionship , i t could be l i ab l e 
independently for another re lat ionship 
wherein a f iduciary or other duty arose; 
or 
(2) That a t o r t claim could never be asserted 
against a f i r s t party insurer for t o r t s 
which arose prior to , during the course of 
or following the contractual re lat ionship . 
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The case of Gaqon v, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins . Co.. 746 
P.2d 1194 (Utah App. 1987), cert , denied. 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 
(1988) and i t s appel late h i s tory provide guidance with respect to 
the appl icat ion of Beck by the Courts of Utah. In Gaqon. an 
insured brought an action against h i s insurer as ser t ing a claim 
under an automobile insurance pol icy and a claim for the insurer's 
bad fa i th refusa l to pay. The insured sought the amount of his 
l o s s p lus a t torneys ' f ees and punit ive damages. At t r i a l , the 
p a r t i e s s t ipu lated that the i s s u e of bad fa i th would be submitted 
t o the jury before any consideration of puni t ive damages evidence 
At the conclusion of the case, both par t i e s moved for a directed 
verd ic t . The t r i a l Judge granted the insurer ' s Motion and the 
jury awarded the amount of the insured's l o s s only. The insured 
appealed from the t r i a l Judge's granting of the insurer 's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the bad fa i th claim. 
After analyzing fac t s adduced at time of t r i a l in l i g h t 
of Beck, the Court of Appeals found that reasonable minds could 
d i f f er as to whether, among other th ings , the insurer fa ir ly 
evaluated the insured's claims and acted reasonably in reject ing 
or s e t t l i n g the claim. The Court of Appeals determined that the 
i s s u e of bad fa i th should have gone to the jury and reversed the 
lower Court. The insurer then f i led a Pet i t ion for Writ of 
Certiorari to t h i s Court. 
This Court denied Certiorari and J u s t i c e Zimmerman f i led 
a concurring Opinion, in which Jus t i ce Durham concurred. In the 
- i i _ 
concurring Opinion, Justice Zimmerman stated that the holdings of 
the Court of Appeals with respect to issues it addressed were 
correct, but he was concerned with regard to a comment of the 
Court of Appeals pertaining to the propriety of punitive damages 
under Beck. With respect to the same, Justice Zimmerman provided 
some amplification of Beck as it relates to tort claims. 
On the issue of punitive damages, Justice Zimmerman 
observed that the breach of an insurer's duty to act in good faith 
does not, alone, give rise to a cause of action in tort; rather, 
the cause of action is in contract. Justice Zimmerman stated 
that, in such a case, consequential damages in contract are 
available but not tort damages, including punitive damages. 
Finally, Justice Zimmerman stated that: 
[t]o recover punitive damages, a plaintiff would 
have to show all of the elements of a separate 
tort. Beckr 701 P.2d at 800-02 and n. 3. 
Accordingly, under Beckr a plaintiff is not 
entitled to put on evidence of punitive damages 
unless he or she can make out a sufficient case to 
go to the jury on an independent tort theory. 
Beck. 701 P.2d at 800-02 and n. 3. 
Gagonf 92 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. Implicit in these statements by 
Justice Zimmerman is the conclusion that an independent tort claim 
against an insurer is not precluded by Beck and that Beck does not 
require such a claim to be brought concurrently with a breach of 
contract action. 
In the instant case, to accept Judge Uno's decision with 
respect to the Beck case, one would have to interpret Beck to 
abrogate any independent tort claim against a first party insurer, 
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regardless whether the tort claim arose prior to, during or 
following the contractual relationship between the insurer and the 
insured. In addition, one would have to interpret Beck to 
prohibit a dual relationship between the insurer and insured, such 
that any fiduciary duties or obligations akin to those existing in 
a third party relationship could not exist contemporaneous with 
the f irs t party insurance relationship. Finally, one would have 
to interpret Beck as providing a shield against fraud or 
misrepresentation for the f irst party insurer which furnishes 
insurance policies based upon intentionally or negligently 
misrepresented information. In effect, insurers could insulate 
themselves from their own fraud, despite the fact that that fraud 
represented a violation of a preexisting duty to the party 
ultimately insured. Beck does not stand for these propositions 
and instead allows tort claims based upon duties independent of 
the insurance contract, such as those asserted against LTIC in the 
instant case. 
Although clearly distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case, the lower Court not only failed to appreciate the 
clear distinction, but has also misapplied the holding of Beck in 
the summary judgment proceedings from which this Appeal has been 
taken. A cursory examination of TFSL's Complaint and 
consideration of facts adduced during discovery will reveal the 
existence of precontractual services by LTIC in the form of a 
t i t l e report, as well as a negligent performance of those services 
which resul ted in damages t o TFSL. Also, the re lat ionship i s much 
more similar t o the third party re lat ionship described in Beck, 
where the insured (TFSL) was placed in a t r u s t and rel iance 
pos i t ion with respect t o s e r v i c e s expected t o be performed by the 
insurer (LTIC). See e.g. Ammerman, 430 P.2d at 576. Rather than 
a f i r s t party insurance re lat ionship , the re lat ionship here i s one 
where TFSL contracted for s e r v i c e s t o be performed and those 
s e r v i c e s were neg l igent ly performed. I t happens that the 
neg l igent performance of s e r v i c e s was compounded by a contract 
entered into between the par t i e s , upon which TFSL also re l i ed . 
Beck involved claims by an insured against the insurer 
for i t s a l leged bad fai th refusal to s e t t l e an uninsured motorist 
claim. TFSL's claims against LTIC in the ins tant case are remote 
from the type of claim involved in Beck. TFSL's claims stem from 
LTIC#s neg l igent performance of a duty t o accurately and 
completely examine and report l i e n s of record, which information 
was c r i t i c a l t o TFSL in determining whether t o extend a loan t o 
Buildmart Mall. For the lower Court t o find that such a claim i s 
e i ther abrogated or l imited by t h i s Court's dec is ion in .Beck, was 
a l ega l error and i s ent i t l ed t o no deference on t h i s Appeal. 
Because the lower Court proceeded on the bas i s of an inaccurate 
conclusion of law, i t disregarded numerous i s s u e s of material fact 
which would preclude summary judgment in favor of LTIC. For these 
reasons, the lower Court Order granting LTICs Motion for Summary 
Judgment must be reversed and t h i s case remanded t o the lower 
Court for t r i a l on TFSL's claims against LTIC. 
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IV. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CLAIMS AGAINST LTIC UNDER THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN BECK V. 
FARMERS INS, EXCHANGE, 
As more part icu lar ly s e t forth in Argument III above, 
Beck did not hold that an insurer could not be l i ab l e to an 
insured for an independent t o r t claim ar i s ing outs ide of the 
contract which placed the par t i e s in the insurer / insured 
re la t ionsh ip . However, even i f that interpretat ion of Beck i s 
correct , TFSL submits that i t s Third Amended Crossclaim and 
discovery of record e s tab l i sh a breach of contract claim against 
LTIC s u f f i c i e n t t o overcome LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A review of the pleadings and discovery shows that two 
breach of contract claims are es tabl i shed . The evidence wil l 
d i s c lo se that LTIC was retained to prepare an abstract of t i t l e , 
that the abstract of t i t l e received from LTIC was not accurate, 
that TFSL would not have loaned monies i f the undisclosed 
mechanics' l i e n s which were l a t er discovered had been reported to 
i t by LTIC and that , as a re su l t of LTIC's breach of i t s duty to 
accurately report information in i t s abstract of t i t l e , TFSL was 
damaged. In addition, as Beck comments, impl ic i t in every 
contract i s a duty of good faith and fa ir deal ing. As more 
part icular ly s e t forth in Beck, the duty of good faith also 
requires the insurer to : 
'Deal with laymen as laymen and not as experts in 
the s u b t l e t i e s of law and underwrit ing' and to 
refrain from act ions that wi l l injure in insured's 
a b i l i t y t o obtain the bene f i t s of the contract . 
(Citat ions omitted) These performances are the 
essence of what the insured has bargained and paid 
for, and t h e insurer has the obl igat ion t o perform 
them. When an insurer has breached t h i s duty, i t 
i s l i a b l e for damages suffered in consequence of 
that breach. 
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. This Court l a t er s tated that the damages 
recoverable are those naturally flowing from the breach and that 
they may be in exces s of the pol icy l imi t s . Clearly, in the 
ins tant case, TFSL had the r ight to expect what i t bargained for, 
that i s , a complete and accurate Preliminary Ti t le Report upon 
which i t could reply in i t s determination whether t o loan monies 
to Buildmart Mall. In producing an inaccurate t i t l e report, LTIC 
c lear ly breached i t expressed contractual dut i e s and i t s implied 
contractual duty of good faith to TFSL. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recent ly addressed the i s s u e of 
a claim for breach of an insurer 's duty t o act in good fa i th in 
the case of American Concept Ins . Co. v. Lockhead, 751 P.2d 271 
(Utah App. 1988). In American Concept, the Court of Appeals, 
c i t ing Gagon, s tated: 
[t]he i s s u e of breach of the duty of an insurer to 
act in good fa i th i s a factual i s s u e t o be 
determined by a jury after consideration of a l l 
attendant circumstances and evidence. 
American Concept, 751 P.2d at 273. Ultimately, the Court's 
decis ion hinged upon consideration of an expert ' s a f f idavi t . The 
lower Court had determined that the expert ' s a f f idavi t was 
conclusory, therefore insuf f i c i en t to overcome summary judgment. 
On appeal, t h e Court of Appeals found that the expert ' s af f idavi t 
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contained ult imate conclus ions regarding t h e i s s u e of lack of good 
fa i th and f a i r deal ing which were based upon s u f f i c i e n t facts 
(review of an adjuster 's f i l e ) . Therefore, t h e Court determined 
the a f f idav i t s u f f i c i e n t t o ra i se i s s u e s of material fact as to 
whether the insurer breached i t s duty t o deal fa i r ly and in good 
fa i th . Consequently, summary judgment was reversed and the case 
remanded t o t h e t r i a l Court. 
In t h e ins tant case, discovery has adduced material 
factual i s s u e s in support of TFSL's breach of contract claims 
against LTIC which must be t r i e d , for which reason summary 
judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, summary judgment in 
favor of LTIC must be reversed and t h i s case remanded t o the lower 
Court for t r i a l of TFSL'S contract claims against LTIC. 
V. THE FORECLOSURE SALE BY FIRST SECURITY BANK DID NOT 
EXTINGUISH TFSL'S CLAIMS AGAINST LTIC. 
In i t s Memorandum Decision, the lower Court determined 
that TFSL's damages were caused by any breach of LTIC, rather, 
they were the r e s u l t of Buildmart Mall's default on i t s loan. In 
addition, the lower Court found that TFSL had fai led to refute the 
fact that i t s l o s s was caused by F irs t Security Bank's 
foreclosure . 
Aside from the fact that the Court's conclusions of law 
necessar i ly involve a factual determination of proximate cause, 
thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate, the Court's 
conclusion that the foreclosure sa le ext inguished TFSL's i n t e r e s t 
in the project in no way impairs or impedes TFSL's ab i l i ty to 
pursue a claim against LTIC. An accurate t i t l e report would have 
caused TFSL t o dec l ine extension of the loan to Buildmart Mall, a 
dec is ion which would have been made long before the foreclosure 
sa le by F irs t Security Bank. Clearly, any r ight s TFSL had against 
the Project were wholly separate and independent of any claims 
which TFSL had against LTIC for i t s fa i lure t o completely and 
accurately report the s ta te of t i t l e in i t s Preliminary Ti t le 
Report. 
Although not required t o proceed forward with proof at 
the summary judgment s tage , TFSL demonstrated that undisclosed 
l i e n s ex i s ted , of which LTIC admittedly had knowledge, that TFSL 
re l ied on t h e accuracy of the Preliminary Ti t l e Report in 
extending the loan# that the loan would not have been extended had 
TFSL had complete and accurate information regarding the s t a t e of 
the t i t l e and that TFSL has been damaged as a r e s u l t of extending 
the loan. Clearly, numerous material factual i s s u e s e x i s t which 
require submission of t h i s matter to a jury. As such, TFSL 
requests that the Court reverse the lower Court's Order granting 
summary judgment, and remand the case to the lower Court for t r i a l 
of TFSL's claims against LTIC. 
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CONCLUSION 
In i t s Third Amended Crossc la im, TFSL a s s e r t e d c a u s e s of 
a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t , n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and 
breach of t h e duty of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g . D i scovery 
adduced f a c t s s u p p o r t i n g each of t h e c l a i m s a s s e r t e d by TFSL 
a g a i n s t LTIC, As a r e s u l t of e r r o n e o u s c o n c l u s i o n s of law and 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t which were i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y made a t t h e summary 
judgment s t a g e , Judge Uno g r a n t e d LTIC's Motion f o r Summary 
Judgment . Summary judgment was improper and TFSL r e s p e c t f u l l y 
r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s Court r e v e r s e Judge Uno's Order and remand t h i s 
c a s e t o t h e l o w e r Court f o r t r i a l of TFSL's c l a i m s a g a i n s t LTIC. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By: 
John P. Ashton, Esquire 
B£ian S. King, Esquire 
City Centre 1, Suite 900 
175 E. 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
and 
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JC^HTT^A. Kmca id , Jd 
John R. O'Keefe, J r . , E s q u i r e 
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P i t t s b u r g h , PA 15222 
(412) 281-2120 
CO-COUNSEL FOR FIRST FEDERAL OF 
PITTSBURGH (FORMERLY FIRST FEDERAL 
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EXHIBIT " A 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John P. Ashton (0134) 
Brian S. King (4610) 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
and 
John A. Kincaid, Jr. (28799). 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
Two Gateway Center 
19th Floor 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 
(412) 281-2120 
Attorneys for First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, successor to Tower 
Federal Savings and Loan Association 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership; BUILDMART MALL, 
INC.; STEVEN P. URRY; SHIRL 
WRIGHT; GLORIA S. WRIGHT; 
S.B.K. PARTNERSHIP; FOOTHILL 
THRIFT; FIRST SECURITY BANK, 
N.A.; HARPER EXCAVATING, INC.; 
NOISE CONTROL, INC.; JERRY 
MELLEN; COMPLEX FABRICATIONS, 
INC.; RICHARDS-WOODBURY 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION; TOWER 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION'S THIRD 
AMENDED CROSS CLAIM 
Civil No. C85-5883 






ASSOCIATION, now known as 
FIRST FEDERAL OF PITTSBURGH; 
DAVID V. JOHNSON d/b/a GREAT 
SALT LAKE ELECTRIC; STAKER 
PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC.; ACMOR DOOR DIV. 
OF BUILDING SYSTEMS; MOULTON 
EXCAVATING, INC.; TENANT 
COORDINATION SERVICES, INC.; 
JACK VAN GERVEN, d/b/a J & M 
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; MIKE 
FARNSWORTH PAINTING, INC.; 
UNIVERSAL CONCRETE, INC.; 
NATIONAL PLUMBING & HEATING 
COMPANY; THELMA KEECHIE d/b/a 
MESA DRYWALL SYSTEMS, INC.; 
SUPERIOR ROOFING & SHEET METAL 
COMPANY; IDEAL CONCRETE CORPOR-
ATION; ASSOCIATED SPECIALTIES, 
INC.; and LAWYERS TITLE 
INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, now known as 
FIRST FEDERAL OF PITTSBURGH, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SEAL, KENNEDY AND FRANDSEN, a 
partnership, GREGORY L. SEAL, 
JERRY R. KENNEDY, and RONALD M. 
FRANDSEN, 
Third-Party Defendants. 




FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES 
CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Defendant and third-party plaintiff Tower Federal 
Savings and Loan Association (hereafter "Tower") by and through 
its undersigned attorneys, Kincaid and McGrath, P.C. and 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler files the following Third Amended 
Cross-Claim: 
FIRST - SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Tower hereby incorporates its original 
Cross-claim dated December 12, 1985, and its Amended 
Cross-claim of July 7, 1987, along with the prayers for relief 
in their entirety as if fully set forth herein* 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Tower Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation 
(Breach of Contract) 
2. At all times relevant hereto, Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation (hereinafter "LTIC") was acting by its 
agents, servants and employees with real and apparent authority 
to act in furtherance of the business of LTIC, 
3. At all times relevant hereto, LTIC held itself 
out to Buildmart Mall, Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation 
and Tower as an expert in lien searches, title abstracts and 
title insurance. 
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necessary to obtain a title abstract to determine whether there 
were liens of record or claims pending or any other claim 
against the Borrower or the realty which would have cause Tower 
not to make the loan. 
5. As part of the contract obligations between the 
parties, LTIC was engaged to conduct the lien search and 
prepare an abstract of title. On or about November 23, 1984, 
LTIC issued a Commitment Letter, No. 1191-S (hereafter the 
"Commitment"). On March 13, 1985 Tower agreed to loan the 
Buildmart project $750,000.00. In connection with the loan, 
LTIC provided a policy of title insurance (hereafter the 
"Policy11) naming Richards Woodbury Mortgage Company and Tower 
as insureds and purporting to disclose all claims and/or liens 
against the real estate securing the loan as of March 13, 
1985. 
6. In performing these services, LTIC had a 
contractual duty to Tower to exercise the skill and care 
necessary to discover and report in the Commitment and Policy 
any and all claims and/or liens relating to the property. 
7. LTIC breached their contract obligations with 
Tower in that they failed to exercise the requisite skill and 
care under the circumstances by failing to either find and/or 
report all of the claims and/or liens against the real estate 
securing the Tower loan. 








information regarding the realty securing the prospective loan 
in both the Commitment or the Policy resulted in the loss to 
Tower of $750,000.00, the amount of the loan extended to the 
Buildmart project by Tower# plus consequential damages in the 
form of interest/ costs and attorney's fees of an undetermined 
amount to be proven with greater specificity at trial of this 
matter. 
EIGHTH CAUSE QF ACTION 
Tower Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Lawyers Title 
Insurance Company 
(Negligent Misrepresentation) 
9. Tower incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8 above. 
10. LTIC had a duty to examine and disclose the 
condition of the title to the real estate in an accurate, 
thorough and correct manner so as to reflect the true status of 
title to the property on November 23# 1984 and on March 13, 
1985. 
11. At the time the Commitment was issued and at 
times thereafter before issuance of the Policy mechanics liens 
encumbering the property securing the loan were of public 
record. Nevertheless/ the Commitment did not disclose these 
liens and no supplemental commitments were issued. 
12. LTIC knew the existence of mechanics liens on the 







for any lender to consider before making a loan. Tower would 
not have loaned $750,000.00 for the Buildmart project had it 
known of the existence of the undisclosed mechanics liens. 
13. Tower did in fact rely on the information 
disclosed in the Commitment and Policy in evaluating whether it 
would agree to loan money to complete the Buildmart project. 
14. Tower's reliance on the information in the 
Commitment and Policy was reasonable given the prevailing 
practice in the industry, the expectations of title insurance 
customers generally, and the statutory duties of title insurers 
in the State of Utah. 
15. LTIC breached the duty referred to above by 
negligently failing to disclose claims and/or liens on the real 
estate securing the Tower Loan. 
16. The misrepresentations by LTIC in the Commitment 
and Policy were material to Tower°s decision to lend money on 
the Buildmart project. 
17. As an actual and proximate cause of the 
negligence of LTIC in failing to disclose claims and/or liens 
affecting the real estate securing the Tower loan, Tower has 
been damaged in the amount of $750,000.00, the amount of the 
loan extended to the Buildmart project by Tower, plus interest, 
costs, attorney's fees and other general damages in an 
undetermined amount to be proven with greater specificity at 




r« I, Suit* 000 
Fourth South 
.4k* City 
PIPTR CAUSE QF ACTION 
Tower Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Lawyers Title 
insurance Company 
(Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
18. Tower incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 17 above. 
19. Tower was a named insured under the terms of the 
Policy written by LTIC in March of 1985. 
20. Tower would not have loaned $750,000 for the 
Buildmart project without obtaining from LTIC its agreement to 
insure in accordance with the terms of the Policy. 
21. LTIC had a duty imposed by law to deal fairly and 
in aood faith with Tower. LTIC breached that duty by 
willfully, maliciously and without cause refusing to indemnify, 
failing to discover and report all liens and encumbrances on 
the property and by otherwise refusing to faithfully perform 
under the terms of the policy. 
22. LTIC's conduct under the circumstances was 
wanton, willful, malicious and outrageous and intended to, and 
did in fact, defraud Tower. 
23. As an actual and proximate cause of the wrongful 
conduct of LTIC, Tower has been damaged in the amount of 
$750,000, the amount of the loan extended to the Buildmart 
project by Tower, plus interest, costs, attorney's fees and 
other general damages including punitive damages in an 
undetermined amount to be proven with greater specificity at 
the trial of this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Tower prays for relief against LTIC as 
follows: 
A. For judgment against LTIC on Tower*s Seventh 
Cause of Action in the amount of $750#000 plus consequential 
damages in an amount to be proven with greater specificity at 
trial of this matter together with Tower's attorney's fees, 
costs and interest; 
B. For judgment against LTIC on Tower's Eighth Cause 
of Action in the amount of $750,000 plus general damages in an 
amount to be proven with greater specificity at trial of this 
matter together with Tower's attorney's fees, costs and 
interest; 
C. For judgment against LTIC on Tower's Ninth Cause 
of Action in the amount of $750,000 plus general damages 
including punitive damages in an amount to be proven with 
greater specificity at trial of this matter together with 
Tower's attorney's fees, costs and interest; and 
D. For such further relief as the Court deems 
equitable in the premises. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By. 
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KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
By 
John A. Kincaid, Jr. 
Attorneys for First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, 
successor to Tower Federal Savings 
and Loan Association 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I h^reby certify that, on the day of February, 
1988, I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION'S 
THIRD AMENDE*) CROSS-CLAIM to the following: 
Robert H. Re<jS, Esq. 
KIPP Si CHRISTIAN 
City Centre X, Suite 330 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, utah 84111 
Peter W. BilHngs, Jr., Esq. 
John E. S. R^bson, Esq. 
FABIAN St CLEIJJDENIN 
215 S. State st., 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L. Rich Humphreys, Esq. 
Craig Wentz, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN Si POWELL 
900 Kearns Binding 
Salt Lake City> vtah B41D1 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Curtis J. Drake, Esq. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 S. West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey Oritt, Esq. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, JONES St 
MOXLEY 
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Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L. Kay, Esq. 
Paul D. Newman, Esq. 
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400 Deseret Building 




EXHIBIT " B 
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&> 
Robert S. Howell (Bar No. 1559) 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (Bar No. 2478) 
Lorin D. Ronnow (Bar No. 3857) 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, JONES & MOXLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant Lawyers 
Title Insurance Corporation 
257 East 200 South-2, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2048 
Telephone: (801) 531-7575 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, BUILDMART MALL, 
INC., STEVEN P. URRY, SHIRL 
WRIGHT, GLORIA S. WRIGHT, S.B.K. 
PARTNERSHIP, FOOTHILL THRIFT, 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., HARPER 
EXCAVATING, INC., NOISE CONTROL, 
INC., JERRY MELLEN, COMPLEX 
FABRICATIONS, INC., RICHARDS-
WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, DAVID V. JOHNSON dba 
GREAT SALT LAKE ELECTRIC, STAKER 
PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., ACMOR DOOR DIV. OF BUILDING 
SYSTEMS, MOULTON EXCAVATING, INC., 
TENANT COORDINATION SERVICES, 
INC., JACK VAN GERVEN, dba 
J & M CONSTRUCTION, INC., MIKE 
FARNSWORTH PAINTING, INC., 
UNIVERSAL CONCRETE, INC., 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION'S ANSWER TO 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION'S 
THIRD AMENDED CROSSCLAIM 
Civil No. C85-5883 
(Judge Raymond Uno) 
NATIONAL PLUMBING & HEATING 
COMPANY, THELMA KEECHIE dba MESA 
DRYWALL SYSTEMS, INC., SUPERIOR 
ROOFING & SHEET METAL COMPANY, 
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION, 
ASSOCIATED SPECIALTIES, INC., and 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 




SEAL, KENNEDY AND FRANDSEN, a 
partnership, GREGORY L. SEAL, 
JERRY R. KENNEDY, and RONALD 
M. FRANDSEN, 
Third-Party Defendants. 




FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES 
CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation ("LTIC"), 
by and through its undersigned counsel, and in response to the 
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Third Amended Crossclaim of Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Association ("Tower"), hereby admits, denies or otherwise alleges 
as follows: 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Tower fails to state a claim against LTIC upon which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
With regard to the allegations in Tower's Third Amended 
Crossclaim, LTIC denies each and every allegation not 
specifically admitted herein. 
1. In the first paragraph of its Third Amended 
Crossclaim, Tower incorporates the allegations in both its 
December 12, 1985 original Crossclaim and its July 7, 1987 
Amended Crossclaim. In neither of those Crossclaims did Tower 
assert any claims against LTIC. In its original Crossclaim, 
paragraph 3, Tower incorporated by reference paragraphs 1 through 
28 of plaintiff Culp Construction Company's Complaint before 
making further factual allegations in 8 subsequent paragraphs. 
Because Tower has failed to identify which of those allegations 
apply specifically to LTIC, LTIC will neither admit nor deny 
herein the allegations either incorporated by reference or set 
forth specifically in Tower's original Crossclaim or Amended 
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Crossclaim. LTIC will respond specifically to the allegations 
made against LTIC in Tower's Third Amended Crossclaim herein. 
2. LTIC admits that through its agent it issued a 
title insurance loan policy to Tower on March 20, 1985 regarding 
Tower's interest in the Buildmart Mall and Distribution Center 
Project ("Project"). LTIC denies each and every other allegation 
in paragraph 2 of the Tower's Third Amended Crossclaim (hereafter 
referred to as "Crossclaim"). 
3. LTIC denies that it made any representation to 
Buildmart Mall, Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation 
("Richards-Woodbury") or Tower with regard to its expertise in 
the area of lien searches, title abstracts and title insurance. 
To the best of its knowledge, information and understanding, none 
of its agents or its agent's employees made any representations 
to Buildmart Mall, Richards-Woodbury, or Tower with regard to 
their expertise in the area of lien searches, title abstracts and 
title insurance. 
4. LTIC has no knowledge, information or 
understanding as to the veracity of the allegations made in 
paragraph 4 of Tower's Crossclaim, and therefore denies the same. 
5. LTIC denies that it was engaged to conduct the 
lien search and prepare an abstract of title. LTIC admits the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 5 of Tower's Crossclaim, but 
denies that the title insurance loan policy ("Policy") issued by 
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LTIC on March 20, 1985 named Tower and Richards-Woodbury as 
insureds• 
6. Paragraph 6 is denied. 
7. Paragraph 7 is denied. 
8. Paragraph 8 is denied. 
9. LTIC realleges and incorporates by reference 
herein its responses to paragraphs 1 through 8 of Tower's 
Crossclaim. 
10. Paragraph 10 is denied. 
11. Admitted that certain mechanics' liens encumbering 
the Project were of public record prior to the issuance of the 
Policy on March 20, 1985, and that no supplemental Commitments to 
the original Commitment were issued, but denied that said 
mechanics' liens were of public record at the time the November 
23, 1984 Commitment was issued. The remaining allegations of 
































18. LTIC realleges and incorporates by reference 
herein its responses to paragraphs 1 through 17 of Tower's 
Crossclaim. 
19. Paragraph 19 is admitted. 
20. LTIC has no knowledge, information or 
understanding with regard to the veracity of the allegations made 
in paragraph 20 of Tower's Crossclaim, and therefore denies the 
same. 
21. LTIC's legal duties with regard to the issuance of 
its Policy to Tower is not a question of factf and therefore 
requires neither admission or denial in this Answer. LTIC denies 
each and every remaining allegation in paragraph 21 of Towerfs 
Crossclaim. 
22. Paragraph 22 is denied. 
23. Paragraph 23 is denied. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Tower's Crossclaim is barredf in whole or in part, 
because Tower has failed to mitigate, or has aggravated, the 
damages it has claimed in its Crossclaim. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Tower's Crossclaim is barred, in whole or in part, by 
the equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Towerfs Crossclaim is barred, in whole or in part, by 
Tower's failure to comply, under the express terms of the Policy, 
with the condition precedent of filing a Notice of Loss, 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Tower1s Crossclaim is barred, in whole or in part, 
because the proximate cause of Tower's alleged damages was not 
any act or omisaion by LTIC, but rather the foreclosure upon the 
Project by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("FSB"), which 
foreclosure extinguished Tower's interest in the Project. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Tower's Crossclaim is barred, in whole or in part, 
because the proximate cause of Tower's alleged damages was the 
negligence and/or misrepresentations of third parties over whom 
LTIC had and has no control. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Towards Crossclaim is barred, in whole or in part, 
because its own negligence in failing to make any attempt to stop 
FSB's foreclosure or otherwise assert its interest in the 
Project was the sole proximate cause, or the substantial 
contributing proximate cause, of the damages it alleges in its 
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Crossclaim, and to the extent that it was culpable, its claims 
are barred. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Tower's Crossclaim is barred, in whole or in part, by 
the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
As a further and separate Affirmative Defense, LTIC 
states that it has, or may have, further and additional 
Affirmative Defenses which are not yet known to it, but which may 
become known through further discovery, which is ongoing. LTIC 
asserts each and every Affirmative Defense as it may be 
ascertained through further discovery herein. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
As a further and separate Affirmative Defense, LTIC 
alleges that Tower's Third Amended Crossclaim was not brought in 
good faith and is meritless, and LTIC is therefore entitled to 
its reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-
56 (1953, as amended). 
WHEREFORE, defendant LTIC pravs for relief from the 
Third Amended Crossclaim of defendant Tower as follows: 
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1. That Tower's Crossclaim be dismissed, with 
prejudice and on the merits, and that Tower take nothing thereby; 
2. That LTIC be awarded its costs, expenses and 
attorney's fees incurred, together with all other costs and 
expenses suffered or incurred by LTIC in connection with any and 
all claims asserted by Tower under the Policy issued by LTIC to 
Tower (including without limitation attorney's fees of counsel 
for Tower, paid by LTIC pursuant to its acceptance, with 
reservation of rights, of Tower's tender of defense under said 
Policy); and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court 
deems just and equitable. / 
DATED this M' day of February, 1988. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, JONES & M0XLE1 
Attorneys for Defendant Lawyers 
Title Insurance Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A 
I hereby certify that on this n' day of February, 
1988, I caused a true and correct copy of LTIC's Answer to 
Tower's Third Amended Crossclaim to be delivered by placing the 
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same in the United States mail, 
following parties and counsel of 
Peter W. Billings, Jr., Esq, 
John E. S. Robson, Esq, 
Patrick L. Anderson, Esq, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C 
215 S. State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Verden E. Bettilyon, Esq. 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER 
2677 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
John A. Kincaid, Jr., Esq. 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
2 Gateway Center 
19th Floor 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
John P. Ashton, Esq. 
Brian S. King, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Curtis J. Drake, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& SMITH 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
tailed, postage prepaid, to the 
record: 
H. Shirl & Gloria Wright 
1571 River Oaks Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
William Thomas Thurman, Esq. 
Scott C. Pierce, Esq. 
MCKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE 
1200 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Thomas L. Kay, Esq. 
Paul D. Newman, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
Craig Wence, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert H. Rees, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314 
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EXHIBIT " C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and °. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ON LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
: CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR 
Plaintiffs, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST TOWER 
: FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
VS. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited CIVIL NO. C-85-5883 
partnership, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SEAL, KENNEDY AND FRANDSEN, a 
partnership, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES 
CORPORATION, 
Third Party Defendant. 
This matter came on for hearing on July 15, 1988 on 
defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation's ("LTIC") Motion 
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for Summary Judgment against Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Association ("Tower"). Defendant LTIC being represented by their 
counsel Doug K. Butler and Jeffrey R. Oritt, and Tower being 
represented by their attorneys John A. Kincaid, Jr. and Brian F. 
King. Memoranda having been submitted by the parties, and 
argument being made, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having read the Memoranda, and having considered the 
arguments, and now being fully advised sets forth its Memorandum 
Decision. 
I. FACTS 
The facts briefly are: 
1. In September, 1984 Industrial Development Revenue Bonds 
("IRB's") dated July 15, 1984, in the face amount of $7,750,000 
were sold to provide permanent financing for the Buildmart 
project. 
2. As a condition of closing the IRB Loan, First Security 
Bank ("FSB") obtained from Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation 
("LTIC") through its then local agent, Richmond Title Company, a 
Title Insurance Loan Policy in the amount of $7,750,000, insuring 
"FSB as trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of July 15, 
1984, and FSB as a letter of credit bank." 
3. On or about November 23, 1984, Richmond prepared and 
delivered to Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation a Commitment 
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for Title Insurance, dated November 23, 1984, which named 
Richards-Woodbury as the proposed insured. 
4. On or about March 20, 1985, Tower Federal Savings & 
Loan Association ("Tower") as assignee of Richards-Woodbury, made 
a loan of $750,000 (the "Tower Loan") to BM. 
5. The Tower loan was secured by a second lien Trust Deed 
dated March 13# 1985, and recorded on March 20# 1985 in the 
Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County. 
6. As a condition of closing the Tower loan, LTIC, through 
its then local agent, Richmond, issued the Tower Policy, naming 
Tower as the insured. 
7. The Tower Policy specifically excluded coverage of any 
loss or damage which might arise as a result of the existence of 
FSB's first lien Trust Deed. 
8. Tower and its agents were aware that the Tower Policy 
specifically excluded coverage for any loss or damage due to the 
existence of FSB's first lien Trust Deed, and Tower knew that its 
security interest in the real property standing as security for 
the loan was subordinate to FSB's security interest in the same 
real property. 
9. Jeffrey K. Woodbury and his law firm, Woodbury, 
Bettilyon & Kesler, acted as counsel for Tower and for Richards-
Woodbury prior to the closing of the Tower loan transaction in 
March, 1985. Woodbury and his law firm were responsible for and 
CULP V. BUILDMART PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
obtained from Richmond the Tower Commitment, as well as the Tower 
Policy. 
10. At or before the Tower loan closing, Woodbury and his 
law firm received from Gregory L. Seal, counsel for BM, a letter 
dated March 13, 1985 which disclosed a mechanics lien in the 
amount of $57,075.26 asserted by Complex Fabrications, Inc. 
against the project and discussed it at length, together with the 
litigation referred to therein as the "Bill Gibson Litigation." 
11. There also appeared of record, prior to the Tower loan 
closing, three other liens for $759.50, $2,255.00, and 
$84,010.58. Richmond did not take exception in the Tower 
Commitment or in the Tower Policy to the liens or the Bill Gibson 
Litigation. The Tower Policy insured over all such matters, 
which Tower and their agents knew it would. 
12. Culp Construction Company ("Gulp") commenced this 
litigation by filing a Complaint for mechanic's lien foreclosure 
on or about September 3, 1985. 
13. Tower tendered its defense of this litigation to LTIC 
under the Tower Policy as required by paragraph 3(b) of the 
Conditions and Stipulations. Tower has not given LTIC any notice 
of loss (such notice being required by paragraph 4 of the 
Conditions and Stipulations as a condition of LTICfs having any 
liability under the Policy as to any loss claimed.) 
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14. LTIC accepted the tender of defense from Tower subject 
to a reservation of rights. Pursuant to such acceptance, 
Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler was appointed as the counsel that 
would independently represent Tower's interest, such law firm 
having been independently selected by Tower. 
15. LTIC accepted from FSB a similar tender of defense with 
respect to this litigation, subject to a reservation of rights. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker v/as appointed as the counsel that would 
independently represent FSB's interests, such law firm having 
been independently selected by FSB. 
16. Sometime after March 20, 1985, BM defaulted on its loan 
with.Tower by failing to make the required monthly payments to 
Tower. Tower did not take any action after BM's default to 
foreclose its lien against the project. 
17. BM defaulted on its obligations under the IRB Loan. As 
trustee under the indenture of trust, FSB initiated non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings against the project. On March 16, 1987, 
FSB held a non-judicial trustee's sale on the courthouse steps, 
at which FSB bid in the sum of $6,200,000 and acquired the 
project. By operation of law, upon the conclusion of such sale, 
all liens junior to the first lien held by FSB, including Tower's 
second lien Trust Deed, were extinguished. Tower and its counsel 
failed to take any action to stop or seek to stop the foreclosure 
CULP V. BUILDMART PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
sale, or to in any other way protect its security interest in the 
project. 
18. On March 27, 1987, this Court granted Summary Judgment 
to certain mechanic's lien claimants and entered its Order, 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. 
19. In April, 1987, FSB appealed from the Summary Judgment, 
and LTIC independently took an appeal. Tower failed to make an 
appeal, thereby failing to challenge the Court's Decree of 
Foreclosure, which extinguished any security interest Tower had 
in the project. 
II. LTIC'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Tower's damages were caused by BM's default on the 
Tower loan and FSB's foreclosure on the project, not by any 
breach by LTIC of the Tower Policy. When FSB initiated its non-
judicial foreclosure action on the project, Tower failed to take 
any steps to stop the foreclosure action, to bid in at the sale 
of the project during the foreclosure action, or to in any other 
way protect its security interest in the project. FSB's 
foreclosure of its first lien Trust Deed interest in the project 
extinguished Tower's inferior second lien Trust Deed interest in 
the project. 
The possibility that Tower would suffer a loss due to the 
existence and foreclosure of the FSB first lien was not a matter 
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for which coverage was provided to Tower under the Tower Policy— 
it was a risk the Policy specifically excluded from coverage. 
Any damages Tower has suffered have been caused by BM's default 
on their loan obligations, and FSB's foreclosure action. 
Accordingly, LTIC has absolutely no liability in contract or in 
tort for Tower's damages. 
Tower has known since the commencement of this litigation 
almost three years ago that LTIC was not liable for any loss 
Tower suffered due to the foreclosure by FSB of its lien against 
the Project. This knowledge is evidenced by Tower's failure to 
bring a crossclaim against LTIC until approximately two years 
after this litigation commenced. This Court dismissed Tower's 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against LTIC. 
An insured cannot assert a non-contract claim against its insurer 
unless it can assert a companion contract claim. Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Although Tower has 
amended its Crossclaim three times, it still has not articulated 
a breach of contract claim against LTIC under the Tower Policy, 
and has admitted this in its responses to LTIC's discovery 
requests. 
In its claim Tower cites duties, the breach of which would 
give rise to a tort claim, not a contract claim. Tower's latest 
allegations are a thinly-veiled attempt to reassert its tortious 
misrepresentation causes of action that were dismissed by this 
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Court on December 28, 1987. Tower merely renamed its "fraudulent 
misrepresentation" cause of action as a "breach of contract" 
cause of action. 
Tower's "breach of contract" cause of action can be 
dismissed summarily for the following reasons: 
(a) LTIC has breached no contractual obligations to 
Tower. The risk of foreclosure was specifically excluded from 
LTIC's insurance obligations. Tower was specifically aware of 
this risk and accepted it at the time it made the loan and 
purchased the Tower Policy. 
(b) LTIC had no contractual obligation to Tower under 
the Tower Commitment. Richards-Woodbury requested a Commitment 
for Title Insurance from LTIC, which was prepared and delivered 
to Richards-Woodbury by LTIC's then local agent, Richmond. Any 
contractual obligations LTIC had under the Tower Commitment ran 
to Richards-Woodbury, not to Tower. 
(c) The allegations Tower makes with regard to LTIC's 
contractual obligations are in fact allegations of tortious 
misrepresentation, which causes of action were dismissed by this 
Court on December 28# 1987. 
B. If Tower has no contractual cause of action against 
LTIC, it is precluded from bringing any independent tort causes 
of action under prevailing Utah case law. Beck. 
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C. Tower's Third Amended Crossclaim was not brought in 
good faith and is meritless# and LTIC is therefore entitled to 
its costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against it, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). 
At the February 11, 1988 hearing of Tower's Motion to Amend, the 
Court indicated that it was persuaded that Tower did not have any 
cause of action against LTIC, as a matter of law. The Court did, 
however, allow Tower to amend their Second Amended Crossclaim and 
utilize the remaining discovery period in an attempt to find 
facts that might support the causes of action alleged in Tower's 
Third Amended Crossclaim. 
Tower's Third Amended Crossclaim is substantially identical 
to its Second Amended Crossclaim; it is a tortious 
misrepresentation claim in "breach of contract" language. 
Tower's Ninth Cause of Action alleges that LTIC breached a duty 
to deal fairly and in good faith, utilizing "bad faith" language 
of willfulness, maliciousness, wantonness, and outrageousness. 
Not only is Tower precluded from bringing such a tort cause of 
action under the Beck case, but no discovery done to date by 
Tower or any of the other parties in this litigation has 
uncovered a shred of evidence to support these allegations. 
Because none of the causes of action Tower has alleged in 
its Third Amended Crossclaim have merit, nor were they brought in 
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good faith, LTIC is entitled to its costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in having to defend against it. 
D# Because Tower cannot dispute the facts set forth above 
by LTIC# and because they cannot present any evidence showing the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact with regard to any 
of their claims against LTIC in their Third Amended Crossclaim, 
those claims are ripe for Summary Judgment. Celotex, Liberty 
Lobbyf Robinson. 
III. TOWERfS ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. It is well-settled law in the State of Utah that when 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must evaluate 
all evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Bowen v. Riverton, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982). 
B. LTIC bases its entire position upon the "risk" 
allegedly assumed by Tower as a result of its intended lien 
position. Tower never received a second lien position, as 
promised. But assuming that Tower did receive a second lien 
position, the legal effect of the foreclosure sale on that 
position has absolutely no materiality to or effect upon Tower's 
tort and contract claims in this case. Tower never assumed the 
risk of fraud. 
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C. Tower never recalls the Court saying, "[B]ased upon the 
discovery done to date, the Court did not feel that Tower had any 
claim against LTIC as a matter of law under their Third Amended 
Crossclaim." Tower's discovery requests to LTIC have not been 
fully answered* Recent efforts to depose representatives of LTIC 
have been frustrated by LTIC's claims of unavailability of the 
proposed deponents, or by LTIC's attempts to limit the scope of 
the testimony of the proposed deponents. 
D. The main issue in this case is fraud; the foreclosure 
sale is immaterial. Tower would not have made the loan at all if 
the undisclosed liens were made known to them. Beck is impotent 
in this situation because Tower's cause of action against LTIC 
arose before LTIC issued the subject title policy. There is no 
need for Tower to assert a contractual cause of action; the 
representations which were made to Tower which constituted fraud 
occurred long before any title policy was issued. The 
misrepresentations were made in order to induce Tower to enter 
into various contracts. LTIC knew or should have known of the 
liens prior to the execution of the title policy and withheld 
this information to the detriment of Tower. 
E. The facts of this case must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to Tower. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
1977) . 
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IV. LTIC'S SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENTS 
A. Tower has failed to dispute any of LTIC's undisputed 
facts. Tower confused the liens that had been filed against the 
subject property prior to March 13, 1985, and which had been 
released of record, or which were released of record prior to 
March 20, 1985, with liens that were subsequently filed against 
the subject property. 
B. Tower misrepresents the status of discovery efforts by 
the parties in this litigation. Tower claims that LTIC did not 
fully answer most of Tower's discovery requests, when the reverse 
is true. Tower was subject to a joint Motion to Compel by LTIC, 
FSB, and Seal due to its obstructive and delaying efforts with 
regard to document requests by the LTIC, FSB and Seal. Tower 
failed to attend the depositions of two LTIC representatives, 
which indicates its belief that its claim rise and fall upon the 
language of the Policy. 
C. Tower has failed to rebut LTIC's arguments in support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and therefore it must be 
granted. The foreclosure by FSB is not an immaterial event. 
Tower simply avoided it because it had no argument with which to 
defend itself. Tower's interpretation of Beck does nothing to 
dispel the ruling in Beck that a breach of the insurance contract 
must be proven before the Court will allow the recovery of any 
damages, whether general or consequential. 
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D. Tower can assert no claim under the Policy because the 
loss of its security interest in the subject property was caused 
by the risk it accepted. Tower has not disputed its knowledge 
and acceptance of this risk. 
V. ANALYSIS 
LTIC succinctly summarizes their case in their Memorandum: 
After the default of BM on the Tower 
loan, Tower found itself searching for 
parties against whom it might have claims 
against whom it might recover its damages. 
During this search, Tower apparently 
concluded that it would not bring any 
contract or tort actions against Richards-
Woodbury Mortgage Corporation, the entity 
that represented to Tower that the Tower Loan 
was a feasible and attractive business 
opportunity, nor did Tower consider bringing 
any action against its legal counsel. 
Instead of bringing claims against those 
parties, Tower has chosen to assert baseless 
claims against LTIC, among other parties. 
Tower's damage was not caused by any breach of LTIC; rather, it 
was the result of BM's default on its loan. That Tower was not 
in the second position is not LTIC's fault. 
Under either a "breach of contract" theory, or a "fraud" 
theory, Tower cannot meet its burden. Tower's analysis of Beck 
does not change the fact that a breach of contractual duties must 
first be found before any other cause of action can be initiated. 
Under allegations of fraud, Tower has failed to produce evidence 
CULP V. BUILDMART PAGE FOURTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of any misrepresentations on the part of LTIC, and negligent 
omission cannot lie where no duty to disclose exists. 
Despite Tower's insistence that the matter of the 
foreclosure is irrelevant, they have not refuted the fact that 
their interest was extinguished by FSB's purchase of the project. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court is of the opinion 
LTIC's Motion for Summary * Judgment should be granted, and so 
orders. The parties to bear their own attorney's fees and costs. 
LTIC's counsel to prepare Judgment pursuant to this Memorandum 
Decision. 
Dated this ^ day of August, 1988. 
JSJ. 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Richmond, Virginia 
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I ALTA Owner's Policy—Form B-1970 (Rev. 10-17-70) 
I ALTA Residential Title Insurance Policy—1979 
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) ALTA Loan Policy, 1970 (Rev. 10-17-70) 
'oposed insured 
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t letotEBE SIMPLE estate or interest in the land 
ascribed or referred to in this Commitment is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
LDMART MALL, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
he land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO 
Commitment M 0 8 5 5 3 
-»rirorl O f l i o A r r\r A n n r t t 
Schedule A—Page 1 
This commitment is invalid unless 
I h o I n e i i r i n n P r n u i c i n n c a n d Q r h p H . 
laiuyers Title Insurance Corporation 
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE A - 4 rnnt'd. 
EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which is North 
0°02l25tl East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59°57,35M East 522.115 feet along said street to a point 
on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37°22,46M East 351.322 feet; thence 
continuing along said street South 12°57,35M East 204.761 feet; thence North 
72°05,59M East 108.000 feet; thence South 18o09'27" East 170.000 feet; thence 
North 77°02'25" East 263.450 feet to the Westerly line of the D. & R.G.W. 
Rail-road right-of-way; thence North 08°03l21fl West 859.000 feet along said 
right-of-way; thence South 81056f39M West 30.000 feet; thence North 44°20I00M 
West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 80.00 foot radius curve to the 
right; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears 
North 22°40,00M West 59.073 feet); thence North OrOO'OO" West 281.994 feet; 
thence South 89°01,27" West 688.790 feet; thence South 0°28l46n East 41.171 
feet; thence North 89°50,46M West 11.724 feet to the proposed centerline 
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with 
a 515.935 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South 30°02'25M West 25.000 feet to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways located on, over 
and across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77°02,25" East 100.00 feet; thence North 17°54f01n West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72°05f59M West 100.235 feet; thence South 18°09,27" 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property and 
for the use of that property immediately abutting to ths West. 
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SCHEDULE B — Section 1 
Requirements 
The following are the requirements to be complied with 
Item (a) Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the estate or interest 
to be insured 
Item (b) Proper instrument(s) creating the estate or interest to be insured must be executed and duly filed for record, 
to-wit 
1. Mortgage or Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, to 
secure your loan. 
2. Reconveyance of that Tirust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as 
Trustor to Richmond Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. 
Shirl Wright, as Beneficiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and 
recorded June 28, 1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977. 
This commitment is invalid unless ihiscommitment isinvana unless «^ ?OAS^^ 
the Insuring Provisions and Sched- Schedule B-Section 1 -Page 1 -Commitment NoJ l i l I£r££2rL A ~ ~ , 1 O ~~ry 
Iaiuyers Title Insurance Corporation 
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE B-Section 2 
Exceptions 
The policy or policies to be issued w i l l contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to 
the satisfaction of the Company: 
1. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
2. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records. 
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and any facts which 
a correct survey and inspection of the premises would disclose and which are not shown by the 
public records. 
4. Any l ien, or r ight to a l ien, for services, labor or material heretofore or hereafter fu rn ished, im-
posed by law and not shown by the public records. 
5. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in 
the publ ic records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the 
proposed insured acquires of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered 
by this Commitment. 
6. Taxes for the year 1984 are delinquent if they were not paid by November 30 
1984 as to the following: ' 
In the amount of $9,104.60 as to Sidwell No, part of 21-36-377-004; 
In the amount of $36.32 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-016; 
In the amount of $7.75 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-017; 
and In the amount of $15.51 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-020 
NOTE: Salt Lake County Treasurer Telephone No. 535-7404. 
7. Subject to an easement and right-of-way in favor of Utah Power and Light Company 
for electric transmission and distribution facilities along a line described as 
follows: Beginning 450 feet South and 760 feet West, more or less, from the 
North Quarter Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Baseband Meridian; thence North 9°46f West 660 feet, more or less, thence North 
8°12' West 787 feet; the width of said easement is not disclosed. Contained in 
that certain Easement dated July 1, 1980 and recorded November 13, 1980 in Book 
5176 Page 1132 as Entry No. 3501386. 
Exceptions numberedl—thru 4 incl. are hereby omitted^g t 0 ^LTA Loan 
Policy 
The Owner 's Policy to be issued, if any, shall contain the f o l l ow ing items in add i t ion to the ones set forth above: 
(1) The Deed of Trust, if any, requi red under Schedule B—Section 1, Item lb) . 
(2) Unpatented min ing claims, reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts author iz ing issuance 
thereof; wa te r r ights, claims or t it le to water 
(3) Any and al l unpa id taxes, assessments and unredeemed tax sales. 
Schedule B—Section 2—Page 1 - N o . 
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SCHEDULE B-2 cont'd. 
8. Subject to a perpetual easement over the North 20 feet of Lots 5B and 6A in 
favor of Salt Lake County, to bring any and all machinery and equipment upon 
said property for the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining, 
repairing and keeping in satisfactory condition, a waterway in Salt Lake County 
Surveyor's Office, Midvale Storm Drain, as contained in that certain Easement 
recorded March 15, 1966 in Book 2439, Page 407, said Easement affects the 
Northerly line of that property described in Schedule "A" hereof which is 
vested in Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, 
9* Subject to an Easement for Utilities, 14 feet in width along and immediately 
adjoining easterly Sandy Parkway, a dedicated street, as reserved in the 
dedication of said street. 
10. Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond 
Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, as 
Beneficiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977. 
11. Subject to all unrecorded leases and to the terras and conditions thereof. 
Richmond Title Company is to be provided a copy of said leases prior to 
closing. 
12. An Agreement dated July 10, 1984 by and between Buildmart Mall, a limited 
partnership and Daw, Inc., Employees Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. Given to 
create a temporary easement for ingress and egress for the use and benefit of 
that property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject 
property described in Schedule "A" hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and 
shall be located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property. This 
easement shall automatically terminate at such time as a road is dedicated to 
the public use or improvements are made to establish a road. 
Schedule **~Z Page z o " No. 
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SCHEDULE B ~ 2 cont'd. 
Subject to right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described 
in Schedule "A" hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more 
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the 
public at a future date. 
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00°02I25M East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59°57'35M East 50.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius reverse curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears North 14°57,35M West 35.355 feet) to a 
point of tangency with a 540.935 foot radius curve to the left, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 283.613 feet (chord bears North 15°01,12" 
East 280.376 feet), thence North 225.312 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 38.844 feet (chord bears North 44°30,43" East 35.053 feet), thence 
South 89°01f27,f West 38.201 feet, thence South 00o28f46M East 41.171 feet; 
thence North 89o50'46" West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point 
of tangency with a 490.935 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said 
curve for an arc distance of 257.398 feet (chord bears South 15°01,12M West 
254.460 fqet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the 
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears 
South 75°02'25M West 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard, 
thence South 59057f35n East 50.000 feet along said Northerly line to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
A non-exclusive Right of Way over the Easterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30 
feet in width, over and through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of 
subject property, being more particularly described as follows: 
BEGIN on the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00°02,25n East 326.883 feet and East 1350.455 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 72°05,59n East 350.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
64.976 foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 90.900 feet (chord bears North 32°01,19" East 83.667 feet) to the 
Westerly right of way line of the D.&R.G.W. Railroad, thence North 08°03f2r' 
West 517.185 feet along said right of way to a point of tangency with a 154.768 
foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 
97.993 feet (chord bears North 26°ir40M West 96.365 feet), thence North 
44°20,00n West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with an 80.000 foot radius 
curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet 
(chord bears North 22o40,00" West 59.073 feet), thence North 01°00,00M West 
257.017 feet to a point of tangency with a 55.000 foot radius curve to the 
left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears 
North 45°59t16,t West 77.765 feet), thence South 89°0r27" West 663.540 feet, 
thence South O O ^ ^ O " East 30.001 feet, thence North 89°or27" East 663.801 
feet to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the right, 
thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.259 feet (chord bears South 
45°59,17" East 35.348 feet), thence South 01°00f00M East 257.017 feet to a 
point of tangency with a 110.000 foot radius curve to the left, thence 
CONTINUED ON RIDER 
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CONTINUED 
along said curve for an arc distance of 83.194 feet (chord bears South 
22°40f00" East 81.225 feet), thence South 44°20,00fl East 234.704 feet to a 
point of tangency with a 124.768 foot radius curve to the right, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 78.999 feet (chord bears South 26olll40l, East 
77.686 feet), thence South 08°03f2rf East 517.185 feet to a point of tangency 
with a 34.976 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 48.931 feet (chord bears South 32°01l18" West 45.037 feet), 
thence South 72°05,59M West 347.407 feet to the Easterly line of Sandy 
Boulevard, thence South 12°57f35n East 30.112 feet along said Easterly line to 
the point of BEGINNING. 
A Right Of Way Easement 16 feet in width in favor of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, a corporation of the State of Utah, it's successors and assigns, to 
lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipelines, 
valves, valve boxes and other gas transaction and distribution facility through 
and across subject property described in Schedule "A" hereof along center lines 
as shown on the plat attached thereof. 
TOGETHER with all rights and privileges incident thereto, as recorded August 
27, 1984, Entry No. 3985384, Book 5585, as Page 599. 
Corrective Easement dated September 11, 1984 and recorded October 23, 1984 in 
Book 5600, Page 934 as Entry No. 4007245. 
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways on, over and 
across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77o02f25" East 100.00 feet; thence North 17°54f01lf West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72°05f59if West 100.235 feet; thence South 18°09f27" 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the subject property and for 
the use of that property immediately abutting to the West. 
Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, as Trustor to 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a National Banking Association authorized 
and doing business in the State of Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of Sandy City, Utah Industrial 
Development Bonds, Series 1984, under an Indenture of Trust dated as of July 
15, 1984; First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as a letter of credit bank, as 
Beneficiaries, to secure $7,750,000.00, dated September 25, 1984 and recorded 
September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, Page 1940 as Entry No. 3997400. 
*rh»ri„t» B-2
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18. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of 
July 15, 1984, appears as Secured Party, recorded September 26, 1984 in Book 
5593, Page 1974 as Entry No. 3997401. 
19. Subject to terms, conditions and special assessments of the Special Improvement 
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a 
Municipal corporation. 
20. Said property is located within the boundaries of Midvale City, Sandy City and 
Sandy Suburban Improvement District and is subject to all assessments and 
service charges levied thereunder. 
Schedule Page No. 
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C O M M I T M E N T FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation, herein called the Company, for valuable 
consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the 
proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land 
described or referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor, all subject to the provisions 
of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or 
policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance of this 
Commitment or by subsequent endorsement 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and 
obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or 
policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the 
fault of the Company This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Commitment to be signea and sealed, to become valid when 
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws This Commitment is 
effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date " 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1 The term "mortgage," when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument 
2 If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, hen, encumbrance, adverse claim or other 
matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown in 
Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be relieved 
from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company is prejudiced 
by failure to so disclose such knowledge If the proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if 
the Company otherwise acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other 
matter, the Company at its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall 
not relieve the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and 
Stipulations 
3 Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties 
included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only for actual loss 
incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or(b)toehminate 
exceptions shown in Schedule B or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this 
Commitment In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the policy or policies 
committed for and such liability is subject to the insuring provisions and the Conditions and Stipulations and the 
Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed for in favor of the proposed Insured which are 
hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein 
4 Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may bring against the Company 
arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this 
Commitment must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment 
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National Headquarters Hi^Ls 
Richmond, Virginia ^ - A ^ " * ^ ^ . 
Policy Number 
82-00-472531 
SUDJECl TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. IHE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF. LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation, herein 
called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount 
of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to 
pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2 Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3 Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title; 
5 The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the extent 
that such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage 
and is based upon (a) usury, or (b) any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law; 
6 The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage; 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the 
insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and 
commenced subsequent to Date of Policy not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness 
secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; 
or 
8 The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A, of the insured mortgage or the 
failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and clear of 
all liens. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this Policy to be signed and sealed, to be valid when Schedule A is counfpr'jigned 
by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws 
Iajuyers Title Insurance (prporallon 
President 
Attost. 
* Secretarv y. 
82 
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OATE Of POUCY 
MARCH 2 0 , 1985 
@10:50A.M. 
AMOUNT Of IMSURANCf 
$ 750,000.00 
THE POLICY NUMBER SHOWN 
ON THIS SCHEDULE MUST 
AGREE WITH THE PREPRINTED 
NUMBER ON THE COVER SHEET I POLICY NUMBER 82-00-472531 
1 Name of Insured: 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
2. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Data of Policy vested in: 
BUILDMART MALL, A UTAH LIMITED PARTUBfiSElP 
3 The estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is: 
FEE SIMPLE 
4 The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and tho assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows. 
( 
Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents from Buildmart Mali, a Utah Limited Partnership, as 
Trustor to Richmond Title, a Utah Corporation, as Trustee and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage 
Corp., a Utah Corporation, as Beneficiary, to secure $750,000.00, dated March 13, 1985 and 
recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 757 as Entry No. 4063300. 
Assigned to Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association by Assignment of Trust Deed, dated 
March 13, 1985 and recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 762 as Entry No. 4063301. 
Security Agreement by and between Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership and 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., a Utah Corporation, dated March 13, 1985 and recorded 
March 20, 1985, in Book 5638, Page 764 as Entry No. 4063302. 
Assignment of Rents and Leases by and between Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, 
aa Assignor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., a Utah Corporation, as Assignee, dated 
March 13, 1985 and recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 793 as Entry No. 4063305. 
5 The land referred to in this policy is described as follows: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
' ' Countersignature; J 
A RICHMOND TITLE COMPANY 
Authorized Officer or Agent-
Policy 82 (Rev 2 79) Litho m U S A This Policy is invalid unless the cover 
Issued st (Location) 




BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which is North 
0°02f25!f East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59°57f35M East 522.115 feet along said street to a point 
on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37°22,46M East 351.322 feet; thence 
continuing along said street South 12°57f35ff East 204.761 feet; thence North 
72°05,59M East 108.000 feet; thence South 18#09,27M Kaet 170.000 feet; thence 
North 77*02,25M East 263.450 feet to the Westerly line of the D. & R.G.W. 
Rail-road right-of-way; thence North 08#03f2rf West 859.000 feet along said 
right-of-way; thence South 81056,39H West 30.000 feet; thence North 44°20!00" 
West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 80.00 foot radius curve to the 
right; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears 
North 22°40l00" West 59.073 feet); thence North OrOO'OO" West 281.994 feet; ' 
thence South 89°01f27" West 688.790 feet; thence South 0°28f46M East 41.171 
feet; thence North 89°50!46,f West 11.724 feet to the proposed centerline 
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with 
a 515.935 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South 30°02f25M West 25.000 feet to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways located on, over 
and across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77°02f25lf East 100.00 feet; thence North 17°54f0rf West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72°05f59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18°09f27" 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property and 
for the use of that property immediately abutting to the West. 
SchcHulo_A Page_.2oI2 No 
i\l'j O '"> ') 0'H)0 I 
ORIGINAL 
LOAN POLICY 
MARCH 20, 1983 
010:50P.M. Schedules-Parti 
TNI WXJCY NUMaCR 1HO.VN ON 
TMBJ scNiiuiJ 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following: 
1 Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
2 Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records. 
3 Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and any facts which a correct survey and inspection 
of the premises would disclose and which are not shown by the public record*. 
4 Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor, or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law and not shown by the 
public records 
8. 
Taxes for the year 1985 now accruing, not yet due and payable. 1984 Taxes were paid 
as to the following 1984 Sidwell Nos. part of 21-36-377-004; part of 21-36-304-016; 
part of 21-36-304-017 and part of 21-36-304-020. 
Subject to an easement and rigbt^ot*w^»Tll fiver of Utah Power and Light Company for 
electric transmission and distribution facilities along a line described SLB follows: 
Beginning 450 feet South and.760 fatt West, more or less, from the North Quarter 
Corner of Section 1, Township* 3 South; Ra*ge 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 9°46' West 660 feet, more^or U s e , thence North 8°12l West 787 feet; the 
width of said easement is not disclosed.* Coatained in that certain Easement dated 
July 1, 1980 and recorded November 13/ 1980 in Book 5176 Page 1132 as Entry No. 
3501386. 
Subject to a perpetual easement over tha North 20 feet of Lots 5B and 6A in favor of 
Salt Lake County, to bring any and all machinery and equipment upon said property for 
the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining, repairing and keeping in 
satisfactory condition, a waterway in Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office, Midvale 
Storm Drain, as contained in that certain Easement recorded March 15, 1966 in Book 
2439, Page 407, said Easement affects tha Northerly lina of that property described 
in Schedule "A" hereof which ia vests* in Buiidaart Mall, a Limited Partnership. 
Subject to an Easement for Utilities, 14 feet in width along and immediately 
adjoining easterly Sandy Parkway, a dedicated street, as reserved in the dedication 
of said street. 
Exceptions numbered 1-4 inclusive-. are hereby omitted. 
SCHEDULE B - PART II 
In addition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land described or referred to 
in Schedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that such matters are subordinate 
to the hen or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest: 
SEE EXHIBIT " B " ATTACHED HERETO 
Iayjyers Title Insurance Corporation 
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
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SCHEDULE B ~ l cont'd 
Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond 
Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, as 
Beneficiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & U. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Boek 5593 at Page 1977. 
Subordination Agreement dated March, 1985, executed by S.B.K. Partnership, H. 
Shirl Wright and Foothill Thrift and Loftt, recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 
5638, Page 804 as Entry No. 4063306. 
Subject to all unrecorded leases and to the terms and conditions thereof. 
An Agreement dated July 10, 1984 by and between Buildmart Mall, a limited 
partnership and Daw, Inc., Employees Pension and Profit Sharing Plan, Given to 
create a temporary easement for ingress and egress for the use and benefit of 
that property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject 
property described in Schedule ,fAM hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and 
shall be located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property. This 
easement shall automatically terminate at such time as a road is dedicated to 
the public use or improvements are made to establish a road. 
Subject to right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described 
in Schedule "A" hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more 
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the 
public at a future date. 
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00o02f25,f East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59*57,35" Ea«t 50.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius reverse curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears North 14°57,35n West 35.355 feet) to a 
point of tangency with a 540.935 foot radius curve to the left, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 283.613 feet (chord bears North 15°0ri2ff 
East 280.376 feet), thence North 225.312 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 38.844 feet (chord bears North 44°30l43" East 35.053 feet), thence 
South 89°0r27M West 38.201 feet, thence South 00°28f46" East 41.171 feet; 
thence North 89o50!46M West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point 
of tangency with a 490.935 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said 
curve for an arc distance of 257.398 feet (chord bears South 15°01I12M West 
254.460 feet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the 
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears 
South 75°02,25tf West 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard, 
thence South 59*57'35" East 50.000 feet along said Northerly line to the ''oint 
Ia^y^rs Title Insurance G>* poration 
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B— 1 SCHEDULE P * cont'd. 
A non-exclusive Right of Way over the Easterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30 
feet in width, over and through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of 
subject property, being more particularly described as follows: 
BEGIN on the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00°02'25" East 326.883 feet and East 1350.455 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 72°05,59M East 350.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
64.976 foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 90.900 feet (chord bears North 32°ori9M East 83.667 feet) to the 
Westerly right of way line of the D.&R.G«W.X Railroad, thance Horth 08s03l21,f 
West 517.185 feet along said right oCvay to appoint of tangency with a 154.768 
foot radius curve to the left/ thence ^ ldng.said curve for an arc distance of 
97.993 feet (chord bears North 26all,40f* West 96.365 feet), thence North 
44o20l00,, West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with an 80.000 foot radius 
curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet 
(chord bears North 22o40l00,, West 59.073 feet), thence North 01°00,00M West 
257.017 feet to a point of tangency with a 55.000 foot radius curve to the 
left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears 
North 45°59f16" West 77.765 feet), thence South 89°0r27" West 663.540 feet, 
thence South 00°28I40M East 30.001 feet, thence North 89°01,27n East 663.801 
feet to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the right, 
thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.259 feet (chord bears South 
45°59,17M East 35.348 feet), thence South 01a00'00" East 257.017 feet to a 
point of tangency with a 110.000 foot radius curve to the left, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 83.194 feet (chord bears South 22°40f00" East 
81.225 feet), thence South 44°20,00M EaJt 234.704 feet to a point of tangency 
with a 124.768 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 78.999 feet (chord bears South 26°ll,40,f East 77.686 feet), 
thence South 08o03,21M East 517.185 feet to a point of tangency with a 34.976 
foot radius curve to the right, theuce along said curve for an arc distance of 
48.931 feet (chord bears South 32°0ri8" West 45.037 feet), thence South 
TITOS' 59" Heat 347*407 feet to the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard, thence 
South 12*37V3V* fett 39*U***** A U M ^ M U iMltrly liM t» tk* »*iat of 
A light Of W*jr Bat***** If X4ft to wl«CT¥ in favor of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Coapany, a corporatioa of the 8tata of Utah, it's successors and assigns, to 
lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipelines, 
valves, valve boxes and other gas transaction and distribution facility through 
and across subject property described in Schedule MAM hereof along center lines 
as shown on the plat attached thereof. 
TOGETHER with all rights and privileges incident thereto, as recorded August 
27, 1984, Entry No. 3985384, Book 5585, as Page 599. 
Corrective Easement dated September 11, 1984 and recorded October 23, 1984 in 
Book 5600, Page 934 as Entry No. 4007245. 
Srh»H.,l» U * Page * O L J Nn 
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SCHEDULE P cont'd 
15. Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways on, over and 
across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77°02f25fl East 100.00 feet; thence North 17*54,01fl West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72°05f59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18#09f27M 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the subject proMttr mad fejr 
the use of that property immediately efeutttfeiuto the Wffti 
16. Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, * ITO1FLimited Partnership, ae Trtitbr t# 
First Security Bank of Utah/ N.A.,"i Nitloiul Banking Association authorised 
and doing business in the State of tJtah, at trustee and First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of Sandy City, Utah Industrial 
Development Bonds, Series 1984, under an Indenture of Trust dated as of July 
15, 1984; First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as a letter of credit bank, as 
Beneficiaries, to secure $7,750,000.00, dated September 25, 1984 and recorded 
September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, Page 1940 as Entry No, 3997400. 
17. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of 
July 15, 1984, appears as Secured Party, recorded September 26, 1984 in Book 
5593, Page 1974 as Entry No. 3997401. 
18. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and Young 
Electric Sign Company, appears as Secured Party, filed October 3, 1985 as 
Filing No. 989327. 
19. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, a Ut. Ltd. Part. (General 
Partner Buildmart Mall Inc.), appears as Debtor and First Security Bank of 
Utah, National Association, appears as Secured Party, filed January 11, 1985 as 
Filing No. 001921. 
20. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Builmart Mall, a Ut Ltd. Part., appears as 
Debtor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., appears as Secured Party, recorded 
March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 787 aa Entry No. 4063303. 
21. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, a Ut Ltd. Part., appears as 
Debtor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., appears as Secured Party, recorded 
March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 790 as Entry No. 4063304. 
22. Subject to terms, conditions and special assessments of the Special Improvement 
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a 
Municipal corporation. 
23. Said property is located within the boundaries of Midvale City, Sandy City and 
Sandy Suburban Improvement District and is subject to all assessments and 
service charges levied thereunder. 
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SCHEDULE B ~ 2 cont'd. 
Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond 
Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, as 
Beneficiairy, to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
1984 in Book 5568, Page 2596 as Entry No. 396098. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded July 18, 1984 in Book 5574, Page 1856 as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K. Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 In Book.5593 at P»ge 1977. 
Subordination Agreement dated March, 1985 executed by S.B.K. Partnership, R. 
Shril Wright and Foothill Thrift and Loan, recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 
5638, Page 804 as Entry No. 4063306. 
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4. Notice of Lost—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these Condi-
tions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or damage for 
which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall be 
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage shall 
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured 
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnished. 
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any 
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage. 
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or in 
the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate 
all liability and obligations of the Company hereunder by paying or 
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together 
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred up to the time of 
such payment or tender of payment by the insured claimant and 
authorized by the Company. In case loss or damage is claimed under this 
policy by an insured, the Company shall have the further option to 
purchase such indebtedness for the amount owing thereon together with 
all costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligated 
hereunder to pay If the Company offers to purchase said indebtedness as 
herein provided, the owner of such indebtedness shall transfer and 
assign said indebtedness and the mortgage and any collateral securing 
the same to the Company upon payment therefor as herein provided. 
6. Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no case exceed 
the least of 
(i) the actual loss of the insured claimant; or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, 
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2{a) hereof; or 
(HI) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage 
as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the time the loss or 
damage insured against hereunder occurs, together with interest 
thereon. 
(b) The Company will pay, in addition to any loss insured against by this 
policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation carried on by the 
Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys' fees and expenses in 
litigation carried on by such insured with the written authorization of the 
Company 
(c) When liability, has been definitely fixed in accordance with the 
conditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30 
days thereafter 
7. Limitation of Liability 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a) if the 
Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or 
encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise. 
removes such defect, hen or encumbrance or establishes the title, or the 
lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, within a reasonable time after 
receipt of such nonce, lb) in the event of litigation until there has been a 
final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of 
a*l ippra'tft therefrom advert* io th« title or to the lien of the insured 
mo#v;ege. • i m s ^ f ) , at provided <n par egfapn 3 h#ieof,o# (c)fo# liability 
vofe"\u+y a*u"**d b>? an tntured tn tttfhng an* ctotf* or tun wtftout 
^s^SSSSES 
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release o 
insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company excei 
provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
(b) The liability of the Company shall not be increased by additi 
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, except 
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage 
secured thereby. 
No payment shall be made without producing this policy 
endorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroy* 
which case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished tc 
satisfaction of the Company. 
9. Liability Noncumulative 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction c 
indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any part thereof 
expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy 
be reduced bv any amount the Company may pay under any policy insi 
a mortgage hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge or lit 
the estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A. ant 
amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy. 
10. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this polk: 
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act c 
insured claimant, except that the owner of the indebtedness aecur 
the insured mortgage may release or substitute the personal liabtl 
any debtor or guarantor, or extend or otherwise modify the ten 
payment, or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien 
insured mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indebted 
provided such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice < 
claim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not result in ar 
of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. The Company st1 
subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies which 
insured claimant would have had against any person or prop* 
respect to such claim had this policy not been issued, and if reque? 
the Company, such insured claimant shall transfer to the Comp; 
rights and remedies against any person or property necessary in o 
perfect such right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to i 
name of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation im 
such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the loss c 
insured claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to such ngh 
remedies in the proportion which said payment bears to the amount 
loss, but such subrogation shall be in subordination to the i 
mortgage. If loss of priority should result from any act of such i 
claimant, such act shall not void this policy, but the Company, 
event, shall be required to pay only that part of any losses insured, 
hereunder which shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Com| 
reason of the impairment of the. right of subrogation 
11 Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and 
instruments, if any. attached hereto by the Company is the entir< 
and contract betwoen the insured and the Company 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligen 
wh»ch arises out of the status of the !»en of the insured mortgage c 
Ml* to the estate or interest covered hereby or any action assortin 
cU«m than be restricted io the provision* and conditions and stipu 
retire* mem t« 
iigrtex* bv ertt 
y, %t% Assistant Secre 
_ rttte Company. 
. _... __ - - „ VP* wfufw SRini 
V. An notice* required to be given the Company and any stater 
ftrrrting required to be furnished the Company shall include the r 
of this policy and shall be addressed to its Corporate Headqi 
6630 West Broad Street, Richmond, Virginia 23230 Mailing a 
P.O. Box 27567, Richmond, Virginia 23261 
Jaiuyers Title Insurance Corporation 
National Headquarters 
Richmond, Virginia 


























EXAM BY KIPP 
Q WHAT WAS THE NATURE, THE LEGAL NATURE OF THAT ENTITY? 
A THERE WERE SEVERAL E N T I T I E S THAT USED THE NAME 
"BUILDMART MALL." THE E N T I T I E S THAT ARE INVOLVED IN THIS 
L I T I G A T I O N WERE BUILDMART MALL, A UTAH L I M I T E D PARTNERSHIP, 
AND THE GENERAL PARTNER OF THAT L I M I T E D PARTNERSHIP WHICH 
WAS BUILDMART MALL-UTAH. 
Q WHAT WAS THAT? 
A THAT WAS A CORPORATION. 
Q A UTAH CORPORATION? 
A A UTAH CORPORATION. 
Q WAS THERE SOME PERSON WHO WAS PRINCIPALLY IN CHARGE 
OF THAT BUSINESS? 
A YES. 
Q WHO WAS THAT? 
A STEVEN URRY. 
Q URRY? 
A STEVE URRY. 
Q U - R - R - Y ? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU ALSO DO LEGAL WORK FOR MR. URRY? 
MR. DUNN: WELL, ASIDE FROM ANYTHING RELATING 
TO BUILDMART MALL? 
MR. K I P P : W E L L - - . 
MR. DUNN*. I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT 
QUESTION BUT THAT MIGHT BE A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. 
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EXAM BY KIPP 
MR. KIPP: IT MIGHT BE. 1 DON'T INTEND TO GO 
INTO ANY DETAILS ABOUT I T . HE TOLD ME HE REPRESENTED 
BUILDMART MALL, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. DID YOU 
REPRESENT BUILDMART MALL-UTAH, A CORPORATION? 
A YES. 
Q AND DID YOU ALSO EVER SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR STEVE 
URRY PERSONALLY? 
MR. DUNN: HOLD ON A SECOND. 
MR. KIPP: I JUST WANT TO KNOW YES OR NO. 
MR. DUNN: OKAY. 
NO. 
DO YOU KNOW WHETHER BUILDMART MALL-UTAH WAS 
INCORPORATED? 
A THE LATTER PART OF 1983. 
Q AFTER THESE LETTERS? 
A BEFORE THOSE LETTERS. 
Q IN » 83 . THANK YOU. DID YOU PERFORM THE LEGAL 
SERVICES TO ACCOMPLISH THAT INCORPORATION? 
A YES. 
Q YOU REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS AND CAUSED THEM TO BE 
EXECUTED AND FILED? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU HAVE ANY ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH BUILDMART 
MALL-UTAH OTHER THAN COUNSEL? 
A I SERVED AS A DIRECTOR OF BUILDMART MALL CORPORATION. 
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EXAM BY KIPP 
Q ARE THOSE CORPORATE MINUTES AVAILABLE TO YOU? 
A I HAVE COPIES. I DON'T HAVE THE ORIGINALS. THEY 
WERE DELIVERED TO EITHER WRIGHT OR URRY. 
MR. KIPP*. SUBJECT AGAIN , T I M , TO HOW YOU FEEL 
ABOUT DOING I T , LET ME ASK I F I T ' S CONVENIENT I F YOU'LL DO 
THOSE. I F I T ' S NOT CONVENIENT, PLEASE TELL ME A N D — . 
MR. DUNN: I THINK THEY'VE ALREADY BEEN 
REQUESTED AND WE'RE IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING THOSE TOGETHER, 
SO WE'LL PRODUCE THOSE. 
MR. K I P P : THANK YOU. THE L I M I T E D PARTNERSHIP 
WAS PUT TOGETHER TO DO A PROJECT, I TAKE IT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT WAS THAT PROJECT? 
A THE BUILDMART MALL COMPLEX APPROXIMATELY 90TH SOUTH 
AND 1-15 IN SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
Q WHEN WAS IT FORMED? 
A SEPTEMBER OF 1983 I BEL IEVE. 
Q WHO DID THE LEGAL WORK TO FORM THE L I M I T E D 
PARTNERSHIP? 
A I D I D . 
Q AND DID YOU REPRESENT THE L I M I T E D PARTNERSHIP? 
. A YES. 
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EXAM BY K1PP 
Q WOULD THAT SAME STATEMENT BE TRUE THROUGH MARCH 
OF 1985? 
A YES. 
Q DID ANYONE ELSE EVER REPRESENT EITHER OF THOSE 
ENTITES? 
A NOT PRIOR TO MARCH OF 1985. 
Q THANK YOU. DID YOU CHARGE THEM FOR YOUR TIME OR 
HOW DID YOU BILL THEM? 
A I CHARGED THEM FOR MY TIME ON AN HOURLY BASIS. 
Q AND SUBMITTED INTERMITTENT STATEMENTS TO THEM? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT DID YOU CHARGE THEM AN HOUR? 
A I CAN'T REMEMBER. I THINK IT WAS PROBABLY ABOUT 
$85 OR $90 AN HOUR. 
MR. DUNN: $75 AN HOUR ORIGINALLY AND $85 
AN HOUR THEREAFTER. I DON'T THINK IT EVER DID GET TO $90 
AS I RECALL. 
Q THANKS. DID THEY PAY YOU? 
A IN THE EARLY STAGES YES. 
Q AND LATER STAGES NO? 
A NO, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND AS OF MARCH, 1985, DID THEY OWE YOU A BALANCE 
FOR FEES? 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH? 
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EXAM BY KIPP 
Q WHAT HAPPENED NEXT? 
A AS FAR AS MY INVOLVEMENT? 
Q YES, WHAT WERE YOU NEXT EXPOSED TO? WHAT DID YOU 
NEXT DO? WHAT CONTACT DID YOU HAVE NEXT REGARDING THE 
ONGOING PROJECT? 
A AT THE SAME TIME THE BONDS WERE BEING CLOSED--IN 
FACT PROBABLY PRIOR TO THE CLOSING OF THE BONDS--I WAS INVOLVED 
IN NEGOTIATIONS TO OBTAIN A BUYER FOR THE BU1LDMART MALL. 
Q TELL ME ABOUT THAT. 
A IT WAS APPARENT EVEN BEFORE THE BONDS WERE CLOSED 
THAT THE MALL COULD NOT BE BUILT FOR 7.75 MILLION DOLLARS. 
Q YOU WERE AWARE OF THAT FACT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT LED YOU TO REACH THAT CONCLUSION? 
A I WAS ACTING ON INFORMATION THAT WAS PROVIDED TO 
ME BY PRIMARILY STEVE URRY, SOME THROUGH SHIRL WRIGHT. 
Q HOW MUCH SHORT WAS THE BOND AMOUNT? 
A AT THAT TIME EVERYONE ANTICIPATED THAT IT WOULD BE 
SHORT BY AROUND $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 
Q OKAY. SO WHAT HAPPENED? 
A FIRST SECURITY BANK INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT 
SERVE AS THE LETTER OF CREDIT BANK IN THE BOND FINANCING 
UNLESS ADDITIONAL CAPITAL WAS BROUGHT INTO THE PROJECT OR THE 
PROJECT WAS SOLD. 
Q THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT WHEN? 
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EXAM BY KIPP 
A THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SUMMER OF 1984. 
Q WHAT CAPITAL HAD BEEN CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROJECT AT 
THAT TIME? 














YOU COULDN'T TELL ME I F I T WAS A DOLLAR OR A M I L L I O N 
SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. 
THANK YOU. HAD THEY ALSO PUT THE PROPERTY IN AT 
A PRICE GREATER THAN THAT FOR WHICH THEY PURCHASED IT? 
A THAT'S NOT MY UNDERSTANDING. 
Q YOU THINK THEY PUT IT IN FOR THEIR PURCHASE PRICE? 
A I BELIEVE THAT THE PARTNERSHIP PLAYED FAIR MARKET 
VALUE FOR THE PROPERTY. 
Q WELL, WHAT I ' V E ASKED YOU I S : WAS THAT FAIR MARKET 
VALUE GREATER IN AMOUNT THAN THE AMOUNT FOR WHICH URRY AND 
WRIGHT HAD PURCHASED THE PROPERTY OR AGREED TO PURCHASE IT? 
A NO. 
Q OKAY. THEN WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SUMMER OF '84 
ABOUT FIRST SECURITY'S POSITION? 
A FIRST SECURITY REQUIRED, AS I INDICATED, THAT 28 
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EXAM BY K1PP 
MR. KIPP: IS THAT AMONG THE DOCUMENTS BEING 
PRODUCED, TIM; DO YOU KNOW? 
MR. DRAKE: I DON'T THINK THAT'S BEEN 
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED. IT MAY VERY WELL BE WITHIN THE SCOPE. 
MR. KIPP: LET ME PUT IT ON THE SHOPPING 
LIST AND WE'LL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT. 
MR. DRAKE: AT THIS POINT, TO THE EXTENT IT'S 
HELPFUL, CARMAN, WE HAVE IN THESE DEPOSITIONS TRIED TO MAINTAIN 
A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MALL, THE DISTRIBUTION CENTER, 
AND THEN THE OVERALL PROJECT, FOR SOME SORT OF COMMON 
VERNACULAR; IF THAT'S HELPFUL TO YOU. 
MR. KIPP: IT PROBABLY IS. LET ME HAVE YOU 
EDUCATE ME ABOUT THAT. YOU'VE HEARD WHAT COUNSEL SAID ABOUT 
DIFFERENT PHASES OR PARTS OR ELEMENTS. WOULD YOU EXPLAIN THAT 
TO ME, PLEASE? 
A THE BUILDMART MALL PROJECT CONSISTED OF TWO PARTS: 
A RETAIL SHOPPING CENTER CONTAINING APPROXIMATELY 130,000 
SQUARE FEET OF RETAIL SPACE; AND A SECOND FACILITY, 
APPROXIMATELY 100,000 SQUARE FEET KNOWN AS THE DISTRIBUTION 
CENTER. IT WAS MORE A WAREHOUSE, SOME OFFICE, BUT PRIMARILY 
A WAREHOUSE. 
Q BOTH OF THOSE ARE SUBJECT OF THIS LAWSUIT? 
A YES. 
Q WERE BOTH OF THEM SUBJECT AT THE SALE? 
A YES. 
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EXAM BY KIPP 
ME HE HAD ARRANGED A LOAN WITH R1CHARDS-W00DBURY THAT COULD 
BE UTILIZED AS A BRIDGE LOAN OR BACKUP. 
Q DID YOU HAVE SOME SENSE OF WHAT HE MEANT OR DID HE 
TELL YOU WHAT HE MEANT BY "BRIDGE LOAN OR BACKUP"? 
A WELL, HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD A COMMITMENT FROM 
R1CHARDS-W00DBURY THAT THEY WOULD LOAN UP TO $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 . THAT'S 
THE FIRST TIME RICHARDS-WOODBURY WAS MENTIONED. 
Q THIS IS LATE ! 8«t? 
A DECEMBER OF ' 8 U . 
Q WAS THERE SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT THIS $750,000 
WOULD DO OR WHAT IT WOULD BE USED FOR? 
A YES. ACTUALLY AT THE TIME THE BONDS WERE CLOSED 
IN SEPTEMBER, EVERYONE--AND I SAY "EVERYONE," I 'M SPEAKING 
OF BUILDMART MALL AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, THE CONTRACTOR— 
Q THAT'S CULP? 
A - -CULP, KNEW THERE WAS GOING TO BE A SHORTFALL. THAT 
WAS THE REASON THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED THE SALE. WE WERE 
CONCERNED THE SALE MIGHT NOT TAKE PLACE IN TIME TO PROVIDE 
THE FUNDING TO FINISH THE MALL AND IT WAS A CHICKEN-AND-EGG 
PROBLEM. 
IN CLOSING THE BONDS, THE BOND DOCUMENTS PLACED 
A RESTRICTION ON THE SECONDARY FINANCING, AND WE NEGOTIATED 
AT THE TIME FOR LANGUAGE THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO BORROW UP TO 
$750,000 WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE LENDER. 
Q DID YOU ACHIEVE THAT GOAL? 
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EXAM BY KIPP 
A YES, IT WAS WRITTEN INTO THE BOND DOCUMENTS. 
Q WAS IT THE THOUGHT OF THE PRINCIPALS THAT THAT 
$750,000 WOULD BRIDGE THIS GAP SO THE PROJECT COULD BE 
COMPLETED? 
A RIGHT. 
WHEREUPON THE SALE COULD BE FINALIZED? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 





A RIGHT. IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A 
NEED FOR A BRIDGE LOAN IN THE EVENT THE SALE DIDN'T TAKE PLACE 
IN TIME. 
Q AND IT DIDN'T. 
A IN FACT THE SALE DIDN'T TAKE PLACE IN TIME AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK STOPPED FUNDING THE PROJECT IN EARLY 1985. 
Q I TAKE IT YOU WERE INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS 
GENERALLY WITH THE VARIOUS PEOPLE DEALING WITH THE FINANCING 
ARRANGEMENTS? 
A YES. 
Q WERE THEY ALL AWARE OF THIS FINANCIAL SITUATION 
YOU'VE DESCRIBED? 
A YES. 
Q THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF YOUR VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS 
AMONG OTHER THINGS? 
A IT WAS A CONCERN OF EVERYONE. 
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ATTENTION THAT IF THE SUBSEQUENT CAUSES OF ACTION ARE SIMILAR 
TO THOSE OR SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT ARE CURRENTLY 
IN THE CASE, THAT WE MIGHT RESIST SUCH A SUBSEQUENT 
DEPOSITION, BUT IF THE CAUSES OF ACTION ARE DISTINCT FROM 
THOSE THAT CURRENTLY EXIST IN THE LAWSUIT, WE WOULD ALLOW 
SUCH A DEPOSITION. I WOULD, ANYWAY. 
MR. HOWELL: OKAY. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWfcLL: 
Q MR. SEAL, ROBERT HOWELL AND I REPRESENT, ALONG WITH 
MY FIRM, TIBBALS, HOWELL, JONES 5 MOXLEY, LAWYERS TITLE 
INSURANCE CORPORATION. 
GOING BACK FOR A MINUTE TO CLARIFY JUST A COUPLE 
OF THINGS I THINK THAT NEED TO BE CLARIFIED, YOU'VE INDICATED 
THE FIRST TIME YOU RECOGNIZED THAT THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN WOULD 
BE OUT OF BALANCE WAS IN THE SUMMER OF 1984; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. NEWMAN: OBJECTION, MISCHARACTERIZES HIS 
TESTIMONY. I DON'T THINK HE'S USED THE WORDS "OUT OF BALANCE." 
Q WHEN WAS THE FIRST TIME YOU RECOGNIZED THAT THERE 
WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT? 
A THE SUMMER OF 1984. 
Q AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF YOUR TESTIMONY THIS MORNING, 
YOU INDICATED THAT EVERYBODY KNEW THAT. WHEN YOU REFER TO 
"EVERYBODY," WHO ARE YOU REFERRING TO? 
A I WAS REFERRING TO ALL THE PRINCIPALS OF BUILDMART. 
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EXAM BY HOWELL 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, THE PROSPECTIVE BUYERS WE WERE TALKING TO. 
Q WOULD YOU ALSO INCLUDE FIRST SECURITY REALTY 
SERVICES? 
A Y tS . 
Q WHEN YOU INDICATED THE FUNDS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT 
TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT, WHAT FUNDS ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT, 
WHAT AMOUNT? 
A THE $ 7 , 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 THAT WERE—THAT REPRESENTED THE 
PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF THE BONDS. 
Q ALL RIGHT. BUT D I D N ' T - - . 
MR. DUNN: JUST A MOMENT. WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE PRIOR ANSWER ABOUT THE TERM "EVERYBODY," DID YOU INTEND 
THAT QUESTION BE CLOSED OUT AS INCLUSIVE OF EVERYBODY, THAT 
EVERYBODY BE NAMED THAT WAS INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF 
"EVERYBODY"? 
MR. HOWELL! I GOT THE ANSWER I WANTED IN THE 
SENSE I WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER OR NOT FIRST SECURITY BANK 
KNEW ABOUT I T . 
MR. DUNN: OKAY. PROCEED. 
MR. HOWELL: IF THAT LEAVES IT OPEN, WE CAN--, 
MR. DUNN: WELL, I 'M NOT SURE THAT WE 
EXHAUSTED ALL CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE IN THAT UNIVERSE. 
MR. HOWELL: I AGREE. I 'M NOT HOLDING HIM TO 
IT AS BEING EXHAUSTIVE. WHEN WERE THE 7.75 MILLION DOLLAR 
LOAN PROCEEDS DISBURSED? 
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seems to me that I received a copy of a title report at the 
same time that I received that. That's what I recall. 
(Off-the-record discussion) 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. A 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KINCAID) Mr. Woodbury, I have here what has 
been marked as Exhibit A, which appears to be a commitment 
letter on Richards-Woodbury1s letterhead dated December 12, 
1984. It's addressed to Mr. Steven Urry. I hand you a copy 
of this and ask if you recognize that document? 
A Well, without having looked in my file and 
determining whether it's the same one, my guess is that this 
is a copy of the commitment letter that I received in this 
loan transaction. 
Q Mr. Woodbury, do you recall when the first time was 
you saw this letter? 
A It seems to me it was sometime in January after I 
had been contacted by Diane Derr. I received it — she would 
have probably brought it to my office personally. 
Q Did you have any input into the drafting of this 
commitment letter? 
A I did not. Let me clarify that a little bit. I at 
one point in time had input in drafting a form commitment 
letter for Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation, although 
it's pretty significantly different than this commitment 
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A Thatfs one of those liens that could come up in the 
future. 
Q Do you include in that mechanic's liens of record in 
the title policy? 
A Shouldn't be. If there are any mechanics lien of 
record, they should have told me about them, in my opinion. 
Q Who is they? 
A The title company, or Greg Seal, depending on, you 
know, who knew what* 
Q Who would you typically rely on to tell you about 
those in the the course of a transaction? 
A You have to rely upon everybody in these 
transactions, because very frequently a title company might 
not know something about — know something that an attorney 
may know. You know, a title company, might not be privileged 
to some sort of title problem. So I don't rely just on a 
title company. Now, if an attorney is telling me I only have 
to rely on a title company, you know, that's another matter, 
but in this case, no attorney was ever telling me I just have 
to rely on the title company. 
Q Are you aware on or about March 13 of 1985 that for 
instance, there was a lien in favor of Staker Paving of public 
record in this case? 
A I was not aware of it in any way. 
Q If that had been the case and assuming for the sake 
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of the question that it was the case in March of 1985, who 
would you have expected to advise you of its existence at the 
time this loan was being closed? 
A Both the title company and Greg Seal, 
Q Do you recall ever discussing a lien in favor of 
Staker Paving with Greg Seal? 
A Never discussed it, ever. 
Q No discussion whatsoever? 
A None whatsoever. 
Q How about any other similar type liens? 
A The only potential type liens were the type liens 
that were mentioned in his letter explaining the lawsuit. We 
didn't talk about liens, though. See, those were — those 
were lawsuits and I ended up getting in a very heated 
discussion with this person at the title company because Mr. 
Seal described those as liens or potential liens and they 
weren't included on our title report, and in my opinion, a 
title company has to include all — anything that exists on 
the record and then we deal with it, but that's my opinion. 
Q What is your definition of the word lien? 
A Any matter of record on title of a property. 
Q And similarly, what is your definition of the word 
encumbrance? 
A Any obligation against a property. 
Q Any obligation against a property? 
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1 the Tower trust deed, would it not, under the facts that I've 
2 given you? 
3 A It could be, yes. It could be* 
4 Q You knew that at the time? 
5 A As a potential possibility, yes. 
6 Q Yes. And that could have been true for any type of 
7 tenant finishing or other construction work that was ongoing 
8 on the Buildmart Mall at the time this loan closed; is that 
9 correct? 
10 A Thatfs right. 
11 Q How was the opinion letter of March 13 of 1985 
12 written by Greg Seal supposed to protect against that 
13 contingency or eventuality. 
14 A Because he indicated to me that, one, that they had 
15 various subordination agreements from contractors, and that 
16 the contractor was obtaining subordination agreements from 
17 subcontractors, et cetera, et cetera, on an ongoing basis that 
18 would protect us in that situation. And that to this day, 
19 they were completely clean. He was telling me that. Thatfs 
20 the thing he was telling me, and that was part of what I was 
21 relying on in closing that. Granted, I was relying on the 
22 attorneysfs opinion letter, to that extent. I was also 
23 relying on the title insurance to provide us insurance against 
24 mechanic's liens. In addition, I was relying on the borrowers 
25 under the loan documents to tell us if there were any liens or 
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anything like that, which they never did do. And tell us that 
they needed the bills paid because our funds were tof in fact, 
satisfy those bills. It was represented to us that this was 
the funds sufficient to complete the project. 
Q Did you pass along or explain your thought process 
to Tower through Mr. Autenreith? 
A Of course. 
Q As far as the things that you were relying on? 
A I relied on the whole package. Mr. Autenreith — 
yes, we discussed it. 
Q And he was agreeable to that, said that's okay, 
Jeff, go ahead? 
A Nothing else you could do. 
Q What do you mean by that? 
A There is not anything else we could do, other than 
relying on the borrower, the borrower's attorney and the title 
insurance in that situation, unless we were to$go out and bind 
every single contractor that was to come up in the future. 
The only other alternative out there is to try to bind all of 
those before anybody even steps — puts a name, hammers a nail 
in the wall on the property. I mean, there is no second lien 
anywhere whether the property is under construction or what, 
that couldn't arguably, you know, be subject to some other 
type of lien. Well, that's not completely true, now that I 
think about it. 
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this lien priority issue, is Greg Seal right about this, Jeff, 
or words to that effect? 
A Probably not* 
Q Did you review that language before you sent along 
the opinion letter to Tower? 
A We discussed the opinion, Mr. Autenreith and I did 
after I sent the drafts. Everything I received Mr. Autenreith 
received. And we discussed them together as I received them. 
So when you say did I review it and express an opinion, we 
discussed the opinion letter and it said — it said all we 
could require him to say. 
Q Did you believe paragraph 3 to be accurate and 
correct at the time you discussed it with Mr. Autenreith? 
A Yes. 
Q Then you testified earlier that the letter you then 
learned was not correct. 
A That's right. 
Q And why is that, in your opinion? 
A Because there, in fact, were liens that existed on 
the property at the time of the closing. 
Q What liens were those? 
A I donft know specifically the number of liens and 
what liens they were, but that there were, in fact, liens and 
problems with bills that were unpaid that were, in fact, 
encumbrances against the property that no one had told us 
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about. 
Q What types of things have you subsequently learned 
about that you believe made the opinion incorrect? Can you 
give me a generic description? Are we talking about material 
men liens? 
A Primarily material men's liens. 
Q If you had known# for instancef that a lien in favor 
of Staker Paving had existed on March 13 of 1985, how would 
you have handled that in this transaction? 
A I would have required that it be paid and removed 
from — removed from the title of the property. And I would 
have probably — it probably would have given me a notion to 
find out what other liens or what other bills are outstanding 
that were not paid. 
Q You've used the language Greg Seal told you they 
were clean. Is that exactly what he told you? 
A Both Greg Seal and — probably — I meanf I don't 
remember Greg Seal said exactly that, but he said something of 
that order, yes. 
Q Have you ever talked to Charles Gulp or anyone from 
Culp Construction? 
A No. 
Q Have you talked to anyone at all — 
A The title company and Greg Seal is who I talked to. 
Q No one else about whether or not subs were being 
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he made this opinion. 
Q ifou use untruthful as a description of this letter. 
What makes the letter untruthful, in your opinion, 
Mr. Woodbury? 
A I believe that it's untruthful because I believe 
that he knew of other liens that he didn't tell me about, both 
from his prior testimony that I heard downstairs that he was 
aware of liens that existed on the property, but he still 
wrote a letter here saying that there were no liens because I 
told him I wasn't going to rely on it. I think that that's 
untruthful. He said down there in that testimony that he knew 
— let me finish, he said that he knew that there were other 
liens because he had other title reports that showed that 
there were liens at the time that he wrote this letter. I was 
never aware of any of those, so I feel that his letter in that 
respect was untruthful. 
Now, with respect to the potential liens that could 
arise in the future, you know, that wouldn't make the thing 
untruthful. Maybe it would make it legally incorrect, but at 
least it wouldn't be untruthful in that instance. 
Q Is there anything other than what you've just 
described that makes the letter untruthful, in your opinion? 
A There may be other things, I don't know. 
Q That you know of, Mr. Woodbury. I can only ask you 
about your knowledge. 
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A When I say "this thick/" I mean two feet. 
Q I didn't bring an extra copy, but I'm going to refer 
and quote from the third party complaint that your office 
filed in this action. 
A That's fine. 
Q And in paragraph 14 it states that Tower would not 
have closed the loan transaction or advanced the sum of 
$750f000 unless it had been assured that its trust deed would 
be a second valid and subsisting second lien against the 
property. 
Do you have that? 
A Okay. 
Q My question is what in your mind does the language 
second valid and subsisting second lien mean? 
A What that means is that — well, I guess probably 
the example in a first lien situation is that if you were to 
go and close on a piece of property and discover that there 
were five unpaid liens on that property, it would make an 
attorney leery whether they would want to close and buy that 
property, because they'd think that there are probably other 
unpaid liens out that could jump up because they haven't been 
paying their debts as they go along and haven't been managing 
the transaction properly. 
And in this situation, we got — we received no 
indication that business was not operating in an harmonious 
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and fluent manner. So when I say valid and subsisting lienf I 
probably mean that as far as a second lien is concerned, that 
we needed to — if we would have known that bills were not 
being paid and those liens were being piled up on the 
property, the transaction would not have closed. I would have 
advised Tower that itfs crazy to close this, because these 
people don't have the money right now to handle ongoing 
problems that are probably greater than the amount of the 
debt. And they would have had to understand that. 
Q Was the language that I just read you yours, so far 
as you know? 
A No, probably not. It's probably Verden Bettilyon's. 
Q Does the word subsisting have a common meaning or 
definition in the trade or the industry? 
A Not necessarily that I know of. 
Q I just want to know if it means anything to you? 
A No, I didnft write it. 
Q Okay, fine. Have you ever discussed this 
transaction since the filing of the complaint with August 
Brand? 
A Discussed the transaction? I've discussed the 
lawsuit with him. Ifve never discussed any — well, that's 
not — that's an overgeneralization. I've discussed this 
lawsuit with him against me. I have not discussed the details 
of the transaction, no, to my knowledge. I may have made some 
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remember anything more specific. 
Q With regard to the assurances he gave youf did you 
ask him for any written confirmation, any documentation? 
A I didn't. It was foolish on my part. 
Q And you never received any subsequent to that 
conversation? 
A Other than the title policy and the escrow 
instructions, I didn't receive anything other than that. I 
relied on the title policy and escrow letter signed on that. 
Q You testified — you went on to testify you obtained 
a preliminary report from the title company and that's the 
document that has become an exhibit in this deposition? 
A Right. 
Q Just to be clear, that's Exhibit D, I believe? 
A Right. 
Q And to the best of your recollection, Mr. Woodbury, 
that's the only preliminary report you recall receiving prior 
to closing? 
A That's the only one I've ever received, other than 
verbal reports, verbal confirmations, but the report is the 
same, that report was the same. 
Q Now, you've indicated in your testimony that you 
asked Mr. Seal to prepare a statement or a document regarding 
the ongoing litigation? 
A That's right. 
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regarding the litigation discussed in Exhibit G? 
A I definitely received it from the title company. 
From Mr. Seal? It seems to me when I discussed it with Mr. 
Sealr Mr. Seal said, Well, call the title company, it seems to 
me is what he said, and see how they've taken care of that. 
It seems to me that's what happened. I'm not so sure they 
gave me an assurance that it was okay. I guess I received 
somewhat of an assurance when he gave me his opinion letter, 
whatever assurance that is. 
Q Subsequent to this assurance you say you received 
from the title company and your discussion with Mr. Seal, did 
you discuss those conversations with Seal and the title 
company with Diane Derr. 
A Probably not. 
Q Did you discuss — 
A Yesf I probably discussed them, but — I don't know 
that — I don't have any specific recollection of that. 
Q And did you discuss them with Earl Autenreith? 
A Yes, I'm certain I did that. 
Q Was Earl satisfied with the oral assurances? 
A Yes. It was our understanding that we were getting 
a policy clear of all of those and that, you know, they had 
indicated that they had taken care of that already. And it 
wasn't a matter on the title policy at this point in time, on 
the title at this point in time. So that I didn't need to 
EXHIBIT " H 
a loan package and most likely in this one is a loan summary, 
an appraisal report, financial statements of the individuals 
and the borrower, partnership or corporate documents, if any, 
rent roll. And if available in most cases copies of the 
leases. 
Q Having heard your answer I realize you told me about 
some of those things earlier so I apologize. 
Would any type of title report or preliminary title 
report be included in the loan package? 
A No, that's not customary. 
Q Was it done in this case to your knowledge? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q You may have said this too and I apologize. When was 
that loan package submitted to Tower originally? 
A I don't recall that. But I am sure it was sometime 
January or February of 1985. 
Q Okay. At any time from the application for the loan 
until the loan actually closed did Richards-Woodbury do any 
kind of an independent search of the title on the Buildmart 
Mall property? 
A No. How do you do that? I don't know how you would 
go about it. 
Q Maybe you ought to tell me what you understand the 
phrase "search of the title" to include. 
A Well, yes, that's the job of the title company and 
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their research department* That's what we rely on. 
Q And you do nothing in and of yourself on an in-house 
basis to check the title of the property? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever personally review a preliminary title 
report on this property? 
A Practically all of themf yes. 
Q Did you do so in this case? 
A I am sure I did. 
Q You have a specific recollection of looking at a 
title report on the Buildmart Mall property? 
A No, not specific. 
Q When would you have reviewed a title r<*portr if you 
had done so in this case, in the course of this transaction? 
A I would have looked at it at the time it arrived at 
Richards-Woodbury, and what I normally do is go through the 
preliminary title report and check for any problems or 
situations that would impair the closing of the loan, such as 
liens, certain right-of-ways that might be a problem, 
et cetera. 
Q Prior to the closing of this loan were you personally 
aware of any mechanic's liens against the Buildmart Mall 
property? 
A No, not at all. 
Q None whatsoever? 
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commenced on the project before the deed of trust was recorded? 
A The first deed of trust you are referring to? 
Q Any deed of trust. The second deed of trust in this 
case. 
A No, I am not familiar, that much familiar with the 
lien law. 
Q You didn't know that? 
A No. 
Q Who did you rely upon in terms of legal advice with 
respect to mechanic1s lien law in March of f85? 
A We rely on the title company and our attorneys. 
Q And your attorney in this case was Jeff Woodbury? 
A It was the law firm of Woodbury, Bettilyon and 
Kesler. In this particular case Jeff Woodbury was handling it. 
Q How many prior loans had you closed with the 
assistance of Jeff Woodbury in March of 1985? 
A I can't recall that. 
Q Any kind of an estimate? 
A Perhaps five or ten. 
Q Would those loans have been similar to the type of 
Tower loan wefve been talking about? 
A Yes. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: I need a point of clarification. Do 
you mean a gap loan? 
THE WITNESS: Or similar by — 
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MR. HUMPHERYS: He's already testified hefs only done 
one gap loan. 
THE WITNESS: Income property loan, is that what you 
are referring to? 
MR. DRAKE: Thatfs fine. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: It becomes importantf because if that 
is narrowly interpreted/ then of course — 
MR. DRAKE: If itfs important to you make your 
clarification. I appreciate that. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: He was referring to income producing 
property loans. 
Q (BY MR. DRAKE) Would the filing or the arising of 
mechanic's liens on a piece of property between the time of a 
loan application and a loan closing be one of the problems# to 
use your language, which might arise in the course of a loan 
transaction? 
A Would they be a problem? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A Of course they would be a problem. Unless they 
cleared up before the loan closing. 
Q Did Richards-Woodbury take any steps to clear up 
mechanic's liens, to use your phrase, with respect to this 
Tower loan? 
A I don't recall whether there were any liensf whether 
any liens appeared at the preliminary title reportf or whether 
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there were any existing liens before the loan closing. 
Q If the preliminary report had showed no mechanic's 
liensr and the loan closed some three months later, would 
Richards-Woodbury have taken any steps to determine whether or 
not mechanic's liens had arisen in that three-month period of 
time? 
A No other steps except to work with the title company* 
Q You mentioned that Mr. Authenreith and Mr. Spagnola 
came out and actually went to the Buildmart Mall property at 
some point in time. And I believe you accompanied them; is 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Were you ever a party to a discussion with either of 
those gentlemen about mechanic's liens on the Buildmart Mall 
property? 
A No. 
Q The subject never arose? 
A Never arose. 
Q To your knowledge were either of those gentlemen 
concerned about mechanic's liens on the property? 
A You are always concerned about mechanic's liens, 
obviously. But we would have never closed the loan if we had 
any knowledge that any lawsuits or mechanic lien problems would 
appear after the loan is closed. 
Q And what specifically did you do to protect against 
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(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 240 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. DRAKE) Let me show you Exhibit 240r 
Mr. Brand. Okay. This documentr Exhibit 240f is labeled Final 
Analysis. What was the purpose for the preparation of this 
document? 
A In our loan submission we make a statement why we 
feel that we recommend the loan to the investor and bring out 
pertinent points. 
Q To whom would this document, or the original of the 
documentr have been submitted? 
A To Tower. 
Q Would it have accompanied any other documents or 
would it have gone by itself? 
A No, it would have been in the loan package. 
MR. DRAKE: Thatfs all I havef Mr. Brand. Thanks 
very much. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: I have a couple of questions. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUMPHERYS: 
Q Mr. Brandf would Richards-Woodbury have closed the 
loan if the loan agreement was not signed by the parties 
indicated on the loan agreement? 
A No. 
MR. DRAKE: Wellf Ifll object to the form of the 
59 
question. It calls for speculation on the part of the witness 
and it lacks foundation. 
Q (BY MR. HUMPHERYS) In the event the trust deed were 
not signed by the parties at the time of closing would you have 
closed the loan? 
A No. 
MR. DRAKE: Same objection. 
Q (BY MR. HUMPHERYS) In the event the other loan 
documents were not signed as prepared at the time of closing 
would you have closed? 
A No. 
'MR. DRAKE: Same objection. May I just have a 
continuing objection so I don't have co interrupt you if you 
are going to proceed along this line? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: Thatfs fine. 
Q (BY MR. HUMPHERYS) Would you have closed the loan 
without the title policy? 
A No. 
Q Would you have closed the loan without an opinion 
letter from a lawyer? 
A No. 
Q If the opinion letter from the lawyer would have 
indicated that you were not in a second position or that your 




MR. DRAKE: Same objections. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: No further questions. 
MR. REES: I just have two or three. I am sorry. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. REES: 
Q Mr. Brandf as I understand your involvement in the 
process in connection with the Tower loan you are the 
originator so you were kind of promoting the loan to 
Richards-Woodbury and to Tower; is that accurate? 
A That's accurate. 
Q And because you were in that position you did not get 
directly involved then in actually preparing the loan documents 
and closing the loan; is that right? 
A Nor thatfs correct. 
Q And I think Mr. Drake asked you earlier about 
conversations you had with Jeff Woodbury. He said in 
connection with the lawsuit. I want to go back farther. In 
connection with putting together the Tower loan and anything up 
to the closing of the Tower loan did you have any conversations 
with Jeff Woodbury regarding those matters? 
A Not that I recall. 
MR. REES: Thanks. That's all I have. 
MR. NEWMAN: I have some follow-up questions. Mostly 
because of the clarifyingf I apologize for this, but due to 
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1 Q I will get into this into some specifics here 
2 as we go through. Butr when we are reviewing the second 
3 mortgage or loan that was being made while construction was 
4 progressing, did that cause any special procedure or 
5 anything different to be done by the Board in the review 
6 process? 
M A By the Board, perhapsf no. But they would look to 
8 me to assure — reassure them that there didn't appear to 
9 be a problem with outstanding mechanic's liens. 
10 Q I will ask you about what you did. Do you know if 
11 Mr. Spagnola or anyone else on behalf of Tower would have 
12 done anything differently, or especially with a loan of this 
13 nature? 
14 A He would have the same concepts. 
15 Q All comes back to you? 
16 A No. Butf he had enough experience with real 
17 estate and construction loans himself, that, I would think 
18 he would have been concerned as well as myself. 
19 Q I want to ask you a two-part question: One, what 
20 would you typically have done with a loan of this nature, 
21 where the concepts are raised because of a mechanic's lien, 
22 what did you specif ically do with ths Buildmart loan? 
23 A iff assuming title insurance at this point, if 
24 title insurance was available, we would have insisted on 
*) ^  I 
mechanic's lien insurance, or some assurance that the title 
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1 company is insuring over the mechanic's lien. With that, 
2 with those kind of assurances, anything else we can get, we 
3 would probably have made the loan. 
4 Q That is your answer to the general part of the 
5 question. 
6 Do you recall what you did, specifically, on the 
7 Buildmart loan to satisfy your concerns? 
8 A On Buildmart, I know we had two things, because 
9 they were into commitment. One was assurance by Mr. Seal 
10 that there were no mechanic's liens, in his opinion, which 
11 reassured us, plus the commitment from Lawyers Title that 
12 they were insuring over any mechanic's lien, and we had no 
13 evidence there were any, looking at both reports, from 
14 Mr. Seal and from Lawyers Title. There was no evidence that 
15 we had any problems. If we had known there was any mechanic's 
16 liens, the potential mechanic's lien, we wouldn't have made 
17 the loan. 
18 Q Were you g i v e n any s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n s on the 
19 Buildmart loan by Spagnola or the Board t o do anyth ing wi th 
20 r e s p e c t t o m e c h a n i c ' s l i e n s or with the t h i n g s t h a t you t o l d 
21 me about? And then w e ' l l g e t i n t o detai l as what you did as a 
22 good lawyer doing your job. 
23 A Wel l , I hope I'm doing my j o b . When I am so doing 
24 those t h i n g s , a s I s a i d , i t was a unique l o a n . And the 
25 concern i s informing the Board members of mechan ic ' s l i e n s . 
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1 And Spagnola also. So,it was impressed on me the importance 
2 of seeing that we are secure in that position. And behind 
3 this loan is a sizable mortgager first deed of trustf which 
4 puts us in a risk position to begin with. 
5 Q I am jumping a little bit on you here. I don't 
6 mean to do that intentionally. I would apologize. Had all 
7 of the prior loans of Tower made in Utah been worked through 
8 or processed by Richards-Woodbury? 
9 A I can't think of anybody else. 
10 Q Was there an individual at Richards-Woodbury with 
11 whom you worked more closely than others? 
12 A Myself? 
13 Q Yes. 
14 A That changed. I am trying to think of names. 
15 Basically, I was working with legal counsel. It would have 
16 been Jeff Woodbury. 
17 Q When did you begin working with Mr. Woodbury? 
18 A Well, he came along later. There was a 
19 predecessor of hisf and before thatf Bettilyon — Kesler. 
20 I can't remember. 
21 Q First name was Woodbury, Bettilyonr Kesler, who I 
22 first started working with. And I was impressed with his 
23 document and his work. Then he leftf I think, on a two-
24 year trek. 
25 A Yes. And didn't return right away. I was a 
n 
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1 Q Tell me the things that you have done to determine fy 
2 whether or not there were other liens-of record that might \U 
3 have been 
4 A Two things to rely on. 
5 Q All right. 
6 11 A One was the preliminary title commitment from 
7 lawyers which showed nothing, and we had an opinion letter 
9 from Jeffrey Seal. 
9 || Q Greg Seal? 
10 A Greg Seal. Gregory Seal. 
11 Q All right. 
12 A And we had, as I recall, we had a fairly detailed 
13 response. He had about two minor matters which we say 
14 didn't relate to it, which were insured over any way on the 
15 prior loan with First Security Bank. Other than that, with 
16 those assurances, we were satisfied. I was. 
17 Q Go ahead. 
18 A The only risk I am concerned about is First 
19 Security Bank. And that is because that is the risk that 
20 the Tower Board accepted when they made the second loan. 
21 Q The preliminary title report that I have asked you 
22 about was issued in November of 1984? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Near t h e t i m e t h e commitment f o r t h e l o a n was made by 
25 Richards-Woodbury, l o a n d i d n ' t c l o s e t i l l March 20 th of 1 9 8 5 . i n 
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1 that intervening period of three or four monthsf did Tower 
2 or did you do anything to update the preliminary title 
3 report or to do additional search of the record to 
4 determine — 
5 A That is what this does. Excuse me. 
6 II Q By this, would your answer be where you are pointing? 
7 A Escrow instruction says to the title company," you 
8 update and then update your search; and if there are any 
9 changes, donft record it." That is what it says to me. 
10 Q °id you have any discussion or communication with 
H the title company to make sure that the title company could 
12 understand that is what that language meant? 
13 A This would have been done by Jeff Woodbury. 
14 0 To your knowledge, did Mr. Woodbury have such a 
15 communication with Richmond? 
16 A I don't know. 
17 Q For the sake of discussion, let's say, between the 
18 time of the pre-title report of November of 1984, and the 
19 closing of March 20th of '85, that there had been an 
20 intervening mechanic's lien filed by someone who had done 
21 work on the mall, subcontractor? 
22 A Y e s-
23 Q Someone filed a notice of lien for painting or 
24 some other work that had been done. How would that have 
25 been handled in the transaction if it had been known to 
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1 Tower? 
2 II A I think it would have been a problem, because at 
3 that point you are beginning — it's a red flag — I 
4 think it would have been a red flag to me and red flag to 
5 Spagnola or whoever at Tower; that maybe there are problems 
6 that we are unaware of. 
7 Q Had you discussions with Mr. Spagnola or anyone at 
8 Tower about that very issue of whether or not a lien had 
9 been discovered, would have been a red flag, whether it 
10 would have affected the loan transaction? 
11 A Knowing him well enough and knowing myself and the 
12 nature of the transaction, I don't think that discussion 
13 would even have to be made. He knows, and I know, that any 
14 time you have got a potential mechanic's lien floating out 
15 there, you have a potential problem. 
16 Q Well ~ 
17 A In other words, the transaction might have gone 
18 ahead, but at that point it's a red flag. You do a little 
19 more investigation into finding out what is going on here. 
20 Q Would the effect of discovery of the lien like 
21 that and the manner in which it was dealt have been 
22 determined by the size of the lien, type of the lien, or 
23 anything about the lien itself? 
24 Let me just give you an illustration. Let's use 
25 as an example, the painter had filed a lien for 1,000 bucks 
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1 in January of 1985, between the time of the present title 
2 and the closing of the loan report. 
3 What would you have done about that as opposed to 
4 a larger lien, say of $100,000? Would the amount have given 
5 you any concern or been relevant at all to your 
6 consideration? 
7 A I wouldn't make that judgment. All I need to 
8 know is there is a lien filed. 
9 Q What would you have done? 
10 A That judgment would then have to be made by 
11 management. It becomes an underwriting question. Not 
12 necessarily a legal question at that point. 
13 Q So, do I understand you to say, if you had known 
14 about such a lien, that your response would be merely to 
15 inform underwriting or the Board, the appropriate person, 
16 and the determination of how to deal with that would have 
17 been left to them? 
18 A At that point, it would have been up to them. 
19 Q Had you ever faced a similar kind of situation in 
20 any other Tower loans? 
2 1
 MR. KINCAID: What other situation? Clarify it, 
22 Q Let's say where you discovered an intervening lien 
23 of record between the time of commitment or pre-title 
24 report, and the closing of the loan. 
25 A I can't remember everything. 
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1 with the loan. 
2 And, that particular case, I don't think we went 
3 forth with the loan. We decided not to make the loan. 
4 Q Any other instances that you recall specifically? 
5 A No, because some of them do get worked out. That 
6 is the only one I can specifically recall. 
7 Q You have been involved in transactions where, to 
8 use your phrase, they have been worked out by way of 
9 subordination or payment, or some other manner? 
10 A Total control over disposition , distribution of 
11 funds in some manner, yes. 
12 Q Well, at any time prior to the closing of the 
13 Buildmart loan in this case, were you aware of any liens of 
14 record other than the First Security first deed of trust? 
15 A Never. 
16 Q Never? 
17 A Never. 
18 Q None at all? 
19 A Well, strike that a minute. There were two 
20 instances I recall by Seal's letter which he in depth 
21 described it. But, they didn't have any problem with those. 
22 He assured us they were a problem, and insured over by 
23 Lawyers Title. 
24 Q Other --
2 5
 A It didn't appear to be related to the construction 
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1 of the project. 
2 Q For your benefit, those have been referred to as 
3 the complex fabricators1 lien, and the Bill Gibson 
4 litigation. 
5 Other than those two items, did you have any 
6 knowledge of any liens of record? 
7 A Nof I did not. 
8 Q To your knowledge, did anyone at Tower know about 
9 any liens of record prior to the closing? 
10 A Not to my knowledge. 
11 Q You have had experience with mechanic's lien 
12 coverage or extended coverage title insurance. We have kind 
13 of used those terms interchangeably. Which one are you more 
14 comfortable with? 
15 A Mechanic's lien insurance. 
16 Q You have been familiar with mechanic's liens and 
17 title insurance in the past. 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q It was obtained for the Tower loan for the 
20 Buildmart loan in this case. Was it not? 
21 Q To the best of my knowledge, it was. 
22 Q Did you ever see the final title policy for the 
23 Buildmart loan? 
24 A Yes, I believe I did. 
25 Q Did you review it with a specific purpose in mind? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And that an abstract of title is prepared to 
3 reflect the state of title and history of the title? 
4 A Wellf an abstract does reflect that, that is true. 
5 Q Is that the purpose of the abstract of title as 
g opposed to the commitment or title insurance policy? 
7 A To mer an abstract, as I said, is a chain of title 
g showing ownership. 
9 Q Now, is Tower or First Federal used 
10 interchangeably in answer to Interrogatory No. 16, which 
H related to the allegations made in Paragraph 7 of the third 
12 amended cross-claim? Maybe I should — let me read that 
13 for you, if I may. 
14 "LTIC breached their contractual obligation with 
15 Tower in that they failed to exercise the requisite skill 
lg and care under the circumstances by failing to either find 
17 and slash report on all of the claims and slash liens 
18 against the real estate securing the Tower loan." 
19 And then, the interrogatory states the factual 
20 basis for those allegations in Tower's answer. The answer 
2i reflects that, in fact, there are liens of record, and that 
22 the Buildmart loan closed in March of 1985. Are you aware 
23 of any specific liens or Utah notices of lien that were on 
24 file as of the closing of that loan? 
25 A The only liens or whatever I was aware of were the 
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1 two that were referred to in Seal's letter. 
2 Q Excuse me. What do you mean? 
3 A Other than thatf no, I was not aware of anything 
4 else. 
5 Q Are you now aware 
6 A Am I aware there were some? 
7 Q Yes, 
8 II A I am aware there were some that were not reported, 
9 as I recall. 
10 Q That were of record? 
11 A They were of record. 
12 Q Where do you get your information? 
13 A From the litigation. That is when I became aware 
14 of it, through the litigation. 
15 Q Or from the pleadings or some of the lawyers 
16 involved? 
17 A No. Both. 
18 Q Do you have any personal knowledge of it, or have 
19 you received a copy of documents that were of record? 
20 A No. 
21 Q In your testimony earlier today, Mr. Autenreith, I 
22 believe you — and in the context of discussions about 
23 what went into Tower's decision to make the loan — I 
24 believe your testimony was that had you known of any 
25 Potential liens prior to the closing, it would have raised a 
EXHIBIT " J 
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1 had been told that a lien existed against the Buildmart Mall 
2 property for work that had been done on the property before 
3 your loan was closedf say, for instance, the Staker Paving 
4 lien for one, monies that the Staker Company was owed for 
5 doing paving or road work on the project, that they were 
6 owed the money, that they had gone through the process that 
7 you are talking about, not only were they owed it, they 
8 filed a lien evidencing that they were owed it. 
9 If you had known about the existence of that kind 
10 of lien on the Buildmart Mall property before the loan 
H closed, what would you have done about that? 
12 A I feel reasonably certain that Mr. Autenreith, 
13 having been — it would have been in his bailiwick at that 
14 time. He would have called me. Had there not been adequate 
15 funds to take care of that lien, we would never have funded 
16 the loan; we would never had put our loan on as long as that 
17 judgment was outstanding. He would have said it's 
18 potentially a lien, and it has precedence over the mortgage. 
19 I know we would not have done it. 
20 Q You would not have done it? 
21 A Without that being satisfied some way. Some way, 
22 by paying, you know, be satisfied — our position would 
23 have been that. 
24 Q Are you familiar with a procedure whereby a lien 
25 like that can be released prior to the closing? 
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1 II A I know liens can be released or subordinated. 
2 0 Have you encountered other loans prior to the 
3 Buildmart Mall loan where mechanic's liens have been either 
4 released or subordinated or handled in some fashion? 
5 A I can't recall anything of that nature that I have 
g been involved in, anything of that nature. I can't recall 
7 anything. 
8 II Q If that lien I have described for you had existed, 
g and if it had been released prior to closing, would the 
1Q Board of Tower have gone ahead and made the loan and 
H disbursed the funds? 
12 A Well, as I say, again, the responsibility of the 
13 Board, after the Board approval of the loan, would have 
14 ceased, and then Mr. Autenreith's responsibility to the 
15 Board and to the Association was to make sure that our 
16 position was where it should have been, that, no, there 
17 shouldn't be any title problems or anything of that sort. 
18 This is his position to protect us Board members. We are 
19 not astute enough and not expert enough. 
20 Q If the title problems, as you have described them, 
2i had been taken care of, and if those liens had been removed 
22 prior to the closing of the loan, would you have expected 
23 Mr. Autenreith to alert the Board or to advise you in any 
24 manner to not disburse funds or anything of that nature? 
MR. HOWARD: This is hypothetical here. 
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1 BY MR. DRAKE: 
2 Q Go ahead. 
3 A Mr. Autenreith in the pastr he has proven to 
4 us — that he has on other occasions held back and needed 
5 a satisfaction and voided the loanf perhaps. With 
g Mr. Autenreith, to my knowledgef he never did anything 
7 except make sure he protected the Association. 
8 Q If you had been advised that a Staker Paving loan 
9 like the one I have described to you existed prior to the 
10 closing of the loan, would that have caused you to go back 
11 o r t h e Board to go back and re-evaluate the decision of 
12 whether or not to make the loan? 
13 A If we, on advice of Mr. Autenreith, would have 
14 felt we were not going to be in our second position we 
15 intended to be inr we would have either voided the loan or 
16 just would not — something would have had to change. 
17 Q Is it fair to say that decision and what action 
18 might have been taken by the Board upon being advised of the 
19 loan would depend on the type of loan it was and the 
20 circumstances surrounding the existence of the lien? 
21 A Wellf the Board and myself are not knowledgeable 
22 in and understand the types of liensr and define them as to 
23 whether they are not — we'd probably sayf do they create 
24 II a nY problem, interfering with our position. I think based 
oe ,, on that answer we would have said we wouldn't do it, or it 25 
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1 has to be cleaned up, or something has to be done. We 
2 wouldn't alter our position. We either have a second deed of 
3 trust or else;that is what we would have wanted. 
4 II Q If the Staker lien had been identified to you, and 
5 if it had been released and you were advised that you were 
6 in second position on this Buildmart Mall loan, would you 
7 have gone ahead and made the loan? 
8 MR. O'KEEFE: Objection. That is going beyond, 
9 wildly speculative at this point. 
10 BY MR. DRAKE: 
11 Q Go ahead. 
12 A Only on the advice of Mr. Autenreith. He would 
13 have advised us; he would have given us an opinion. Based 
14 upon his opinion, we would have probably acted on what he 
15 would have recommended. 
16 Q In the course of using Mr. Autenreith to help you 
17 in making loans through Tower, had you ever had a situation 
18 before this, the kind of scenario that occurred that he 
19 then discovered a legal problem, if you will, with the 
20 title and alerted you to it and advised you not to make a 
21 loan? 
22 MR. OfKEEFE: Objection to the 
23 characterization. Unless you more clearly define 
24 it, of Mr. Autenreithfs identifying the problem, I 
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Q Customarily, who would have prepared the escrow 
instructions for a loan made by Tower? 
A Mr. Autenreith. 
Q Mr. Autenreith would have? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it possible in this case it was prepared by 
counsel for Richards Woodbury? 
A It could have been, yes; and sanctioned and 
approved by Mr. Autenreith. 
Q From the start, where we went way back to 
Mr. Brand's conversation, to the laborious end we have been 
recently, did anyone discuss with you something generally 
along the lines of, you didn't have to worry about the 
priority of your trust deed because First Security would 
take care of things, or words to that effect, because of its 
first trust deed position? 
A No, sir. 
Q You indicated that you were at Salt Lake and saw 
the Buildmart Mall project, and saw the scope of it. In 
fact, you had an appraisal that told you that it was an 































You were aware of that, were you not? 
A Yes. 
Q Given your experience in lending and having gone 
out and kicked a lot of bricks, as you have said, would you 
have considered it to be unusual for mechanic's liens to 
have been filed at the time that this loan closed? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection as to relevance. 
A Well, again, you know, those legal aspects of the 
loan are generally — have never been really any officer's 
nor my jurisdiction; and, consequently, I would not have 
really had to do that. In other words, I would have never 
gsiven that any thought necessarily. I leave that to legal 
counsel. So, it never entered my mind, if I am approaching 
or assuming my responsibilities. 
Q Assuming that you had been advised that a 
mechanic's lien was filed against the property before the 
loan closed, would you consider that to be unusual, given 
the scope and the stage of the construction on this project? 
A Well, again, if there are a number of years of 
having mechanic's liens filed, I would be concerned what it 
was, can it be resolved, is it a big issue, does it affect 
our equity position. A number of years, that would have 
prompted — but unless I would have had a satisfactory 
answer, and that of Mr. Autenreith, it would have been a 
problem for us to look into it. 
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1 Q So, the existence of such a lien could have 
2 resulted in your automatically refusing to make the loan 
3 under any circumstances? 
4 II A Under no circumstances, I would say, unless it was 
5 to be resolved. If it was not immediate, we would find a 
6 solution if itvas probably one that was condoned, accepted by 
7 legal counsel# and would not have jeopardized the position 
8 of the Association* we would have proceeded. If we had any 
9 indication of that, we would not have proceeded. 
10 Q One last one. Please take no offense; customary 
11 instruction. Your testimony today has been under oath, as 
12 if it were a court of law. I stress the seriousness of the 
13 oath, and trust you have testified in the best and in an 
14 honest fashion here today. 
15 A I can make one further comment, as I already said 
16 before we entered this room to my attorney. He said, "If I am 
17 to represent you, Don, you must totally speak the truth." 
18 Gentlemen, I have done just that, to the very, 
19 very best of my ability. 
20 MR. ORITT: Thank you, Mr. Spagnola. 
21 MR. HOWARD: Two questions. 
22 EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. HOWARD: 
24 Q I am holding Exhibit No. 8, which is the letter of 
25 September 13, '85, from Mary Lance of Richards Woodbury to 
EXHIBIT " K 
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. mechanic's liens, how they operated, their priority, and 
2 things like that? 
- A When you say "knowledge," what do you mean? 
4 Q Well, everybody I think has some belief 
5 A Having owned real estate and everything, yes, I 
g know what a mechanic's lien is, 
- Q Tell me, in March of 1985, what your understanding 
fl of a mechanic's lien was, 
Q A Well, my understanding is that a mechanic's lien 
1Q is an encumbrance upon the property, 
. n Q Do you recall mechanic's liens ever being an issue 
.^  or topic that was discussed at the time the decision to make 
13 this loan was being made? 
14 A No-
15 Q You have before you a number of different exhibits, 
lg Could you refer to your letter of February 13, 1986? 
A Yes. 
Q Exhibit No. 3. 
A No. 3, yes. 
Q Specifically, the third full paragraph in the 
letter. Well, before I get to that, the second paragraph, 
the language to the effect that, tfI continue to be concerned 
as to why any foreclosure on the part of First Security 
would negate our right to sue them, Lawyers Title and 



































Do you have that language? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall any more details about why you wrote 
that language to Mr. Autenreith? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Do you remember any discussion about your right to 
sue Greg Seal and his firm? 
A No. 
Q One more paragraph, the next-to-the-last sentence: 
"Obviously, had we known that we didn't have second position 
but instead third position, we certainly would not have 
advanced the funds or participated in the project . . . " 
A Yes. 
Q Referring to your language in the third paragraph, 
could you tell me what you mean by that in your letter? 
A Well, I guess I meant we didn't have a second lien 
on the property. I don't know what I meant when I said 
that, other than the fact we didn't have a second lien. 
There were others ahead of us; let's put it that way. 
Q That is your recollection today, you have no 
specific recollection of why you wrote that language on the 
13th of February '86? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q What is the source of your information that Tower 
did not have a second position? 
TOWER FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
HOME OFFICE: Ml THIRD AVENUE, NEW BRIGHTON, PA 15066 / (412)846.7010 
BRIGHTON TOWNSHIP OFFICE, TUSCA PLAZA, BEAVER, PA 1500* / (413) 495-7300 
CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP OFFICE, 114 OLD FREEDOM ROAD, MARS, PA 16046 / (412) 776-3611 
February 13, 1986 
E. Earl Autenreith, Esq. 
Panner, Holland, Autenrelth and Wolford 
345 Commerce Street 
Beaver, Pennsylvania 15009 
Dear Earl: 
Confirming our telephone conversation of yesterday afternoon, after reading 
Verden E. Bettllyonfs letter of February 11, 1986 and the attachments, it 
appears to me that ve have no alternative but to go with Option 3* 
In the meantime, I continue to be concerned as to why any foreclosure on 
the part of First Security would negate our right to sue them, Lawyers 
Title and Gregory Seal and Seal* 
We accepted what we thought was a second Deed of Trust and advanced $750,000 
relying on information provided by these parties. Obviously, had we known 
that we didnft have second position but Instead third position, we certainly 
would not have advanced the funds or participated in the project in any 
manner. I believe they have liability and can't understand how any foreclosure 
action would excuse that liability. 
If you deem it necessary, you are authorized to travel to Utah representing 
Tower Federal Savings and Loan in order to insure that we make the best deal 
possible out of this very difficult situation. 
Obviously, we are not negotiating from any position of strength and I feel 
strongly that our $750,000 may well be in jeopardy. 
Sincerely, 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
President 
d L . S h a w "•* - • " V • • 
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CURTIS J. DRAKF. [A0910] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Gregory L. Seal, 
Jerry R. Kennedy, Ronald M. Frandsen 
and Seal, Kennedy & Frandsen 
Key Dank Tower, Suite 700 
b0 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CUT.P CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
FLIDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ) TIMOTHY KRUEGER 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
DUTl-nMART MALI,, a Utah l i m i t e d ) 
partnersh ip , o t a l . , ) 
Defendants. ) 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ) 
ASSOCIATION, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil NO. C85-5Q83 
SEAL, KENNtDY AND FRANDSEN, a ) 
partnership, GREGORY I.. SEAL, ) Judge Raymond S. Uno 
JERRY R. KENNEDY and RONALD M. ) 
FRANDSEN, ) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE ) 
CORPORATION, ) 




FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES ) 
CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SK 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Timothy Krueger, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
states as follows: 
1. In March, 1985, I was employed by Richmond Title 
Company and conducted various title searches and other tasks in 
relation to the $750,000 Loan made by or through 
Richarcls-Woodbury to Buildmart Mall. 
2. Exhibit A hereto is a true and correct copy of a 
draft, toqether with my marginal notes, which was used to 
prepare the final Tower Policy of Title Insurance. 
3. Exhibit B hereto io a true and correct copy of 
ehatvjn sheets which I prepared or, in part, caused to be 
prepared, AM part of tho preparatory work for issuance of the 
Tower Policy. 
4. As part of my duties for issuing the Tower Policy 
and recording the Loan documents, I knew, on or about March 7, 
lOrtO, that I had to obtain and record lien releases for the 
Staker raving (Book 5628 Page 1776) and National Plumbing 
(Dook 5615 Pago 1054) liens. 
5. I conducted an "update" to search for mechanic's 
liena and other encumbrances on the Buildmart property on 
March 7, 1985 and another like update on March 20, 1905, before 
recording the Loan documents. 
6. I did not discover either the Mike Farnsworth or 
Harper Excavating liens in conducting my update searches, 
DATED this . {2 day of __,X.L , 1988. 
TIMOTHY K>UEGE»^ 
SUBSC^peasft^DSWORN to before me this / ^ d a y of July, 1908. 
NOTARY PU ii L w m i / , w n ' o j NUTAKY PUBLIC ~~ 7 
Residing *«^J\ /?>/ M y C o n O T i B S i °n Expires: /0//S/%? 
'IF1CATE OF DELIVERY 
I'here1S5«5owrtTfy-that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand-delivered or mailed on this /£** 
dny of VJ.y , 1988 to the following counsel of record: 
HAND-DP;LIVERED TO: 
John P. Ashton, Er.q. 
Brian s. King, Esq. 
TRINCE, YEATKK & GELD/.AIILER 
City Centre 1. Suite 900 
175 Eaet Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MAILED TO: 
John A. Kincaid, Esq. 
KIHCATD & McGRATH, P.C. 
Two Gateway Center, 19th Floor 
Pittsburgh, TA 15222 
Jeffrey Oritt, Esq. 
TIBBALK, HOWELL & MOXLEY 
257 East 200 flouth-2, Suita 050 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Thomaa L. Kay, Esq. 
Paul D. Newman, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
KRUFGBRl/CJD 
- A -
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Ioiuyers THlc Insurance (prporolion 
Notional Headquarters 
Richmond. Virginia 
/ ^ X 7 |C fr£ COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
.^^^ ' SCHEDULE A 
-tivif Lhii*-— ^ ^ ^ ^ C a s c n o „ . . ' 
DATE ENTE^O _ 
PRFMIUM 
BEtS$UtO* 
G 1-4 FAMILY D OTHER 
1 . Ll lOC 
2 Policy or pnlicifts lo he issued 
LI ALIA Ownei'G Policy-Torn. 8-19/0 (Hev. 10 1 /-70> 
L.l ALIA n^&Ulentuil liilc In&ufonce Policy—19/9 
Pioposed insured. 
(b| ALIA Lean Polity. 1970 (Rev 10 17-70) 
Piopotird insured 
1
 i;.N\-;?;w«./My:bi! f i m c t S i ci;lp. 
Pi'oi'used insured. 





. r . - ~ Z ^ C , * * * * A # • * •<• •» / *«»• l«i • U M U « » < 
4 The land 'eferred lo in this Commitment is described as follows. 
014052 
(..onnu»i<ii«ji'»:ij ,jt . ...... , Commitment Nfl'.. m „: . . . 
Schedule A—Page 1 




EXHIBIT ffA" LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
REGINNtNG on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which ia Hortb 
O^OJ^zy Eaat 1066,977 feet and Rest 638.748 feet from the Norttaweat Comer of 
Section I. Townahip 3 South, Range I Weat, Salt Lake Baee and Meridian and 
running thence South 39#57f35M Eaat 522*115 feet along a*id street to a point 
on A 440.471 foot radio* curve to the right} thence along aaid curve for an arc 
cliatance of 361.372 feet (chord bean South 37*22#46H East 35U322 feet; thence 
continuing along said atreet South I2*57f35" Eaet 204*761 feet; thence North 
7r05'59H Kant 108,000 feet; thence South l8#09f27H Eaat 170*000 feet; thence 
North 77*02f25lf Kaat 263.450 feet to the Veeterly line of the D. « R.C.W. 
Rail-road right-ot-wey; thence Forth O O ^ ' l l " Weat 839.000 feet along aaid 
right-of-way; thence South 81#56f39" Weat 30*000 feet; thence North 444,20f00ft 
Weat 734.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 00.00 foot radiua curve to the 
rittht; thence along aaid curve for an ate distance of 60*505 feet (chord bear* 
North 22#40f00" Weat 59.073 feet); thence North OrOQ'OO" Weat 281.994 feet; 
thenco South 80#01f27w Weat 68B.790 feet; thence South 0«28f46H Eaat 41.171 
feet; thence North 89*50f46M Weat 11.724 feet to the propoaed centerlin* 
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.319 feet to a point of tangency with 
a 515.935 loot radio* curve to the right; thence along aaid curve for an arc 
rijir.auce of 270.506 feet; thence South 30#02,25rt Weat 25.000 feet to the Point 
Of BEGINNING. 
^object to an Eaeenent for joint uae of parking and driveveya located oof over 
and acroai the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of aaid property and a point which 
i* North 198*544 feot and Eaat 1506.434 Ceet from the Northwtat Corner of 
Section I, Township 3 South, Range 1 Weatt Salt Lake Baae and Meridian and 
running thence North 77#02,25,f Eaat 100.00 feet; thanca North I7#54f01" Weat 
l/*3-6il f*et; thence South 72#05,59lf Weat 100.235 feet; thence South 16*09*21" 
T.A*r. I31i.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which eartfimecit ia reserved for the joint uae of the aforedeacribed property and 
for the uae of that property immediately abutting to the Weat. 
Ipiuyers Irtlejnsarance Grporaiion 
National Hoadquartors ' 
Richmond, Virginia 
SCHEDULE B—Section 1 
Requirements 
Th*/ folSowmy :ne thr roiiuirnniont'; to bfc romplitMl with 
IIVMII t.i) Pjivmunt to 01 for tho account of the grantors or imirttjnyors of the full consideration for the estate or interest 
10 be m^uiw*1 
Itrm (b) l*iop«»r n^iii.jifi^ni(v) i ityniiny tho estate or interest to be innifrpcl must ba oxer.utnH and duly filed for record. 
IO v)/lt 
t^ .cwirc ^au* IvAAfU 
\ r > v v t t ? ^ ^ oi t int l ru*t i/*** ir»* l;»iiriui*rt >4*it, A If imitad ?*rtn«rjMp f j * 
Tr^iiu* ti# 4icinu»i<J T i l l * 0<*;>a<ryt 4« T*u»ro* 4i»«i *•&•«* P*rin«r4ius> *r*<i : l . 
^ : i r i W*v<t | «** &4H«nct*ry la iwcu/* «1 ?i f 7J^>^^trf d*d*(i JUMP i?, i ' /H and 
rin-.ai£.,»<t June i » , !>£*, in A*** J,>bUi * * ^ ^ r > r > t ^WuWry l*u* J4/$C?&7t 
fc
.im-KAfi't of Ttint *>*4 r«c>:'1«4# Ju\v 1£> ivy* f ;n 0ci.\ i>7^ f r*4* !&;>•>, *4 
ii.*t<*M /ai Uiiirj.'.u;,, to % « A . f r*arrf«\«n\i/ 6 *»# lJhicl «rlA4i\ # i-tfcarit'J 
wv|ii*tau6r i * f Hfc* ^ ^ r y N o , J^iU'S] i t V * n i j y j^ i t i*4« l i l t . 
loiuyers Tule Insurance 0rpora(ion 
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE B-Sec»ion 2 
Exceptions 
ll»r» policy or polkivs to he issued will contain exception! to the following unless the tame are disposed of to 
the *ullsfu<.tiun of the Company: 
I. Rights or* claims of parties In possession not shown by the public records. 
?. Cn<r»rn f^it5, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records. 
3. Di%cfrpaiK(f?s, conflicts In boundary lines, shortage In area, encroachments, and any facts which 
a coovct survey and inspection of the promises would dlsclole and which are not shown by the 
public records. 
44 Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, im-
posed by low and not shown by the public record* 
5 Delect*, liens, encumbrances, adverse clalmir^of ottser matterTSjf any, created, first appealing In 
the public records or attaching subsequom to the effective datcNjiereof but prior to the date the 
proposed insured acquires of record forX^aluc thej/stoje or interest or mortgage thereon covered 
by this Commitment. 
\4Jt$ ktfZT+x 
Tix<?» i u r Uik: ? ^ r r7J>s^re ' l t l i » i u ^ f I'.ls^ft tnuy v * r e sua p m J ur Vm»ibtr 3( , 
I*}*'* ft* to c.i'i l . ) lLok i ; 'A ; 
tti : i i * c n o M ^ o ^ J ^ ^ ^ V & J ^ 2 * * to i i J v f t i l •'<>. J / t r t of 14—J*i-37 7—».C^ W; 
) n tU* i V w u t i C ^ ' l £ ^ * 4 ^ r f r f 10 ? i J b r / i l Vj« P4fC. 'J* i i~ Jo- J « J * - C ! o; 
.tin! t:; :N« *i*y\jg&l 
1>^' J CX^ : ^ i i N ^ i i :*o# oe r t or S i - 1 6 - i ; 4 * » u l 7 ; 
S O ; V S S C i . t o v . - i < i v * i l i'r>. p * i t o i i i~,iU-)*.•<••»< i ( . 
Velv|>aottti >•«• y j ^ T f t ' . i i t 
^t iht^ct «.L> dn *efce.r^trrVici r i:/lit~«*J'*vtfy i n f a v o r of tft-tu r^visr « M * Li;^>i ( V j ^ t n y 
i»n- K I C C I I I C c r i n n i s s i o ' . ' isnu" riisirikclion ; i u i 4 i L V £ * a iouy « li?*e <!<?*crii>e»i a« 
' '^vt'-vfit S»;nw«inp; '»Vo - ' s * i <^ui( i a t . i 7<H» r !<u ' ^ w t , . i jT« or lo:>#, f r o » t . i * 
?a* r :r:u ' f c r i J i * A ; tncrvtu >\>rin. V * 4 4 f *e«c 66C }. j*r . f s o r * o r i u e a t tttdtsca * o r t h 
' - • J ^ 1 '.^rffc 7*7 Z"«MH; : n * w i d t S oi * « U eA4**«>fft * * r^ t 4wc lo«<»4 , C<ftit*iii.Nt i n 
' j M » C f t i . i i t ; ;:j*tV4f»nt uc t^J J u l y I , 19M* . atsrj re<;<ira^'J ^vorsoer i 3 f 1VRI» i n soa* 
>l/-> *•*<,« I ; J * A* zuny ?•). j i - u ^ s . 
Fxceptions numbered. I l a 1st ^ i r . c l . L . i ! _ are hereby omitted. '•' l 0 - L T A L««* 
K o i i c y 
Hit* OwMCf'« i Po l i c y to U.* "5SUM J, ,f o n y . s h a l l c o n t a i n t h * f a l l o w i n g i t r m s m a d d i t i o n to the ones set for th above? 
( I ) Tho t;«-i.ft of f.us», i* ony, requl»f»d under Schr?dvle B--Section 1, Item fb), 
(?) l lnpcHori tod M i i n i i v j r l t i n>'. ; r«»- c- r VCJ l ions 0« fxcMpt ions in p a t e n t s or in Acts a u t h o r i z i n g issuance 
l l w i t ' O i , vvnt»;r »igl»l',( c la ims oi 1111r» ro w a l f ^ i . 
( J l A n y (ifiO* oM u f> t3 ( i id ! n < r » * /i«n.*m.<.»>^#»»%r4 M . ^ m > . *r l ** /k* , . - .^ i • - . - - — 1 - -
lawyers Title Insurance Gprporalion 
NAIIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE J&!L? cont'd, 
fl- Subject to * perpetual easement over the North 20 feet of Lot* 5B and 6A in 
rnvor of Salt Lake County, to bring any and all machinery and equipment upon 
>i*id property for the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining, 
rApxnrinp, and keeping in satisfactory condition, a waterway in Salt Lake County 
Surveyor1 a Of fie*, Mitlvale Storm Drain, aa contaiued in that certain Eaaement 
recorded March 15, 1966 in nook 2439, Pa*e 407, aaid Easement affects the 
Northerly li.fi* of that property described in Schedule "A" hereof which is 
vested in Buildmart Hall, a Limited Partnership* 
9« Subject to an Eauvwent for Utilities, 14 feet in width along and immediately 
adjoining utterly Sandy Parkway, * dedicated street, *» reserved in the 
dedication of aaid atreet, 
10* Tmat Vno.d from fluildroart Ma)l» a Limited Partnership, as Truator to Richmond 
Title Compeiiy, a$ Trustee and S.K»K, Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, ai 
Rcnrficiary to aecure $175,725*00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
J9P.4, in Book 5568, Page 2596, a* Entry Ho. 3960987* 
The Beneficial interest he rei minder assigned to Poorliill Thrift by that certain 
A<tsignnerit of Trust Oeed recorded, July 16, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, aa 
Eiiny No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildwart Mall, A 
L'{ wiled Partnerihip, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
S"i»pte«her 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977* 
11. Subject to all umecordad leaseo and to the terms end conditions thereof* 
HichimiTid Title Company is to be provided a copy of said leases prior to 
cloning. 
I?. An Aqteeroent dated July 10, 19P4 by end between Buildraert Mall, a limited 
i>Aituership and lUw, Inc., Rwpioyee* Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. Given to 
create a temporary r/ifteioent for ingress and agres* for the use and benefit of 
Mini property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject 
properly duftcrihed in Schedule l#Aft hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and 
*hall b* located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property* This 
«>H?eroi-itt Khali automatically terminate ar such time an a road is dedicated to 
(.he public us* or improvements are rude to establish a road. 
laiuyers Title Insurance Corporation 
NATIONAI HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 
Subject to right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described 
in Schedule "A" hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more 
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the 
puMic at a future date* 
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point vhich ie North 
00*02'25" Kant 1066.977 feet and East 638,748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Action 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 We«t, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59*57,35" East 50.000 feet to a point of tangeucy with a 
2r>.000 foot radius re.verae curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 39.770 feet (chord bears Horth 14*57l35M West 35,355 feet) to * 
point of tangency with a 540,935 foot radiua curve to the left, thence along 
aaid curve for an arc distance of 283*613 feet (chord beers North 15*01•12" 
Kant 280*376 fe<*t)f thence Horth 725.312 feet to a point of t*ngency with a 
75*000 foot radiua curve to the right, thence along aaid curve for an arc 
distance of 38.844 fevt (chord bears North 44*30*43" East 35.053 feet), thence 
South tJ9*01?27" Went 38.201 feet, thence South 00*28t66t1 East 41*171 feet; 
thence North fi9#50,46M West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point 
of tangency with a 490*935 foot radiua curve to the right, thence along said 
curve lor an arc diHtance of 257.396 feet (chord bears South IS'Ol'H1' We»t 
754.460 fnet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the 
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears 
South 75*02f25" Weat 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard, 
thence South 59*37\35" East 50.000 feet along taid Northerly line to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
A non-excluaivu Right of Way over the Eaaterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30 
ff.jt iw width, over and through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of 
subjuct property, being wore particularly described as follows: 
BEGIN on the Easterly line ot Sandy boulevard at a point which la North 
00*or;5M Baat 326.883 feet and Fast 1350.455 feet frota the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 72*05,59,f East 350.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
64.076 foot radiua curve to the left, thence along aaid curve for an arc 
distance of 90*900 feet (chord bears North 32*01,19M East 83.667 feet) to the 
Vont^rly right ol way line of the D.SR.G.W* Railroad, thence North 08#03f21M 
Wear. 517.185 feet along said right of way to * point of tangency with a 154.768 
foot radiua curve to the left, thence along aaid curve for an arc distance of 
r>7.993 feet (chord hears North 26*llfAO%f West 96*365 feet), thence North 
44*20*00" West 234.704 ieet to a point of tangency with an 80.000 foot radius 
<uiv<* to th« right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet 
(chord beat-1 North Xi'ftOW West 59.073 feet), thence North 01*00,00M West 
2!>7.017 f*?et. to a point of tangency with a 55.000 foot radiua curve to the 
lelt, thr.nce along Raid curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears 
Worth 45*39,16" Went 77.765 feat), thence South 89*01f27" West 663.540 Teet, 
tiirtnc* South OOVfl'AO" East 30.001 feet, thence North 89*0lf27u KaAt 663*801 
(eet to a point of,tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the right, 
tinvice aloou tii-i *urve for **< arc distance &i W.239- feet (chard bears South 
WWII" Rant 3%.148 feet), thence South 01*00,00w East 257*017 feet to a 
point of tangency with a 110.000 foot radiua curve to the left, thence 
CONTINUED ON RIDER 




 c o n t 'd . 
}»• lfa>l Financing Statement wherein Buiidwart Mall, appear* a* Debtor and First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a^ Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated aa of 
July 15, 19e4t appears as Secured Party, recorded Septenber 26, 19tf4 in Book 
3r>9.1f Paj;e 1974 a* Entry No. 3997401, 
lf>. Subject to tertaa, conditions and ap#cial asaesflmenta of the Special Improvement 
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a 
Municipal corporation. 
jiJrt Said property i* located within thn boundaries of Midvaie City, Sandy City and 
7.,'J Sandy Suburban Improvement District and it subject to all asaeJStneuCs and 
service charges levied thereunder. 
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Mfifuarfcn 
CURTIS J. DRAKE [A0910] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Gregory L. Seal, 
Jerry R. Kennedy, Ronald M. Frandsen 
and Seal, Kennedy & Frandsen 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and, 
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership; et al., 
Defendants. 




SEAL, KENNEDY AND FRANDSEN, a ] 
partnership, GREGORY L. SEAL, ] 
JERRY R. KENNEDY, and RONALD M. ] 
FRANDSEN, ] 
Third-Party Defendants. ; 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
i KEITH ELLERTSON 
I Civil NO. C85-5883 






•Party Plaintiff, ) 
FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES ) 
CORPORATION, 
Third--Party Defendant• ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Keith Ellertson, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
states as follows: 
1. I am the president of Title Insurance Agency of 
Utah, Inc. 
2. I am qualified to conduct title searches and am 
familiar with the record keeping practices of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office for the filing of mechanic's lien, 
lis pendens, releases of liens and other instruments. 
3. I have reviewed documents reflecting mechanic's 
lien and -other instruments concerning the Buildmart Mall 
Project, the legal description of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
4. Based on my review of the records, the following 
instruments were filed and of record in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office on the dates indicated: 
2 -
12/12/84 Lien for $759.50 filed by Jerry 
Mellen for linoleum installed in 
tenant space for Howell's Paint. 
(DKT 5613 INST 4025095) 
12/17/84 Lien #4028892 for $40,058.29 filed by 
National Plumbing and Heating. 
(DKT 5615 INST 4028892) 
12/17/84 Lien #4028893 for $74,272.94 filed by 
National Plumbing and Heating. 
(DKT 5615 INST 4028893) 
12/19/84 Lien for $25,386.09 filed by Tenant 
Coordination Services, Inc. 
(DKT 5616 INST 4030053) 
2/8/85 Lien for $145,870.77 filed by Staker 
Paving and Construction. 
(DKT 5628 INST 4048874) 
2/11/85 Release of Lien filed for release of 
Tenant Coordination Services, Inc. 
lien. 
(DKT 5628 INST 4049405) 
2/14/85 Release of Lien filed for release of 
National Plumbing & Heating lien 
#4028893. 
(DKT 5629 INST 4050870) 
3/13/85 Lien for $2,255.00 filed by Mike 
Farnsworth Painting. 
(DKT 5636 INST 4060817) 
3/14/85 Lien for $84,010.58 filed by Harper 
Excavating, Inc. 
(DKT 5636 INST 4061418) 
3/15/85 Release of Lien filed for release of 
Staker Paving and Construction lien. 
(DKT 5637 INST 4061887) 
3/20/85 Release of Lien filed for release of 
National Plumbing & Heating lien 
- 3 
#4028892 
, (DKT 5638 INST 4063307) 
DATED this J?i-/ -""day of \ ^
 L, ,- , 1988."" 
- - ^ v \ - \ <----- A,. V ,..V J. , 
KEITH vELLERTSON ^^^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this XH day of 
June, 1988. 
A U / A NOTARY PUBLIC T~^ 





BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point'which is North 
0°02,25" East 1055.977 feet and East 636.74B feet from the Northwest Corner 
of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thence South 59°57,25" East 522.115 feet along said street to a 
point on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve 
for an arc distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37°22M6" East 
251.322 feet); thence continuing along said street South 12°5?"35" East 
2D4.761 feet; thence North 72°05l59" East 108.000 feet; thence South 
18p09f27" East 270.000 feet; thence North 77°02,25n East 263.450 feet to the 
Westerly line of the D ic RGW Rai lroad right-of-way; thence North 0B°03,2111 
West 859.00 feet along said right-of-way; thence South 81°56,39n West 30.000 
feet; thence North 44°20,00M West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 
80.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears North 22o40,00ft West 59.073 feet); 
tnence North O^OO'OO" West 281.994 feet; thence South 89°01'27n West 
686.790 feet; thence South 0°28f46?f East 41.171 feet; thence North S g ^ O ^ " 
West 11.724 feet to the proposed center line extended of Allen Street; thence 
South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with a 515.935 foot radius curve 
tc the right; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 270.506 feet; 
thence South 30o02,25*f West 25.000 feet to the point of beginning. 
Suoiect to an Easement for joint use of Darking and driveways located ont 
over and across tne following descrioed property: 
Beginning at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which is 
North 19E.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence North 77°02'25n East 100.00 feet; thence North l T ^ ' D l " West 
142.511 feet; thence South 72°05,59f* West 100.225 feet; thence South 
i8c09' 2?ft East 135.000 feet to the point
 0f beginning. 
Which easemer; is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property 
anc for the use of that property imDeciately abutting to the West. 
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE 
The u n d e r s i g n e d hereby c e r t i f i e s t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p i e s of t h e 
f o r e g o i n g Br ie f of A p p e l l a n t were s e r v e d by f i r s t c l a s s mail, 
p o s t a g e p r e p a i d t h i s /ft7 day of ff/d/l/^r 1989, upon 
t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
J e f f r e y R. Or i t t , Esqu ire 
Robert S. Howell , Esqu ire 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
Two F i f t y Seven Towers, S u i t e 850 
257 Eas t 200 South - 2 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , UT 84111-2048 
Mark T. Davenport , E s q u i r e 
Doug K. B u t l e r , E s q u i r e 
FIGARI & DAVENPORT 
4800 F i r s t Republ i c Bank Plaza 
901 Main S t r e e t 
Da l la s , TX 75202 
By: 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John y/ Ashton, E s q u i r e 
Brian^/S. King, E s q u i r e 
City Centre 1, S u i t e 900 
175 E, 400 South 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , UT 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
By: *9S6& 
Johjn[J^i Kincaid, Jr.£/E$cjui#e 
John R. O'Keefe, J r . , E s q u i r e 
Two Gateway Center , 19th Floor 
P i t t s b u r g h , PA 15222 
(412) 281-2120 
CO-COUNSEL FOR FIRST FEDERAL OF 
PITTSBURGH (FORMERLY FIRST FEDERAL 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, SUCCESSOR 
BY MERGER TO TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, "TFSL") 
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